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This dissertation focused on citizen advocacy groups 
as an intervention strategy for affecting change in the 
policy process. The analysis is of a specific intervention 
in school desegregation policy by a citizen advocacy group. 
The purpose of this research was to identify the conditions 
2 
under which a citizen advocacy group can intervene; the 
constraints to a successful intervention; and the attri-
butes of a successful interven"tion. 
The case study was of the community Coalition for 
School Integration, a citizen advocacy group which existed 
in Portland, Oregon betw,sen 1977 and 1980. A multi-method 
approach was used. It involved fif~y interviews with mem-
bers of the Coalition, school administration, school board 
and the media. In addition, historical and document ana1y-
sis of secondary data and extensive literature review was 
done." The theoretical framework guiding this research was 
Iannaccone's dissatisfaction theory of governance, 
DIS/ID/STO/OS. DIS is evidence of community changed dis sat-
isfaction reflected in voting behavior leading next to 
incumbent school board member defeat (ID) followed within 
two years by involuntary superintendent turnover (STO) 
and outside succession (OS). Rothman's (1968) models of 
community organization practice were used to analyze the 
intervention of the Coalition. 
The findings do confirm the DIS/ID/STO/OS theory of 
governance, but also suggest that community intervention is 
an intervening variable between the stage of dissatisfaction 
and incumbent defeat. The analysis of the intervention 
identifies six conditions necessary for community interven-
tion: timeliness of the issue, financial resources, 1eader-
ship, organizational support, staff, and media coverage. 
.~ 
The major constraints were the lack of trust between the 
policy-making body and the citizen advocacy groups, and 
the political environment of the community. Attributes of 
successful intervention were: focused ad¥ocacy, multiple 
intervention strategies, and permanency of the organiza-
tion. The impact of the citizen advocacy group's inter-
vention is discussed, as are recommendations for future 
research. 
3 
: L 
., . , 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This dissertation describes the process of policy 
intervention by a citizen advocacy group. The cooperation 
of the Community Coalition for School Integration made this 
study possible. I wish to thank the members of the Coali-
tion who shared their experiences with me. Also, my 
appreciation to school board members; school district staff, 
and members of the media who were interviewed. 
I appreciate the support of my dissertation committee 
over this past year and Dan Davis for the fellowship assis-
tance during the proposal and data collection stage of the 
dissertation. 
Finally, this dissertation was made possible through 
the strong support of my friends and family, especially 
my father who encouraged me to pursue doctoral studies. 
",' 
.' 
. , 
,., , 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS •••••••••••••• fa •••••••••••••••••••••••• iii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............ , ......................... . vii 
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1 
CHAPTER 
I 
II 
III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Citizen Participation in Education 
Education Professionals, School 
Boards and School Policy •••••.•••.••••• 
Federal Government, the Courts 
3 
3 
8 
and School Desegregation •••••.••••••••• 11 
The Policy Process •••••••••••••••.••••••• 17 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGy •.••••••••••• 27 
Methodology .............................. 28 
Method of Gathering Data ••••••••••••••••• 31 
Ana.lysis ................................. 34 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
POLICY, PORTLAND, OREGON •••••••••••••••••••• 38 
"De Facto Segregation": 1954-1965 •••••••• 38 
community Response to Desegregation 
Plan: 1965-1970 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 42 
Desegregation Plan #2: "Schools 
for the Seventies" ••••••••••••••••••••• 48 
v 
CHAPTER PAGE 
Implementation of Schools for the 
Seventies Plan:' 1970-1977 .•••••••••••. 52 
Analysis of ~esegregation Policy--
Portland Style: 1962-1977 ••.••••.••.•• 60 
IV COMMUNITY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 
DESEGREGATION POLICy....................... 64 
Communi ty Reaction •.•••.....•••.••.••.•• 65 
Factors Contributing to Co!:iItlunity 
Dissatisfaction •••••••.•.••••••..••.•. 73 
V ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY INTERVENTION ••.••••. 80 
VI 
VII 
Chronology of Coalition Activities .••••. 88 
Description of Coalition Membership •..•. 94 
Factors Shaping Community Organi.zation 
Interventi0n (Rothman; 1968) •••••••••• 100 
IMPACT OF THE POLICY INTERVENTION .•.•.•.••. 137 
Initial Impact of Coalition Report .•.••. 139 
Long-Term Impact ••••••..•••••.. 0 0 • • • • • • • 151 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ••.••.••.•.••...•.• 
Dissatisfaction Theory of Governance 
Theoretical Implications for Policy 
Intervention By Citizen Advocacy 
165 
165 
Groups •.•.••.••.•••.••.•.••••.•.•.•••• 177 
Areas for Future Research ••••••••••.•••• 182 
SOURCES CONSULTED .••••...•.•.••••...•••.•.•.••.••.••• 186 
APPENDICES ••••••••••••.•.•.•••••••.•••.•.•••••••.•••• 197 
A.. Interview Guide •••.••.••••••.•••..•.••. »... 197 
B. Informed Consent Release •••••..••••.••.•••• 200 
C. Key Interview Questions •••••.....•••••••••• 201 
APPENDICES 
D. 
E. 
,._1 
.. 1 
'j 
Chronology of Coalition Activities: 
1977-1979 .............................. . 
"What is the Coalition?" June, 1978 •••••• 
vi 
PAGE 
202 
203 
.,; LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Changes in existing policy.................... 18 
2. Models of community organization practice: 
definitions and examples ....••.•.•.•••...•.•.. 25 
3. Theory of dissatisfaction with social action/ 
socia~ re~orm models of community 
organ~zatl.on II 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 26 
4. Portland public schools boundaries map -
elementary and high schools ...••.•.•••.•.•.... 81 
5. Comparison of the community coalition with 
two models of community organization 
practice (Rothman, 1968) •••..•.•••..•..•.•.•.. 102 
6. Policy impact of Coalition •.•.•........•...... 152 
, . ~ . , . , 
~ . ~ 
. ! 
INTRODUCTION 
" 
The purpose of this study is to analyze a specific 
intervention in school desegregation policy by a citizen 
advocacy group. Social science research has investigated 
citizen participation, the public policy process and school 
desegregation as separate phenomena in a democratic politi-
cal system. Citizen participation has been a focus of 
research in the fields of community organization (Alinsky, 
1971; Rothman, 1968), political science (Donovan, 1973; 
Moynihan, 1969), planning (Arnstein, 1969; Hallman, 1968), 
education (Davies, 1974; Iannaccone and Lutz, 1978; Gitt6ll, 
1979), and the politics of school desegregation in politi-
cal science (Crain, 1968; Levy, 1971; Kirby et al., 
1973). 
While these elements have been identified as signif-
icant to an understanding of the democratic policy process, 
they have not been dealt with in an integrated fashion. 
The study of th~ public policy process requires an inter-
disciplinary approach to understand how policies are 
initiated, enacted, implemented, and evaluated (Dror, 1971; 
Dye, 1978; MacRae, 1976; Wildavsky, 1979). A synthesis 
of these critical elements as applied to an actual contem-
porary issue should provide a more complete understanding 
of the policy process, intervention, and change. Specifically, 
· ) 
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it will identify the conditions under which a citizen 
advocacy group can intervene to affect a change in policy; 
the constraints to a successful intervention; and the attri-
butes of a successful intervention. 
This study begins with a review of these various 
fields of study: citizen participation, school desegregatio~ 
and the policy process. Chapter II describes the research 
design and methodology. Chapter III provides the historical 
analysis of school desegregation policy in Portland, Oregon 
from 1962 to 1977. Chapter IV analyzes the development of 
conununity dissatisfaction with the school desegregation 
Folicy. Chapter V contains an analysis of the citizen 
advocacy group and its intervention strategies, developed 
through the application of Rothman's (1968) models of 
conununity organization practice. Chapter VI assesses the 
impact of the intervention on the policy. Chapter VII 
concludes with a discussion of the findings and their 
implications for developing a theory of educational policy 
intervention by advocacy groups. 
'::, 
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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Citizen Participation 
in Education 
Citizen participation in federal programs became a 
major factor with the passage of the Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964 which mandates the "maximum feasible participa-
tion"of the poor in planning and administering the various 
programs which comprised the community action component of 
the federal anti-poverty effort. One of the foundations 
of America's democratic society is that citizens have a 
right to participate in the political, economic, and social 
life of that society. Part of the historical struggles in 
political participation in the United states has been that 
of women and blacks to gain the right to vote. The signif-
icance of the Economic Opportunity Act was that it targeted 
a specific population for inclusion in the policy process 
(Donovan, 1973). The Economic Opportunity Act stated that 
"community action programs should be developed, conducted, 
and administered with the maximum feasible participation 
of residents of the areas and group to be served" (U.S., 
Congress, Economic Opportunity Act i Pub. L. 88-452, 88th 
Cong., 2d sess u , 1964). 
The federal mandate of citizen participation was a 
, ; 
, 
", 
.. :" 
.',,-
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result of several historical forces at work in the United 
States during the 1950s and 1960s: the Civil Rights movement 
with its focus on voting rights for blacks in the South 
(Carmichael and Hamilton,' 1968); the discovery of the 
economic and social p~oblems of big city ghettos by private 
foundations (Spiegel, 1969); the federal government's exper-
ience with poor communities in its urban renewal programs 
(Bellush and Hausknecht, 1967); and the implementation of 
new social work practices directed at organizing and mobil-
izing the poor (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Marris and Rein, 
1967; ,Moynihan, 1969). All of these forces influenced the 
federal government in its decision to involve the poor in 
the War on Poverty. 
Citizen participation in education began with the 
feder-al programs of Head Start, Follow Through and Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which man-
dated citizen involvement through the establishment of 
citizen advisory committees and the employment of local 
residents (Fantini, 1970). Since then, institutionalized 
citizen participation in federally supported education 
programs has grown to one million citizens who are members 
of local school councils and advisory committees in the 
United States (Davies, 1978). 
In the years since the passage of the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, citizen participation has expanded in a series 
of federal government programs, such as Model Cities and 
>-:: 
; . ~ ; 
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1"'\ 
community Block Development Grants. Participation has 
grown beyond the poor and minority communities to include 
all citizens. 
One of the persistent difficulties since the call for 
"maximum feasible participation" 'Has a clear definition of 
citizen participa.,~.ion (Donovan, 1973; Moynihan, 1969). In 
order to clarify some of the issues involved in citizen 
participation, Sherry Arnstein (1969) developed a typology 
of citizen participation in the "form of a ladder, each 
rung corresponding to a degree of citizen's power in deter-
mining plans or programs" (Davies, 1974, p. 12). Partici-
pation ranges on a continuum from the lowest rungs which 
represent token or superficial participation to the highest 
rungs where there is substantial citizen control through 
a transfer of decision-making power (Arnstein, 1969). 
The question of how citizens should participate or 
to what degree should they decide policy, has been sharply 
debated among advocates of citizen participation. Most 
citizens participate in federal programs at the lowest 
rungs of the ladder in an "informing" and "consultation" 
capacity--meaning that they may be heard and their advice 
considered, but they lack the power to ensure that their 
views will be heeded (Arnstein, 1969). Although support 
5 
for substantial citizen control exists, there is no evidence 
that a significant transfer of decision-making power has 
occurred. Arnstein (1969) notes that "community action 
, . ~ 
"', . , 
; " 
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programs are characterized by empty ritual of participation 
with no redistributic;h of power occurring to the poor" 
(p. 216). 
Researchers evaluating citizen participation in edu-
cation found little or no impact on redistribution of 
decision-making power. One report concluded: 
A genuine commitment to community participation 
requires extensive attention to structures at the 
individual school and district level which encour-
age and support direct community roles in the 
selection and review of personnel, the determina-
tion of priorities in the allocation of resources, 
and the development of educational options. 
(Gittell, 1979, p. 49) 
Don Davies, the di~ector of a three-year study of community 
organizations for the National Institute of Education, said 
that "despite new organizations and impressive statistics, 
little power has been transferred to parents and citizens" 
(1978, p. 12). 
Supporters of the "in::ormation and consultation" role 
for citizens in education point to the number of citizens 
6 
active on committees and as school volunteers. Parents work 
in Parent-Teacher Associations (PTA) and volunteer in their 
children'S classes. Citizens vote in school board elec-
tions and on school tax levies. Some citizens serve on 
the school board, which can be an elected or appointive 
position. At present, there are 100,000 school board mem-
bers in the United States (Salisbury, 1980). 
The issue of the nature of the impact of citizen 
participation on federal programs and local school policies 
is unresolved. Advocates of substantial citizen contI:ol 
although recognizing that redistribution of power has not 
occurred, still push for more meaningful citizen participa-
tion in the policy process. Others argue that citizens are 
,) already active on citize;,n advisory committees, but they 
····i 
., lack evidence as to the significance of that involvement 
(Gittell, 1979). While the debate over the nature and 
purpose of citizen participation continues, federally man-
dated citizen participation remains. 
Two new forms of citizen participation that have 
appeared since 1970 are "child advocacy groups such as New 
Yorkis Advocates for Children and the Massachusetts Advo-
cacy Center, and grassroots neighborhood associations such 
as the South Central Planning Council in Los Angeles" 
(Davies, 1978, p. 12). These new advocacy groups are 
determined to change or modify school practices and policy 
in order to improve educational opportunity and school 
performance by intervention in the decision-making process 
(Davies, 1978; Gittell, 1979; Grant, 1979). 
Although the nunIDers of citizens participating in 
school issues has grown in the past decade, so has the 
influence of other participants in the educational policy 
7 
process. The power of education professiqnals has increased, 
the role of the school board has change~ and federal govern-
ment programs and court decisions have impacted school 
.,.~ policy. 
, 
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Education Professionals, School Boards 
and School Policy 
8 
The public policy process at the local school district 
involves a series of participants: the school board, school 
administration and teachers, and various publics. School 
boards have the legal authority to establish educational 
policy for local school districts (Zeigler and Jennings, 
1974). Education professionals operate the schools--admin-
istrators, teachers, aides, counselors,~d support staff. 
At the beginning of the public school movement in the 
United States, lay committees of citizens established the 
curriculum, hired the teachers, and raised the money to 
operate the schools (Katz, 1975). During the period 1850-
1890 schools moved away from local community control to an 
increasing pattern of centralization. As one educational 
historian commented: 
Thus, the growth of stronger central school boards 
and appointment of superintendents meant the decline 
of Jeffersonian "small unit" democracy and the rise 
of a meritocracy of city-wide policy-makers and of 
highly paid city school administrators. (Cronin, 
1973, p. 59) 
Since the turn of the century, the role of the education 
professional has continued to expand. There are several 
indicators of this shift in power from school boards to the 
education professionals. First, teachers have organized 
and through collective bargaining now influence many aspects 
of educational policy (Davies, 1978~ Fantini, 1970~ Gittell 
9 
et al., 1979). Second, school superintendents also have a 
strong influence on educational policy. In theory, the 
; school board establishes policy, but in practice, education 
, '\ 
,i professsionals control policy "because institutional and 
behavioral norms of school governance promote the authority 
of professionals" (Tucker and Zeigler, 1978, p. 19). The 
education professionals are the professional managers who 
implement the policy decisions and the school board is the 
"citizen legislative body with representative functions" 
(Tucke~ and Zeigler, 1978, p. 19). 
'Third, the school board is composed of lay volunteers, 
who may be elected or appointed. For most, board mernber-
ship is a part-time job. Most school boards do not have 
their own staff and thus depend on the administration. Two-
thirds of the school boards delegate the agenda-setting 
function to the administration. Tucker and Zeigler's study 
(1978) of school boards found that administrative recornrnen-
dations were adopted in ninety-nine percent of the decisions 
made by formal vote and that nearly eight-five percent of 
board votes were unanimous (p. 20). However, lcc~l school 
boards continue to exercise control over most routine and 
episodic decisions, such as personnel matters (e.g., teacher 
contracts) and economic concerns (e.g., bond issues, school 
budgets and buildings) (Iannaccone and Cistone, 1974). 
As discussed in the section on citizen participation, 
federally mandated programs desire to redistribute decision-
", 
. , 
" 
making power to citizens. The next question is: do citi-
zens influence the school board through voting behavior? 
The answer is that very few citizens vote in school board 
elections. In a recent study of school boards, it was 
found that school elections have a low voter turnout with 
only fifteen to thirty percent of those eligible voting 
(Tucker and Zeigler, 1978). Those that do vcte are indi-
viduals with greater than average wealth, education ~nd 
social and occupational status. Also, in many states 
school board elections are held independent of state pri-
mary and general elections. 
Tucker and Zeigler (1978) conclude that although 
citizens elect the board and have at least the potential 
for influence, in reality the citizens enter the process 
after the issue has been defined. 
The public does not exercise influence over school 
district officials and rarely achieve policy goals 
as a direct result of their participation. The 
reform goal of insulating school district governance 
from mass citizen participation and influence has 
been well met. (p. 23) 
10 
In summary, education professional exercise the most influ'-
ence over educational policy, followed by the school board 
which continues to exercise influence over routine and 
'episodic decisions. Citizens, according to Tucker and 
Zeigler (1978) exercise the least amount of influence • 
':; 
i 
~ 
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Federal Government, the Courts 
and School Desegregation 
The federal mandate of citizen participation created 
citizen involvement in a variety of education programs. 
11 
Although federal education programs "provide on the average 
less than eight percent of the cost of running local 
schools" (Davies, 1978, p. 12), they shape policies through 
federal requirements regarding desegregation, the handi-
capped and sex equity which have impact on entire school 
districts. On the issue of school desegregation the federal 
courts and government also have given new legitimacy to 
citizen participation. 
Citizen groups in desegregating cities have partic-
ipated in developing desegregation plans, mobilized 
public support, participated in carrying out the 
plan, monitored and reported on compliance, per-
formed child advocacy and protection services, and 
have been involved in educational improvement. 
(Davies, 1978, p. 12) 
Background on School Desegregation 
At the judicial level, the Supreme Court's landmark 
decision in the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education ruling 
declared that separate educational facilities based on race 
are inherently unequal. 
To separate them [black children] from others of 
similar age and qualification solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community 
(347 u.S. 483) 
Early targets for desegregation were Southern districts 
which ran dual systems for blacks and whites. The South's 
schools were de jure segregation, segregation which exists 
as a result of some type of government action. Usually it 
12 
j was a result of school board policies and practices. As 
.... .:; 
the courts looked at northern school districts, cases were 
brought against school systems characterized by de facto 
segregation, segregation which existed in fact, but was not 
traceable to or resulting from direct government action. 
More recently, the courts have become concerned about 
racially isolated schools and school districts. Racial 
isolation refers to schools or districts where a majority 
of one racial minority predominates, even if this racial 
imbalance results from residential patterns combined with 
neighborhood schools. Many state and federal courtz. c;;»:e 
ruling against racial imbalance so that no school in a 
system may depart substantially from the district-wide 
racial proportions (Pascal, 1977). 
However, some large cities face district-wide segre-
gation since greater than eighty percent of their school 
population are minority students. The Supreme Court has 
been unwilling to "mandate a school desegregation plan that 
crosses the political or legal boundaries of a school dis-
trict" (Rossell, 1978, p. 134). This decision has set 
limits on large urban school district's options for deseg-
regation. 
.. ': 
In the absence of a national plan to desegregate 
all school districts, individuals can choose to 
comply or evade the local desegregation plan simply 
by moving outside the boundaries of the school 
system or enrolling in a private school. 
(Rossell, 1978, p. 134) 
13 
In addition to the courts, Congress passed legislation 
(Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) which authorized 
federal assistance to school boards, school districts, and 
other governmental units legally responsible for the oper-
ation of pubic schools, to aid those bodies in their deseg-
regation efforts. The then Department of Healb~, Education 
and Welfare (now the Department of Education) had the 
primary responsibility for ensuring equal educational oppor-
tuni ty for all students in public school~,. 
The federal government's principal tool to enforce 
desegregation of elementary and secondary schools 
is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.* The 
Office of Civil Rights is responsible for monitor-
ing federally-funded public elementary and secondary 
school districts, eliminating all vestiges of unlaw-
ful discrimination, and ensuring equal educational 
opportunity. (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
1979, p. 14) 
The Office of Civil Rights monitors the progress of deseg-
regation in both court-ordered and board-ordered school 
desegregation plans. 
Various options are available to communities on ways 
*Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national 
origin by recipients of Federal funds. If a Federal agency 
should find illegal discrimination as a result of a hearing, 
it is authorized to terminate or refuse funding or use other 
legal means to ensure compliance with the provision of Title 
VI. (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1979, p. 8) 
'. , 
, ! 
to implement desegregation, whether to remedy de jure or 
de facto segregation. Desegregation may be implemented as 
a result of a court order or a board decision. The deseg-
regation plan m~y be either a voluntary or mandatory plan. 
Christine Rossell (1978) in a recent article on school 
desegregation defines the various terms. 
Terms such as mandatory and voluntary desegregation 
are often confused with court-ordered and board-
ordered desegregation. The terms mandatory and 
voluntary refer to the degree of parental choice, 
whereas the terms court-ordered and board-ordered 
refer to the source of the order to desegregate. 
Court-ordered plans can be either mandatory (as 
in Boston and Pasadena) or voluntary (as in Mil-
waukie, Houston and San Diego). In the latter 
plans, the oourts have ruled that the school dis-
tricts have fulfilled their constitutional obliga-
tions by implementing a voluntary busing plan, 
although such plans rarely result in more than a 
ten point reduction in segregation. Board~ordered 
plans can also be mandatory (as in Berkeley and 
Seattle) or voluntary. The latter are typically 
called minority to majority transfer programs. 
(Rossell, 1978, p. 160). 
Patterns in Northern School Desegregation 
14 
In a survey of ninety-one northern cities experiencing 
school desegregation between 1963 and 1969, Kirby, Harris, 
Crain, and Rossell (1973) found the first demand for school 
desegregation was made in 1963-64 by local chapters of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) concerning "perceived inequities in the entire school 
system" (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 23). The group that made 
the demand wanted more than procedural or symbolic actions 
15 
on the part of the school system. They demanded that "white 
students and teachers participate in improved education for 
Negroes" (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 23). 
Seventy-five percent of the ninety-one cities sur-
veyed responded that their school systems did nothing or 
took only symbolic or procedural actions in response to 
civil rights groups' demands (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 35). 
An example of a symbolic-procedural action was usually the 
appointment of a committee to study the problem. Fifty-
five percent of the ninety-one cities surveyed had school 
boards that decided to appoint a committee to study the 
- problem (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 39). 
The responses • • • suggest that school systems 
felt the problems were not of their own making, 
nor were the solutions their responsibility. 
School systems were not initiators or leaders in 
the school desegregation process. They had to 
be prodded. (Kirby et al., 1973, p. 37.) 
Kirby attributes part of the lack of response to school 
districts' long tradition of assimilation, meaning that 
schools help to socialize or integrate immigrants into 
American society. The belief in assimilation is buttressed 
in the practice by a "color-blind" policy of treating all 
students equally. As a result of these beliefs, most 
northern school districts did not believe that theirs was 
a segregated school system, They responded to the demands 
of civil rights groups by saying that "their school was 
indeed desegregated. By this the school system meant that 
16 
it was not supporting segregation or unequal education" 
(1973, p. 67). 
Although pressure from civil rights groups, other 
,\~ minority organizations and white liberals produced some 
, .~ ... 
symbolic-procedural action, Kirby et ale (1973) found that 
such pressure was less likely to bring about a 
busing program or the establishment of racial quotas 
--actions which are more administrative in nature. 
Integration actions require an ideological and 
philosophical commitment on the part of school sys-
tem officials which, although not impervious to 
controversy and pressure, are not as vulnerable to 
it. (p. 50) 
They conclude by identifying several factors ascri tical 
in those school districts where actual desegregation was 
implemented by the school system. They were: leadership 
of the superintendent, an involved mayor playing a "liberal" 
role, and the support of civic leaders. In contrast, the 
total amount of civil rights activity and white citizen 
opposition had very little impact on school desegregation 
decisions (1973, pp. 14-15). They concluded that very lit-
tle desegregation actually occurred from the many programs 
initiated from 1966-68 and that most desegregation in 
northern big cities has happened since 1968. 
This concludes a brief review of the desegregation 
environment. As indicated earlier, however, there is a 
larger context within which change occurs and can be 
analyzed. It is to this policy process that we now turn. 
::., 
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The Policy Process 
The policy process concerns how decisions are made 
in a political system. Jones (1970) states that the policy 
process "suggests a highly relative'and pluralistic decision-
making system characterized by compromise, incrementalism, 
and continual adjustment" (p. 9). Lindblom (1968) views 
the policy process as an "extremely complex analytical and 
political process to which there is no beginning or end" 
(p. 4). Anderson (1975) defines policy process as "a pur-
posive course of action followed by an actor or set of 
actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern" 
(p. 3). For Dye (1978) public policy is the "description 
and explanation of the causes and consequences of govern-
ment activity" {p. 5). He adds, 
This involves a description of the content of public 
policy; an assessment of the impact of enviJ:'onmental 
forces on the content. of public policy; an analysis 
of the effect of various institutional arrangements 
and political processes on public policy; an inquiry 
into the consequences of various public policies 
for the political system; and an evaluation of the 
impact of public policies on society, in terms of 
both expected and unexpected consequences. (p. 5) 
The key elements in these definitions of the policy 
process are action and change. One model, Jones I (1970), 
demonstrates how changes occur in existing policy, as well 
as how policy develops. The first stage in the policy 
process is identification of the problem to government. 
The second stage is the formulation of the policy to address 
the problem by government. The third stage is the adoption 
I;., rrsar ~ 18 
rili or legitimation, of the policy by government. The fourth 
~.~:'i~~ nl stage is application, in which the govern.ment acts to 
i:'::~ 
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impleme.nt a program. Then the fifth stage is evaluation 
where someone or some group recommends changes of adjust-
ments in the policy, which sets the stage for the process 
to modify itself, or to begin again. This process is not 
static nor linear, but is an evolving, fluid process. The 
dynamic of this model presented by Jones (Figure 1) indi-
cates that after the evaluation stage, other issues may 
arise which cause the policy to be reformulated and for the 
process to repeat itself. Wildavsky (1979) describes the 
policy process as not so much problem solving, but problem 
succession. As Dye (1978) pointed out in his definition 
of the policy process, unexpected consequences of policies 
produce a demand for a new or revised policies in response 
to recently identified needs. 
Id~ntification 
I 
Formulation 
. r. . Leg~t~mat~on 
1 .1 . . App ~cat~on----------__ Evaluat~on 
(First cycle) 
I 
Reformulation 
I 
Legitimation 
(Second and 
subsequent 
cycles) 
Figure 1. Changes in. existing policy (Jones, 1970, 
p. 123. 
Although models provide a framework for policy analysis, 
[ 
, 
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policy is initiated, implemented, and evaluated in a politi-
cal system. Policy impacts people, resources, and values. 
The policy process blends politics and planning. Planning 
implies a rational decision-making model. The rational 
decision-making model assumes that policy-makers have suf-
ficient information. 
This rationality assumes that the value preferences 
of a society as a whole can be known and weighted. 
It is not enough to know and weigh the values of 
some groups and not others. There must be a complete 
understanding of societal values. Rational policy-
making also requires information about alternative 
policies, the predictive capacity to foresee accu-
rately the consequences of alternate policies, and 
intelligence to calculate correctly the ratio of 
costs to benefits. Finally, rational policy making 
requires a decision-making system that facilitates 
rationality in policy formation. (Dye, 1978, p. 28) 
Policy making i.n a political environment must consider 
group interests, and political values, as well as financial 
resources, environmental factors, and structural constraints. 
One of the critics of the rational decision-making model, 
Charles Lindblom (1959), argues that the political system 
in the United States does not permit the rational model. 
He developed a different model to explain the policy process, 
the incremental model. 
"Incrementalism views public policy as a continuation 
of past government activities with only incremental modifi-
cations" (Dye, 1978, p. 32). Policy makers accept current 
programs and agree to continue previous policies, for several 
reasons: (1) they lack the time and resources to pursue all 
alternative policies; (2) they accept present policies 
",l 
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because the impact of new programs is unpredictable; 
(3) previous investment in buildings or organizational 
structure is difficult to abandon; and (4) it is politi-
cally expedient. Small changes mean less conflict in the 
organization and more stability. 
No one model explains all aspects of the policy pro-
cess. The policy process, according to Wildavsky (1979), 
ideally should be a hybrid of "2/3 politics and 1/3 plan-
ning" (p. 125). He would combine the rational ~nd incre-
mental models for purposes of explaining the process. The 
Jones .(1970) model incorporates the dynamic, changing 
aspects of the policy process. Critical factors in that 
process are: key actors, group interests, environmental 
facto;:s, institutional system, economic resources, and 
socif!3tal values. Each factor plays a part in the policy 
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process. The key actors are those people who are respon-
sible for the policy, as well as those people who May oppose 
or seek to change the policy. Groups are affected by policy 
decisions. The previous sections identified the following 
groups active in education policy at the local level: PTAs, 
Citizen Advisory Committees, grass-roots neighborhood 
groups, public interest groups, and advocacy organizations. 
Additional grou~s are business groups, taxpayers, and reli-
gious organizations. (Lutz and Iannaccone, 1969) Environ-
mental factors include social, economic, and cultural 
issues which ha'\Te the potential to affect the policy process. 
For example, economic fluctuations affect all policy deci-
sions, but frequently policy makers have little control 
OV~L these fluctuations. The institutional system is the 
organizational structure in which policy is made. An 
example from education 1emonstrates the interrelationships 
among governmental units. Local school districts have 
local autonomy and authority. However, they are connected 
to state and federal levels of government through joint 
administration of programs and federal guidelines over 
certain programs. 
'Economic resource refers to an important constraint 
on all policy-making. The allocation of resources 
lim5-+:s program development and implementation. Policies 
can be established but programs never implemented, if the 
financial resources are reduced. Finally, societal values 
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can serve as a constraint or motivating force on the policy 
process. Values such as freedom and equality differ in 
meaning to the public. People's attitudes towards these 
values lead to support of or opposition to a policy. Regard-
ing school desegregation, some citizens have opposed deseg-
regation programs on the basis of freedom of choice, while 
others have supported them on the basis of equality. 
The Intervention Syr.thesis 
The focus of this study is on intervention in the 
policy process. Anderson's definition of the policy process 
(1975) as "purposive course of action followed by an actor 
or set of actors in dealing with a proble>': or matter of 
concern." Intervention is a "purposive attempt to create 
a situation of change" (Wiseman, 1979, p. 4). Much of 
policy analysis has focused on intervention strategies 
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internal to organizations, i.e., organizational development. 
(Argyris, 1970; Chin and Benne, 1972). Littie research has 
focused on understanding the dymamics of policy interven-
tion, from beginning to end. Wiseman (1979) calls for the 
study of standpoints and activities of those persons 
who do view society normatively, both the people 
involved in making social policy and those whose 
lives are touched in one form or another by policy 
int.erventions--with the clear goal of developing 
a theory of policy intervention. (p. 4) 
The type of policy intervention to be examined in this 
study is intervention by a citizen advocacy group, seeking 
to change a desegregation policy of the local school dis-
trict. There are various strategies available to a citizen's 
group seeking a change in policy. Iannaccone's theory of 
dissatisfaction and Rothman's models of community organiza-
tion practice will provide the theoretical and analytical 
framework to examine the intervention of the citizen's 
advocacy group. 
The dissatisfaction theory of governance (Iannaccone, 
1978) describes how voting behavior can change policy. 
Citizen dissatisfaction with educational policy has the 
"capacity to redirect local school government through changes 
in participating groups" (p. 131). 
Dissatisfaction (due to either the exhaustion of 
citizen satisfaction with a previous policy man-
date or changes in citizen expectations and demands 
for education programs) leads to traumatic polit-
ical change and the subsequent adaptation of the 
school organization. (Iannaccone, 1978, p. 130) 
Dissatisfaction theory's premise is that a gap grows 
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between the two dimensions of society, the governmental and 
the societal. The political system, over time, becomes 
closed to citizen demands. The governmental dimension 
moves towards "increased stability, perpetuation of the 
elite, and continuance of the same political ideology and 
related program values in schools" (Iannaccone, 1978, 
p. 130). At the same time, the community undergoes changes 
due to "demographic mobility, generational transitions, 
and educationally altered expectations" (Iannaccone, 1978, 
p. 130). Citizen dissatisfaction grows until public opposi-
tion forms which leads citizens to vote out the incumbents. 
In summary, DIS/ID/STO/OS, the dissatisfaction theory, seeks 
to explain the political change and adaptation of the school 
organization due to citizen dissatisfaction. DIS is evi-
dence of community changed dissatisfaction reflect~'d in 
voting behavior leading next to incumbent school member 
defeat (ID) followed within two years by involuntary super-
intendent turnover (STO) and outside succession (OS). 
The weakness of this theory rests in thE assumption 
that a change in school board members will result in a 
policy redirection. School board elections are not part i-
san; many factors contribute to incumbent defeat. Analysis 
. . , 
~ 
shows that very few voters participate in school board 
elections. This lack of participation raises questions as 
to the effectiveness of the vote and the political system 
in changing policies in local school districts. 
Intervention Strategy 
Rothman's mod~ls of community organization practice 
suggest more direct intervention strategies for citizens 
concerned about policy change. This comparative framework 
provides a basis for analysis of intervention by co~nunity 
organizations. Rothman provides four different models 
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describing the practice of community organization (Figure 2). 
A combination of the theory of dissatisfaction with 
a comparison of the social action and social reform modes 
of intervention provides the theoretical and analytical 
framework for this study. Figure 2 illustrates the com-
posite framework to guide the analysis of the intervention 
strategies used by a citizen's advocacy group to change 
the desegregation policy of the Portland, Oregon school 
district. 
ORGANIZATION/ 
Individual 
Examples 
Peace Corps, 
Vista 
METRO 
(regional planning 
body) 
Alinsky 
League of 
Women Voters 
25 
1. Locality" Development which "presup-
poses that community change may be 
pursued optimally through broad par-
ticipation of a wide spectrum of 
people at the local community level." 
2. Social Planning where "rational, 
deliberatively planned, and controlled 
change has a central place in problem-
solving." 
3. Social Action "presupposes a disad-
vantaged population that needs to be 
organized, perhaps in alliance with 
others, in order to make adequate 
demands on the larger community for 
increased resources or treatment more 
in accordance with social justice or 
democracy. II 
4. Social Reform involves activity by a 
"group or coalition of interests 
which acts vigorously on behalf of 
some community segment which is at 
risk or disadvantaged." 
Figure 2. Models of community organization prac-
tice: definitions and examples (Rothman, 1968 in 
Zaltman, 1972, pp. 474-75, 488). 
Initial Decision bY1Legitimate 
TIME t . 
Authority 
OrganiZe~ral Elite and Clos~tem 
External Fac,s ________ Time 
DISSATISFACTION , 
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Voting Social action/social 
reform models 
Figure 3. Theory of dissatisfaction with social 
action/social reform models of community organ i-
zation.* 
*Laurence Iannaccone, "The Dissatisfaction Theory of Gov-
ernance: Implications for Practice and Research," in 
Pu£lic Participation in Local School Dist.ricts: The 
Dissatisfaction Theory of Governance, eds. Laurence 
Iannaccone and Frank W. Lutz (Lexington, Mass.: Lex~ 
ington Books, 1978). 
Jack Rothman, "Three Models of Community Organization 
Practice," in Creating Social Change, eds. Gerald 
Zaltman, Philip Kotler, and Ira Kaufman (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972). 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Iannaccone's dissatisfaction theory of governance and 
Rothman's models of community organization practice provide 
the theoretical framework to analyze the developmental pro-
cess of citizen dissatisfaction and the policy intervention 
by the Community Coalition for School Integration in Port-
landi Oregon. 
The purpose of this study is to test the adequacy of 
the Iannaccone and Rothman framework as an explanation of 
community intervention in the policy process. The findings 
also may contribute towards a theory of policy intervention. 
This study searches for an explanation of the citizen 
advocacy group's intervention in the Portland, Oregon school 
district's policy-making process regarding desegregation 
policies.· The case study focuses on the developmental 
process of citizen dissatisfaction with the school deseg-
regation policy. The dissatisfied citizens formed the 
Community Coalition for School Integration (CCSI), hereafter 
referred to as the Coalition, which then studied and made 
recommendations for changes in the district's desegregation 
policy. 
The problem statement of this study is: 
How do citizens intervene in the policy 
process to address perceived inequities? 
The questions that guide this research in addressing the 
problem statement follow: 
1. What are the conditiotis under which a citizen's 
advocacy group can intervene to affect a change 
in the policy? 
2. What are the constraints to successful interven-
tion? 
3. What are the attributes of successful interven-
tion? 
Methodology 
28 
A naturalistic case study is the research methodology 
selected for this study of policy intervention by a commu-
nity organization. Naturalistic research is the "investi-
gation of phenomena within and in relation to their 
naturally occurring contexts" (Brandt, 1972, p. 7). This 
method was selected because it involves exploratory research, 
the searching out of issues in a natural situation. Its 
greatest power comes from the fact that this kind of 
research is relatively non-obtrusive, meaning that the 
researcher intrudes less in the reality of the world under 
study. Proponents of naturalist research (Brand, 1972; 
Guba, 1978; W8bb et al., 1966) believe another strength 
lies in its heuristic approach to research problems. 
Researchers begin their study without preconceived 
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ideas to collect data on a variety of factors and begin to 
form conclusions from a series of observations. This kind 
of research sees multiple-cause reality, not a single cause 
and effect relationship. Because the world is composed of 
many realities, this approach is closer in accurately 
representing the real world in its research. 
The strengths of naturalistic research--its realism, 
its heuristic quality, its multiple-reality approach--offset 
the disadvantages inherent in this research approach. 
Field work does not provide controls on people or the set-
ting~ Representativeness is a problem because the emphasis 
is on in-depth analysis of groups or a system. The field 
researcher does not select a sample vi individuals to 
intp.r'iriew, but obtains detailed data about particular 
people. 
One answer to the problem of \ <\.iiditj in this kind 
of ~esearch~ due to the lack of control or representative-
ness, is the use of triangulation. "Validity is provided 
by cross-checking different data sources and by testing 
perceptions against those of participants" (Guba, 1978, 
p. 63). Triangulation technique uses a multi-method 
approach to corroborate one set of data with another. 
Support for a multi-methcd approach is found with Webb 
et ale (1966): 
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or 
more independent measurement processes, the uncer-
tainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. 
The most persuasive evidence comes through a tri-
angulation of measurement procedures. (Webb et 
al., 1966, p. 3) 
Researchers look for confirmability, an agreement among a 
variety of sources, before reaching a conclusion in their 
findings. 
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Other issues related to naturalistic research methods 
are: (1) Effects of interviews upon interviewees (Simon, 
1969, p. 24): all the interviews and observations were 
conducted by the author. The research relies on the evi-
dence of other data sources--newspapers, board minutes, 
Coalition documents, and subsequent events to correct any 
bias. (2) Observer bias: the research was not involved in 
the events of 1977-79 either through the Coalition or the 
school district. The researcher sought to include all 
perspectives on these events from persons supportive of the 
Coalition to persons critical of the intervention. (3) Var-
iability over time: this is an ex-post-facto study. Indi-
viduals were interviewed approximately eighteen months after 
the intervention. A series of intervening events between 
September, 1979 (conclusion of study time) and Summer, 1980 
(interviews conducted) may have affected people's interpre-
tation of the Coalition's intervention. (See Conclusions, 
Chapter VII for further discussion.) Although some time 
had passed since the intervention, many people were still 
involved in the desegregation issue. The subject was timely 
and people welcomed the opportunity to talk. Many of the 
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interviews lasted more than one and one-half hours because 
of their interest in the topic. 
In addition to triangulation techniques, this case 
study through its use of the Rothman models of community 
organization which is basea on empirical evidence, will link 
the findings of this C~5e st~dy to the work of Rothman, as 
well as other citizen advocacy research. 
Method of Gathering Data 
The research bases for this study were historical and 
document analysis, interviews, and revil='~l of literature. 
1. Historical/document analysis. A review of the 
Oregonian, Oregon Journal, and Portland Observer news 
articles on school desegregation between 1962 and 1977; 
documents such as the Schwab Committee report (1964), Model 
Cities Education report (1969), City Club report (1972), 
Schools for the City report (1975), and the U.S. Office of 
Civil Rights, School Desegregation in Portland (1977). 
In addition, minutes and tapes of critical school 
board meetings were examined. A review was made of Coali-
tion meeting minutes, memos, and working documents of the 
Research Committee, as well as Coalition correspondence. 
The Coalition files are located in the office of the Metro-
politan Human Relations Commission. 
2. Interviews. The interviews were focused and 
conducted during the summer and fall of 1980. An interview 
1 
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guide was used for all the Coalition interviews. (See 
Appendix A.) In addition to the interviews with Coalition, 
school board, school administration, and media persons, 
there were several interviews with people involved in 
previous community efforts to affect desegregation policy. 
They provided background information of the time period, 
1962-1977. 
3. Review of literature. Extensive reading was com-
pleted in the fields of community organization, school 
desegregation, social change, educational governance, and 
urban politics in order to test the generalizability of the 
field work with empirical evidence from other research. 
The data for this case study were collected between 
March, 1980 and October, 1980. The interviews were con-
ducted from June-September, 1980. The majority of inter-
views were taped. There were fifty interviews involving 
Coalition members, the school board, district administra-
tors, the media, and Black United Front leaders. At the 
conclusion of each interview a brief description of the 
interview was written. There was also a review of each 
interview to look for themes or issues that the interviewee 
had identified. Some of the information gathered from one 
interview was used to verify or to obtain a reaction from 
another interviewee. The interviews with board and dis-
trict administrators were oriented to their perspective on 
the Coalition,_their role in the sequence of events, their 
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assessment of the impact of the Coalition and some general 
comments on the politics of education in Portland. 
A similar procedure was followed during all inter-
views. Each individual was called. The purpose of the 
study was explained and they were asked for an appointment. 
There were two people who declined to be interviewed, a 
Coalition member and a school board member. Both cited 
reasons of time pressures and that their point of view 
could be gathered from other interviews. Two board members 
were unavailable for interviews; one had died and the other 
had moved out of state. All interviewees were guaranteed 
confidentiality and completed an informed consent release. 
(See Appendix B.) 
Thirty-one Coalition members were interviewed, includ-
ing two staff persons. The Coalition members were selected 
according to several criteria. First, all of the Coalition 
leadership were selected, including the Committee Co-Chairs 
and the Task Coordinating Committee. Second, a broad per-
spectiveof members representing the racial, geographic, 
and philosophical diversity of the Coalition were sought. 
Four key Coalition members were asked to identify people 
on the basis of the criteria. The group that was inter-
viewed was selected from that list. The remaining criterion 
was the degree of involvement during the entire eighteen 
month period. (The only exceptions were Task Coordinating 
Committee members, some of whom were not active for the 
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entire time period.) 
Because individuals are not named in this study, 
documentation of the interviews has been coded. All inter-
views are cited by date. If more than one interview was 
conducted on the same date, then interviews are listed in 
alphabetical order, based on the order of the interviews. 
For example, interview 6/10/80a was the first interview 
of that day. 
This is an ex-post-facto study. People were asked 
to analyze and discuss events with the hindsight they had 
gained from a year's distance from the issue. Some of the 
Coalition members were still very involved in desegregation 
issues, while others har . ;.1plet.ely withdra'ffl from any kind 
of involvement. 
~.~alysis 
The analysis of documents, pewspaper reports, Coali-
tion, and school board materials took place between March, 
1980 and December, 1980. The school district, through its 
Public Informat~on Office, maintains a newsclipping file, 
board minutes, and tapes of the meetings. The Coalition 
files contain all minutes of meetings, working papers for 
the research committee and final report, letters of member-
ship, financial records, correspondence, questionnaires 
from participants in a series of Community Forums, deseg-
regation research from other cities, and the interviews and 
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data analysis on the Administrative Transfer Program, a 
study conducted by Oregon Attitudes, Inc. In addition, the 
Oregon Historical Society supplied several taped interviews 
01: long-time activists in the black community, which were 
part of their Oral History Project. The most difficult 
information to obtain was history of blacks in Portland. 
Blacks in Oregon (1978) and The Growth of a City (1979) 
were consulted, but the most current and reliable resource 
is the black weekly newspaper, the Portland Observer (1970-
present) • 
. The material was organized in two ways: (1) by time 
period and (2) by subject matter. The three time periods 
were: 1962-1977 (School Desegregation History in Portland); 
June, 1977-January, 1979 (Formation and Study Phas~ of 
Coalition); and January, 1979-September, 1979 (Aftermath 
and Impact Phase of the Coalition). The first time period 
was divided into subject areas of national civil rights and 
desegregation events; desegregation action in Portland; 
citizen groups active in desegregation policy, Model Cities 
and Citizens Committee for Better Schools; the two school 
desegregation plans, the Schwab Committee report and Schools 
for the 70s; and the state and federal changing role. Most 
of the data were gathered from newspapers, school documents, 
and citizen group primary source materials. Several infor-
mant interviews provided personal insights to this histori-
cal analysis. 
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The sec!ond time period covered the community opposi- ' 
tion to the Boise-King plan and the active period of the 
Coalition. The framework for analysis of this time period 
was the models of community organization practice (Rothman, 
1968). The interviews provided the main body of data for 
this analysis. They were divided into Coalition members, 
school b~~rd, and school administration interviews. The 
Coalition members' questions were keyed to specific vari-
ables of the Rothman models (e.g., what strategies did the 
Coalition adopt to change the situation; what other 
strategies were considered?). These questions were keyed 
to the variables concerning basic change strategy and 
characteristic change tactics and techniques. (See 
Appendix C.) 
The third time period, January, 1979-September, 1979 
was the assessment of the impact of the policy intervention 
by the Coalition. Again, interviews were the main source 
of data with documents and newspaper articles being second-
ary. The 5uhje~t ,,">.·:as of this time period were the series 
of events: board rejection of the Coalition recommendation 
on pairing, school board elections, Coalition visit to 
Seattle, Coalition/Board/District working committees, 
Office of Civil Rights ruling, Black United Front, appoint-
ment of Coalition Co-Chair to school board, proposed Black 
United Front boycott, and the August, 1980 short- and long-
term resclutions on desegregation by the school board. 
":,l 
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Some of the issues were known at the beginning of the 
research while others emerged from the interviews and 
document analysis. The analysis is divided into two parts: 
first, an analysis of the intervention based on the prac-
tice variables of the Rothman models and second, an analysis 
of the impact of the intervention on the school system and 
community, based on two criteria--(l) changes in the formal 
rules of the educational system and educational practices 
affecting these children and (2) alteration of the network 
of activities at the federal, state, school district, and 
school levels that shape services to children (Moore, 1980). 
In summary, this study is based on a multi-method 
data base, using historical and document analysis, inter-
views and references to relevant empirical studies. The 
next chapter is a historical analysis of school desegre-
gation policy in Portland, Oregon. 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SCgOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY, 
PORTLAND, OREGON 
"De Facto Segregation": 1954-1965 
The Supreme Court called for an end to segregated 
schools in 1954, but not until 1965 did Portland public 
schools initiate a desegregation plan. 
Prior to World War II, Portland had a small popula-
tion of blacks. A study of Blacks in Oregon (1978) states: 
Negroes were virtually banned from the state until 
the Second World War, at first by law and later by 
severe employment discrimination. During the war 
years, Portland experienced a much smaller migra-
tion than other west coast cities. (p. 38) 
In 1940, 2,565 blacks lived in Oregon, with the majority 
residing in Portland. By 1950, the number had increased, 
accompanied by a pattern of residential segregation in 
Portland. In 1950, one half of Portland's 9,500 blacks 
were housed in census tracts #22 and #23 in the Williams 
Avenue-Albina districts (MacCol1, 1979). "A 1957 Report 
on the Negro in Portland: A Progress Report 1945-1957" 
said that "90% of the realtors won't sell a house to a 
Negro in a white neighborhood" (City Club, 1957, p. 259). 
The concentration of blacks in some Portland schools was 
'.; .. ,' 
due, therefore, to discrimination in housing. The school 
board had adopted a "color blind" policy in 1954, when it 
stated that it had a policy of equal education and that it 
would take no action regarding segregation in Portland 
public schools (City Club, 1980). 
National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (N~~CP) 
By 1960, Portland's black population had increased 
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to 15,636, with 78% of that population housed in the Albina 
area (Portland Public Schools, 1978). On April 20, 1962, 
the Oregon Journal's front page carried the headline, 
IISchoo1s Here Hit as Racist." The N&'l\CP had named Portland 
as one of the Western cities which segregated public 
schools. The local NAACP chapter in Portland asked the 
school board to end IIde factoU segregation. A schoQ1 offi-
cia1 responded: 
I am not sure what they class as a segregated school. 
In our policy we have not segregated children, we 
have put schools where children are and have estab-
lished boundaries. (Oregon Journal, 4/20/62, p. 1) 
The NAACP continued to pressure the school board. In Octo-
ber, 1962 the NAACP president said the only issue is "the 
fact of segregation. The Portland schools are not in com-
p1iance with the 1954 Supreme Court decision. The Board 
refuses to see the problem. There can be no solution until 
a problem is accepted" (Oregonian, 10/11/62, p. 32). The 
national NAACP organization had instructed all the local 
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chapters to advise them if a lawsuit was necessary to bring 
about the end of segregated schools in their local com-
munity. 
In May, 1963, a 125-member Portland Citizens Committee 
on Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools urged the school 
board to undertake a study to "determine if a large number 
of the city's Negro elementary students are being harmed 
by being concentrated in de facto segregated schools" 
(Oregonian, 6/25/63, p. 1). Neither the Oregonian or 
Oregon Journal's editorial pages were supportive of the 
NAACP or the citizens' committee, stating that the "pro-
posed remedies could be worse than the situation now 
complained of" (Oregonian, 6/5/63, Editorial page). 
Race and Education Committee 
On ,TD-ne 25, 1963, the school board voted to appoint 
a committee of citizens to study and report back to the 
board by Janua::. 1, 1964 its findings on the city's racially 
imbalanced public schools (Oregonian, 6 /25/63). The Com-
mittee on Race and Education (the Schwab committee, named 
after its chairman) concluded an eighteen-month study, 
reporting that Portland's schools were not providing chil-
dren of all races with equal educational opportunity 
(1964). The guiding desegregation policy of the Portland 
Public Schools was established with the unanimous adoption 
of the report of the Committee on Race and Education in 
December, 1964. The school district became committed: 
to take every reasonable step consistent with sound 
educational practice to encourage the integration 
of students of all races and to decrease the con-
centration of minority students in particular 
schools which occurs because of residential pat-
terns. (Board statement, 12/64) 
The recommendations of the Schwab committee became the 
first desegregation plan in the schools and were imp1e-
mented in 1965-66. The key recommendation established 
the Model School program, a compensatory education program 
in nine Albina schools. Elements of this program were 
lowered teacher-pupil ratio to 1:20, preschool programs, 
additional funds for field trips, and increased support 
peI.'sonnel, i. e., teacher aides and community agents. 
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The Schwab committee endorsee the continuation of the 
district's neighborhood school concept. At the same time, 
it recommended the concept of a transfer program. The 
transfer program was an administrative program, with trans-
portation provided for children selected by the district 
as well as for children whose parents desired the transfer 
on a space-available basis (Schwab, 1964). Although the 
Schwab committee stressed the goal of reducing segregation 
in Portland Public Schools through the Administrative 
Transfer Pr~0ram, the major portion of the funds was spent 
on the compensatory education component, Model Schools 
(City Club, 1972). 
Community Response to Desegregation 
Plan: 1965-1970 
The school board's adoption of the Schwab committee 
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report did not satisfy the NAACP. The Portland NAACP chap-
ter opposed the Model Schools approach as one sustaining 
racial isolation and imbalance ~O:r.eq(")n.ianf 11/16/64). 
Parents an~ citizen groups in Albina criticized the Model 
Schools approach for perpetuating segregation and the open 
enrollment plan (the Transfer Program), because both black 
and white parents could request transfer of their children. 
This'was of major concern in the Jefferson High School 
attendance area, where it was feared white parents would 
send their students elsewhere, further decreasing the white 
population at that school (Oregonian, 4.'7/65). Between 
1964 and 1969 the Administrative Transfer Program expanded 
from 250 to 605 students, but "90% of the Negroes were still 
con.fined to a handful of schools [in Albina]" (Oregonian, 
3/1/66, p. 13). 
Model Cities Education Committee 
During the period, 1964 and 1969, major education and 
civil rights legislation was enacted which increased fund-
ing sources and federal requirements for local school 
districts: OEO- War on Poverty (1964), Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act (1964), Civil Rights Act (1964), and 
then Model Cities (1967). These acts were viewed as 
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attempts to change the social, economic, and educational 
opportunities of the disadvantaged in the united States. 
These programs also required citizen participation either 
through citizen advisory boards or as employees of the 
various programs. All Title I, ESEA programs required 
parent advisory co~mittees (PAC), as did Head Start. 
Portland received a planning grant in 1967-68 from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development to develop 
proposals with the participation of citizens from the target 
area (essentially Albina) for programs that would revitalize 
the community (the Model Cities program). After a lengthy 
citizen involvement process, the Model Cities Education 
Committee submitted a plan to the Model Cities C.i..ti..:en 
Planning Board, which asked for some specific changes in 
education and made some definite recommendations to the 
school board. Specifically, Model Cities asked the school 
board to approve: 
1. the establishment of a Community Education Liaison 
Board to review all policies related to schools in 
the Mociel Cities area; 
2. the hiring of 196 aides for Model Cities area 
schools; 
3. the expansion of pre-school programs in Model Cit:i..es 
area; 
4. the creation of a computer sciences program at 
Jefferson High School. (Model Cities Education Re-
port, 1969, p. 18) 
J:n addition, the entire report of the Model Cities Education 
Committee recommended a grade exchange plan, to further 
integration of the schools. This cross-busing plan would 
convert all Albina's schools into 7th~·8th grade centers for 
i.'" 
all the children of the district. Model Cities children, 
K-6, would be bused out to schools in the remainder of the 
city. It also called for the school board's commitment to 
total integration by 1970 and an end to the Model Schools 
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program. The committee's final proposal was for the estab-
lisr\Ylent of an Experimental Learning Center in the Model 
Cities area, with an innovative life-learning program open 
to the entire district (Model Cities Education Report, 
1969). 
The Education Committee critized the district's 
approaches to community involvement in desegregation 
programs. On community involvement, the Education Commit-
tee charged that "citizens of the Model Cities neighborhoods 
have historically been left out when plans have been made 
directly affecting the education of their children" (Ore-
gonian, 1/13/69, p. 16). With regards to the Administrative 
Transfer Program, they stated: 
It is the opinion of the committee that the one-
way busing to the suburbs is highly inadequate 
because it has little effect on the segregated 
public schools.* (Model Cities report, 1969, 
p. 10) 
The reaction of the school board to the Model Cities' 
request and recommendations was immediate. They labeled 
it as "vicious, irresponsible and inaccurate document" not a 
*One-way busing to the suburbs began with the 1968-69 
school year with about 100 students busing to Lake Oswego, 
Parkrose, and David Douglas school districts (Oregonian, 
8/20/68, p. 15). 
l:'; 
"community effort, but the opinion of a few people" (Ore-
gonian, 1/8/69, p. 1). They saw it as an attack on the 
"very foundation upon which the Board had built its edllca.-
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tional policies and programs." The Oregonian described the 
Board as "angry, stunned and hurt" over the accusation of 
"unresponsiveness to community needs and desires, particu-
larly those of the Albina area" (Oregonian, 1/13/69, ~. 16). 
Three days later, the school board said it could not 
act on the "four proposals" submitted by ·'0del Cities for 
approval for HUD funds "without implying endorsement of the 
entire education component" (Oregonian, 1/16/69, p. 35). 
Tha controversy ended in April, 1969 when the Model Cities 
Planning Board withdrew its request for a Citizens Education 
Lidison Board, rather than risk additional delays in appli-
cation for federal funding. 
The school beLl. \.'0. "then approved the othar three propo-
sals (teacher aides, preschool programs, and a computer 
science program at Jefferson High School). The Model Cities 
Education Committee, however, recommended that the Planning 
Board withdraw all four proposals, because "it is essential 
that parents play a policy rather than an advisory role in 
order to assure that schools reflect tr_ needs of the com-
munity" (Oregonian, 4/2/69, p. 19). That view of the role 
of the community was unacceptable to the board. 
The school board would not endorse the Citizens 
Education Liaison Board, which, as proposed, would 
function at a policy-making level. Policy making, 
~ 
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as well as educational planning, is and will remain 
in the hands of the school board. (Oregonian, 
4/2/69, p. 19) 
In the spring of 1969, when Model Cities Education 
Committee trIed to implement their educational programs, 
Portland Public Schools board wo~ld not endorse their 
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request for federal funds from HUD. The dile~ma was that 
the school district did not need the money, but Model Cities 
needed the cooperation of the school district to effectively 
use their funds to help the Model Cities area population. 
The alternative was to start their own school district 
(Interview, 10/6/80). After this initial controversy with 
the school board, Model Cities never became involved in any 
major educational reform or planning effort, but channeled 
its funds to support school programs, such as teacher aides 
in Model Cities area schools. 
Citizens Committee for Better Schools 
Within a few months of Model Cities' report (June, 
1969), a second citizens' group emerged to urge the school 
board to work on integration of the schools. This Citizens 
Committee was formed from a local community action agency 
conference on urban issues. It began as an ad hoc task 
force on education in 1966. After extensive research on 
successful integration efforts nationwide, it sought support 
from various organizations for integration in Portland's 
schools. When they addressed the board in June, 1969, they 
-,' , 
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had pledges of support from twenty-eight community groups. 
The committee was composed of white and black members rep-
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resenting such groups as churches, American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), PTAs, and civil rights organizations. 
--
The Citizens Committee urged the board "to work as 
fast as possible to reduce the Negro concentrations at 
about eight of the city's schools (50-90%)" (Oregonian, 
6/24/69, p. 9). They also asked the board to "name a citi-
zen group to study the possibilities for fuller and speedier 
integration, including the possible establishment of junior 
highs and possibly busing of white students as well as 
black" (Oregonian, 6/24/69, p. 9). 
One board member responded to the committee "It must 
be the board's first order of business to develop an 
integration plan and achieve it without delay" (Oregonian, 
6/24/69, p. 9). At that time, approximately 600 students 
were bused within the district and 200 students bused to 
the suburbs. All the students being bused were from pre-
dominantl~ black schools. One perspective on the situation 
was that the board really did not want to have the communi'i:y 
propose another approach to desegregation and used the fact 
of hiring of a new superintendent to delay action on the 
recommendations of the Citizens Committee. 
" .. ; 
Desegregation Plan #2: "Schools 
for the Seventies" 
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During early 1969, the school board was searching for 
a new superintendent. They were looking for someone who 
could address the "problems of growing militancy and unrest 
among students, teachers and citizens, plus outmoded 
management and buildings" (PPS, 1978, p. 10). The school 
board selected a superintendent whose main strengths were 
management and organization. He also h~d had experience 
in desegregation in his previous superintendency (Oregonian, 
2/26/69) • 
The new superintendent submitted a master plan for 
Portland Public Schools to guide the future direction of 
the district. Its stated purpose was to achieve school 
integration. The key elements of the "Schools for the 
Seventies" plan were: 
1. Reorganization and Decentralization: to divide the 
district into four administrative areas, each with a simi-
lar percentage of Black students; 
2. Establishment of upper grade centers (middle 
schools) that would be racially desegregated; 
3. Provision of Early Childhood Centers in racially 
isolated neighborhoods; 
4. Limit of 25% minority students in middle and high 
schools. (Schools for the Seventies Plan, 1970) 
The public responded to the plan immediately. The 
".: 
'.j 
Urban League gave it unanimous endorsement, followed by an 
endorsement from the Portland Association of Teachers 
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(Oregonian, 1/23/70, 1/24/70). The plan was introduced to 
the public on January 21, 1970. The Citizens Committee for 
Better Schools voiced several concerns about the plan. The 
plan called for the establishment of citizen advisory -X;:':1-
mittees in each of the new area subdistricts. The Citizens 
Committee recommended that the advisory boards be composed 
of 50% black and 50% white; also, that the Area Citizen 
Advisory Committees (ACACs) be appointed through an inde-
pendent committee, not by the school board. On the role 
of ACACs, the Citizens Committee for Better Schools said 
"We think the duties should be substantial, for we believe 
boards with no real voice would create more community dissat-
isfaction than no boards at all (Oregonian, 3/15/70, p. 34). 
The school district conducted a series of public 
meetings to elicit citizen comments on the "Schools for the 
70s II plan. 
The plan was taken to the citizens in a series of 
four carefully planned public hearings scheduled in 
each of the four proposed areas of the city. The 
for.mat for these hearings consisted of a narrated 
slide presentation, pack:~ts of information on the 
plan which were handed out to all participants, 
and a panel of Board members and the superintendent 
to answer questions. Detailed notes were taken of 
all citizen comments, although the notes were not 
consistently summarized for presentation in a work-
able way to the Board for its review. (Douglas, 
1978, p. 3) 
The four hearings attracted approximately 2,000 people. 
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The account in the Oregonian of February 3, 1970, following 
one of the public hearings, is representative of citizen 
concerns. 
• • • Citizens ask if reorganization plan can go to 
a vote of the people instead of being decided by the 
school board. 
• • • A spokesman from the Jefferson High School 
student body objected to any plan which would disrupt 
the student balance that was then prevailing at 
Jefferson (55% white, 43% black, 2% Oriental). 
• • • A citizen objected to the plan because it 
would break up Albina. 'split up the black forces.' 
He also wondered why busing couldn't occur both 
ways--of both black and white students. 
(Oregonian, 2/3/70, p. 7) 
A fifth public meeting was held in Albina in order to obtain 
citizen input from that area. 
Dissatisfaction with the plan was expresseCi. by several 
different groups. The Portland Federation of Teachers (PFT) 
stated it had no evidence yet of "commitment to teacher or 
community involvement in the planning of edu=ational 
improvement and change prior to decision making by the 
school board" (Oregonian, 3/5/70, p. 20). A survey by the 
PFT and several local organizations showed Albina residents 
opposing the pla~ by 2-1. Of the 424 people surveyed, 60 
percent opposed the way the plan divided Albina, opposed 
busing for racial integration, and opposed the 25 percent 
limit on black student attendance. Two-thirds of those 
surveyed wanted Jefferson High School maintained as a com-
munity school and not subject to the 25 percent black 
student limit-(Douglas, 1978, p. 4). 
...... -.. 
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The chairman of the NAACP Education Committee labeled 
the "Schools for the 70s" :;:>lan "a scheme to weaken and 
frustrate black unity" and attacked the "racist philosophy 
of placing small numbers of blacks among whites." This 
long-time critic of school board policy on desegregation 
of Albina area schools described the previous efforts of 
the board: 
The Race and Education Commission, which I call the 
racist and Negro Lackey Commission, was the fore-
runner of this plan. Model Schools is just a sub-
plantation to keep the blacks enslaved. (Oregonian, 
3/16/70, p. 15) 
Some citizens also opposed the middle school plan because 
it would destroy neighborhood schools and result in children 
being bused away from their neighborhood. 
A March 6, 1970 editorial in the. Oregonian said the 
public hearings had disclosed that there was "widespread 
apprehension that the superintendent's recommendations are 
a 'fait accompli' rather than a plan for Board approval, 
rejection or amendment" (Editorial page). 
On March 23, 1970, the school board adopted the pro-
posed reorganization plan. Except for changes regarding 
the number of subdistricts and their boundaries (three 
instead of four), the plan remained largely unchanged from 
its original form. The board decided to appoint the ACAC 
members rather than follow the Citizens Committee recomroen-
dation of appointment by an independent committee. 
The board also reaffirmed it.s December, 1964 stand 
on its open enrollment policy, stating: 
Any student may, upon request of his parents or 
guardian, transfer to and attend any other high 
school (or middle school) in the school district, 
provided that space exists, and provided further 
that such a transfer does not unduly increase the 
concentration of minority students in that high 
school or in the high school from which the stu-
dent seeks to transfer. In order to avoid racial 
isolation of minority students, no high school or 
middle school shall have a minority student 
enrollment which exceeds 25%. (Board resolution 
No. 3553, 3/23/70) 
In a footnote to the resolution, the board stated that the 
25% limit was drawn from "extensive studies and experience 
both in Portland and elsewhere as a desirable upper limit 
to minority concentration" (Board resolution No. 3553, 
3/23/70) • 
Implementation of Schools for the 
Seventies Plan: 1970-1977 
Tax Levies 
In order to convert to middle schools, the district 
needed to secure funds for the remodeling of buildings. 
The plan would convert seventeen existing schools and 
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build three new ones to serve as middle schools. The district 
embarked on a series of budget elections to raise the neces-
sary funds. 
In October, 1971, the superintendent said "both Port-
land's educational and building needs [were] stymied 
this year with the defeat of four key money measures by the 
public." Two teacher organizations interpreted tr..e tax 
[: , 
levy failures differently. The Portland Association of 
Teachers said "it was not a vote against the schools, but 
••• a result of voter's disaffection with a heavy reli-
ance on property taxes in funding education" (Oregonian, 
9/29/71, p. 1). However, the pres.:i.d~·"·"1t of the Portland 
Federal of Tea~hers called for the fi~ing of the superin-
tendent and the rnajori ty of the boat"d members. He said 
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the defeat of the levy was "due to the erosion of confidence 
in the schools and the Board, not the tax structure" 
(Journal, 9/29/71, p.1). 
Although a citizens group formed to help with the 
next budget election, the school le~J failed by a slim 
margin in May, 1972. The superintendent said, "The people 
have spoken. The problems remain. As a result of this 
vote, Portland is no longer competitive with the better 
school systems in our state" (Oregonian, 5/24/72, p. 1) 
This series of defeats meant that the district could not 
pursue its planned development of middle schools. 
Early Childhood Centers 
Although the defeat of the tax levies slowed the 
implementation of middle schools, the conversion of Albina 
grade schools to Early Childhood Education Centers (ECECs) 
began. Irvington grade school was the second Model School 
to be converted to a K-5 Early Childhood Center. Eliot 
grade school had been the first. 
Between 1972 and 1977, Humboldt, King, and Sabin 
would be converted to Early Childhood Centers, with the 
remaining Albina elementary schools, Vernon and Woodlawn, 
converted to ECECs in the 1977-78 school year. Boise 
grade school was the only K-8 grade school in the Albina 
area, mainly due to a strong coalition of parents and 
neighborhood residents who lobbied the school district to 
retain it as a Basic Skills Center (Willamette Week, 
4/17/78, p. 1). 
All upper grades in the Albina area schools had been 
removed in the conversion to ECECs, thus all area students 
from fifth through eighth grade had to transfer out of the 
neighborhood. The absence of new middle schools in close 
proximity to Albina produced an increase in administrative 
transfer students. In 1972-73, when the ECEC conversion 
began, there were 725 students in the administrative 
transfer program, 475 of whom were in-district elementary 
students. In 1977-78, the admir.istrative transfer program 
totalled 2,888 students, 2,009 of whom were in-district 
elementary transfer students (PPS, 1978). 
Middle Schools 
At the same time, there were eleven middle schools 
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by 1977-78, but only two of them (Columbia-Whitnker and 
Fernwood) served as assigned middle schools for Albina resi-
dents. Various neighborhoods had rejected middle schools 
I 
for their area. The bv" .. 1 had adopted a policy of never 
placing a middle school in an area where the parents 
rejected the concept. In the Wilson and Roosevelt High 
School areas, the citizens had rejected middle school pro-
posa1s (Oregonian, 7/11/78). 
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Some of the reasons for community opposition to middle 
schools is cited in an article on Fernwood Middle School. 
Opponents of middle schools • • • have consistently 
been charged with opposing middle schools because 
they offer the district an opportunity to increase 
racial integration. This is so because middle schools 
are one step removed from neighborhood schools (typi-
cally, students from three elementary schools are 
bused to one presumably central middle school). Com-
bining students from three schools gives the district 
the chance to put students from mostly white schools 
together with students from integrated schools • • • • 
Many white parents don't like their children removed 
from the close-by neighborhood school and bused to 
a school considerably farther away, even if that 
school isn't in the black community. nVillamette 
Week, 7/2/79, p. 7). 
There was dissatisfaction on the part of black parents as 
well, because no middle schools had been created in Albina. 
Therefore, their 6th, 7th, and 8th grade students were all 
bused out of their neighborhoods. 
Citizen Advisory Committees (ACACs) 
Three Area Citizen Advisory Committees were created 
as a result of the board's adoption of the "Schools for the 
70s" plan. In 1974, the superintendent, speaking to the 
National Committee for Citizens in Education, reported that 
citizen involvement and decentralization were operating 
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well in Portland. He said that 25,000 citizens were dir-
ectly involved in everyday operations of the school (Jour-
nal, 6/25/74). 
The Area Citizen Advisory Committees were a key part 
of the school district's community involvement process. 
The Schools for the City, a citizen committee formed in 
1972 to assist with that year's budget election, evaluated 
the ACACs from 1970-75. They concluded that although the 
advisory committees have "clearly influenced Board deci-
sions and administrative actions ••.• two major blocks 
remain to be overcome." The first major block was that the 
"whole process is rigidly controlled by the School Board." 
'I'he second block concerns the advisory committee's uncer-
tainty over its actual role in educational decision-making. 
(Schools for the City, 5/19/76, p. 20) They specifically 
recommended strengthening of the Advisory Committees: 
1. Particular attention be paid ••• to inclusion 
of citizens in planning policy changes from 
initial consideration to conclusion of the pro-
cess; 
2. ACAC's need to function in a more independent 
manner ••• also be advocates for the public; 
3. Review panel members (who select ACAC's men~ers) 
be chosen • • • so that their selection is not 
controlled solely by the School Board. 
(Schools for the City, 5/19/76, p. 20). 
Another citizen commented in a Letter to the Editor about 
the need for some changes in the citizen advisory process. 
Area advisory committees should be elected. Local 
advisory committees should either be elected, or 
all interested parents should be allowed to serve 
and vote on issues. Further, all advisory commit-
tees should be given more quality information and 
cOpies of all policy proposals and budget 
recommendations. Committees should be involved in 
all stages of budget formation, teacher and prin-
cipal selection criteria and hiring, and review and 
development of school programs and curricula. 
(Oregonian, 7/11/78, p. c6). 
In summary, the major criticism was that the area advisory 
committees were consulted frequently too late in the 
decision-making process to provide input and to have an 
impact. 
Federal and State Decisions 
on Desegregation Policy 
On March 22, 1974, the State Board of Education 
adopted Policy No. 4171 on "Racial Imbalance in Public 
Schools." The policy stated: 
It is the affirmative duty of each local school dis-
trict which has a substantial racial minority student 
enrollment to formulate policies, and to plan, 
implement, and evaluate educationally sound and 
feasible programs, to prevent or eliminate racial 
isolation in its schools, and to achieve and main-
tain an integrated education program characterized 
by mutual respect, awareness of cultural diversity, 
and responsiveness to the needs of all students. 
Racial isolation exists in a district if the com-
bined enrollment of Black, Native American, Mexican-
American and Asian-American students in any school 
of the district is in excess of fifty percent (50%) 
of the school's total enrollment. (State Board of 
Education Policy No. 4171, 1974) 
In direct response to the State Boardis policy, the Port-
land School Board reaffirmed their 1964 and 1970 actions 
on policies and programs to reduce racial isolation of 
minority students in its schools. It also directed the 
superintendent to encourage and increase administrative 
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transfers "to the fullest extent practicable" and to con-
tinue the conversion of selected elementary schools to 
Early Childhood Centers. They instructed the superintendent 
to recommend steps to reverse increasing minority enrollment 
when it is in excess of 25%, and to analyze the situation 
when any school reaches 10%. (School Board Minutes, 
5/22/75) 
Although the federal government through the courts 
and legislation had defined that no school in a system 
should depart substantially from district-wide rac~a1 
proportions (Pascal, 1977), the major struggle for state 
and local boards of education was how to achieve this racial 
balance. Racial balance and desegregation at this time 
refer to the "physical mixing of the races without regard 
to the relative status of the two groups" (Gordon, 1977). 
There was growing concern with the legal concept of 
racial isolation. In a review of legal decisions, one 
education writer noted that "racial balance as a numerical 
goal will not necessarily improve the quality of education 
in the public schools • • • the problems must be solved by 
educators, not lawyers, legislators and the courts" (Ore-
gonian, 4/3/77, p. 1). Other community studies of desegre-
gation have demonstrated that community involvement was a 
key ingredient in both a successful desegregation and 
improved educational program (Crain, 1968; Kirby, 1973). 
Portland was not under a court-ordered desegregation 
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ruling to integrate its schools. The board had initiated 
its own plan, as a result of the Schwab committee and com-
munity pressure in 1964. Portland through the years had 
stressed the fact that its desegregation plan was voluntary. 
However, according to a September, 1977 staff report of the 
u.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the desegregation plan was 
limited in scope and effect. 
Desegregation in Portland . • • involves • • • 'one-
way busing' of minority (mainly black) students from 
inner-city schools to predominantly white ones • • • 
(p. 6) 
Another problem area rests with the continuing feel-
ing among some members of the minority population 
that the burden of the desegregation process has 
been borne by minorities. (School Desegregation in 
Portland, Oregon, p. 14) 
However, the Portland Public Schools were found in 
violation of the "Singleton Rule" in 1975 by the Office 
of Civil Rights. The "Singleton Rule" resulted from a 1970 
Supreme Court decision that ruled school districts should 
assign staff so that the ratio of Negro and white teachers 
to other staff in each school is substantially the same as 
such ratios are to the teachers in the entire school syst~m. 
The Office of Civil Rights (HEW) found Portland to have a 
disproportionate concentration of minority teachers in 
racially isolated schools. The district, in order to avoid 
the loss of funds, transferred all minority teachers to 
achieve the ratio recommended in the "Singleton Rule." 
In 1977, the Office of Civil Righ~s ~hreatened to 
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withhold Title VII, Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) monies 
because the Portland school district was discriminating 
against minority students in its suspension policies. The 
school district had to agree to change their suspension 
policies in order to remain eligible for the Title VIr fund~ 
federal funds for assisting school desegr.egation. In sum-
mary, school desegregation in Portland as of June, 1977 had 
employed several approaches to accomplish its objectives. 
Since 1964, a voluntary transfer program (Adminis-
trative Transfer Program) has been in use to bring 
about desegregation. In 1970, the Portland School 
District changed attendance boundaries and embarked 
on a middle school policy, citing desegregation as 
part of the rationale for middle schools. In 1970, 
the District also adopted a policy (which eliminated 
grade levels in these schools) of converting elemen-
tary schools in the Black community to Early Child-
hood Education Centers. This policy has since been 
classified by the District as part of its desegre-
gation efforts. (Eguity for the 80s, 11/78, p. 43) 
Analysis of Desegregation Policy--
Portland Style: 1962-1977 
In the first stage, problem identification, different 
groups in the community (NAACP and the Committee of 125) 
raised the issue and defined the problem for the school 
board. The board appointed a blue-ribbon panel, the Schwab 
committee, to formulate a course of action. The Schwab 
committee developed a set of recommendations which the 
school board adopted as its desegregation plan for the 
Pcrtland school district. That was the legitimation phase 
of the policy process. The application stage was the 
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Model Schools, a compensatory education program, which was 
implemented from 1965 to 1970. The other part was the 
Administrative TranS:~2l:' Program which began in 1965 and 
was still operational in 1981. 
The goals of desegregation were the reduction of the 
concentratiorl of minority students as well as improved 
education. Criticism arose from the minority community 
about the Model Schools program because the racial composi-
tion of the predominantly minority schools did not change. 
The Model Cities Education Committee (1968-69) and the 
Citizens Committee for Better Schools (1969) had both 
called for an end to the Model Schools and a cross-busing 
approach in which both white and black students would be 
bused. Although there was no formal evaluation of Model 
Schools, segments of the community did call for major 
changes in the desegregation programs. (In 1972, the City 
Club did a formal evaluation of the Model Schools program, 
finding that it was ineffective. But, by that time, the 
program had been discontinued.) 
The school board did not accept either set of recom-
mendations, but did reformulate its desegregation policy 
by hiring a new superintendent who presented his "Schools 
for the 70s" plan. The superintendent and the board were 
the chief actors in altering the desegregation plan, 
although citizens were consulted through the series of 
public hearings. This second desegregation plan focused 
" ,,I ..... , .. 
., 
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on reorganization of the schools and a continuation of the 
Administrative Transfer ?-rogram. 
The Schools for the 70s plan was adopted (legiti-
mated) in March, 1970. During the implementation stage of 
this plan, financial problems arose (defeat of tax levies) 
which resulted in further modification of the plan, 
especially with the development of the middle schools. 
Community opposition to middle schools slewed down the 
process even further. At the same time, the federal and 
state governments were redefining "acceptable limits" in 
desegregation with an increased emphasis of reducing the 
concentration of minority students under 50 percent i.n any 
school. 
Due to the inability of the school district to reor-
ganize into K-5, 6-8, 9-12 desegregated schools, the board 
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moved to reduce racial isolation through an increase in the 
Administrative Transfer Program and the conversion of 
Albina schools into Early Childhood Centers. The board and 
the superintendent ~~lieved that such programs were sound 
educationally, and would promote progress in reducing the 
numbers of racially isolated schools. 
The school board was guided during this time period 
(1970-77) by several criteria. One was to avoid a court-
ordered desegregation plan. Second, it did not want to 
consider cross-busing, because of the fear it would result 
in white flight from Portland to suburban schools. (Inter-
views, 8/27/80, 7/31/80, 9/8/80) 
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Like voluntary programs elsewhere, Portland's "admin-
istrative transfer program which involved for the most part 
minority students, desegregation has not produced change 
through the city schools." 
One expressed fear is that the white community's 
heretofore generalized acceptance of desegregation 
may be threatened if a heavier burden is placed on 
whites in the future implementation of desegrega-
tion. (School Desegregation in Portland, Oregon, 
9/77, p. 14) 
This historical analysis of desegregation policy has 
identified the critical participants in the policy process, 
as well as reported the changes in the desegregation policy 
process. In addition to knowing who the participants are 
and the issues, it is nAcessary to consider the impact of 
the desegregation policy en Portland's citizens and their 
view of the policy in 1977. The next chapte~ analyzes 
community dissatisfaction with the desegregation policy in 
the summer of 1977. 
I 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMMUNITY DISSATISFACTION WITH 
THE DESEGREGATION POLICY 
If the previous chapter demonstrated the efficacy of 
the early policy model, initiation-implementation-evaluation, 
we can now see the concept of dissatisfaction coming into 
playas the next important variable, the community's inter-
vention, is examined. In this chapter an analysis of the 
sources of community dissatisfaction will be made from the 
perspectives of the community, board, and school district. 
Dissatisfaction with the school district's desegrega-
tion plan had been present since the first plan was initi-
ated in 1965. In June, 1977, a policy change was proposed 
to the school board, because Jefferson High School had 
passed the 50 percent minority enrollment limit during the 
1976-77 school year. According to the state board's 
guidelines, Jefferson was a racially isolated school. In 
an effort to lower minority enrollment, it was proposed 
by the board that children from Boise and King grade 
schools not be allowed to attend Jefferson High School, 
but would be assigned to Lincoln and Wilson High Schools. 
Boys and girls from two mainly black neighborhoods 
would be forbidden to enroll at Jefferson High 
School under a draft policy submitted to the 
Portland school board. Such a student would have 
to attend another high school which had about 
average enrollment of black students. (Oregon 
Journal, 6/8/77 1 p. 3) 
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The goal of the Boise-King (6/77) plan was to further 
desegregation efforts in Portland's schools and to meet the 
State Board of Education requirement that no school's 
enr",:lment exceed a maximum of 50 percent minority students. 
Also stated was a goal to prevent and eliminate racial 
isolation of minority children (Atte~dance Area and Trans-
fer Policy Drill, 6/6/77, Sl'>.ction B, Paragraph 5). 
The proposed policy change was announced at the end 
of the school year. Between June 6, 1977, when it was 
introduced to the board, and July 25, 1977, when the board 
finally acted on the policy change, community dissatisfac-
tion over school desegregation surfaced through several 
local groups. 
Community Reaction 
Several community groups were aware of citizens' 
complaints about the current desegregation efforts. The 
education committee of Metropolitan Human Relations Commit-
tee (MHRC) had discussed a review of the district's deseg-
regation policies and practices, as it had not been 
evaluated since the Schwab committee study in 1963-64 
(Interview, 6/10iBO, 6/17/80b). The MHRC education com-
mitteemet with the superintendent and several board 
members to discuss the Boise-King redistricting proposal 
in July, 1977. 
They recommended that the school board make no 
decision on the controversial desegregation amend-
ment until at least 2/78 ••• In the interim the 
district (should) involve the community in the 
sharing of information and planning. (Portland 
Observer, 7/21/77, p. 1) 
Schools for the City, a citizens' education advocacy 
group, had raised the question of how desegregation was 
doing in Portland the year before. The League of Women 
Voters also had informed themselves about the issues sur-
rounding desegregation. (Interviews, 6/18/80b, 6/19/80b) 
Through the interest of MHRC and the concerns of one 
board member over the progress of desegregation, a small 
group of parents and Northeast community residents began 
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meeting Saturday mornings at King school to discuss a number 
of problems with the desegregation plan: curriculum, discip-
line, transportation, recruitment of minority teachers, 
and Jefferson High School. Several weeks after this 
group began meeting, the concerned board member brought 
the "redistricting" proposal to a meeting. The community 
group was very interested in x·ssponding, but due to the 
timing, were concerned as to how they could inform parents 
at the end of the school year. They decided to formally 
organize and called their group the Committee for Quality 
Education for All Children. A long-time Northeast community 
resident, active in Model Cities, became chairperson. In 
.' 
.1 
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order to spread the word to other affected parents, the 
committee contacted Jefferson High School groups; requested 
to testify at the next board meeting; and sent out a mail-
ing to civil rights and human relations groups, and the 
media; informing them of the Committee's opposition to the 
proposed policy change. 
The "Friends of Jefferson" had been active for sev-
eral years. They represented parents, students, and 
community residents committed to the improvement of Jeffer-
son High School. They joined with Boise parents and Boise 
Neighborhood Association's Education committee to oppose 
this proposed change. As part of the coalition with the 
Committee for Quality Education, they discovered that white 
flight was respo~sible for the racial imbalance at Jeffer-
son. "The outflow of majority students from the Jefferson 
feeder schools to other high schools is the primary reason 
for the increasing percentage of minority students" 
(Observer, 7/21/77, p. 1). 
When the school board member presented the redistrict-
ing proposal on June 6, 1977, the district had not antici-
pated any opposition to what they considered more of a 
"boundary change than a policy change which requires no 
community input" (Observer, 7/21/77, p. 1). The first 
sign of community opposition came from the media coverage 
of a press conference called by the Committee for Quality 
Education for All Children. 
I 
A proposal which, in effect, would bar some black 
students from attending Jefferson High School 
• • • is under fire from a group of black leaders 
and parents. The group, Committee for Quality 
Education for All Children contends that the pro-
posal • • • unfairly puts the burden for racial 
desegregation of Jefferson on black students. 
(Oregonian, 6/21/77, p. 1) 
Some board members and central school administrators met 
with selected black leaders before the proposal's second 
hearing at the July 13, 1977 board meeting. These black 
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leaders, after hearing an explanation of the new attendance 
proposal, advised "the school personnel that they meet \'lith 
the Committee for Quality Education for All Children and 
affected parents before making any decision on this pro-
posal." The school district did not get support for the 
proposal from the black leaders who attended this meeting. 
(Observer, 7/7/77, p. 1; Oregonian, 7/25/77) 
On the night of July 13, 1977, the board delayed the 
public testimony on the policy change until the end of 
their regular agenda. The result was an angry reaction 
by "the sixty persons who waited more than three hours to 
be heard" (Oregonian, 7/15/77, p. c1). Fifteen persons 
spoke with four groups presenting written testimony as 
well. The speakers asked the board to reject the proposed 
policy change and to involve the "entire community in plan-
ning an integration program that is acceptable to the 
ccmmunity" (Letter fr("'m Committee for Quality Education to 
the board, 7/13/77). Rather than decide the issue that 
evening, the board called a special meeting for July 25, 
1977 which would be devoted entirely to the desegregation 
policy change. 
The media was very involved in covering this issue. 
The Oregon Journal (7/20/77), in an editorial entitled 
"It's Time To Take a New Look," pointed out that part of 
the black community's opposition to the new plan was due 
to the way the schcol board had handled the proposal. 
"The plan was announced without consulting beforehand the 
community immediately affected or the community at large, 
both ·of which have much at stake in the vitali~y of city 
schools." 
The Oregonian (7/23/77) reported that "a coalition 
of community groups has asked that the board appoint a 
citizen committee to study alternatives to the proposed 
change in the desegregation plan" (p. A8). The Oregonian 
(7/24/77) also discussed the reason for the community's 
opposition: 
They are objecting to the method proposed to achieve 
the goal--mandatory busing of a predominantly black 
segment of the Jefferson high school attendance 
area to Westside high schools, Lincoln and Wilson. 
(Oregonian, 7/24/77, Sunday Forum, p. D1) 
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The July 25, 1977 meeting was attended by 200 people, 
so many that the overflow from the board room moved to 
standing room only in the halls (Observer, 7/28/77, p. 1). 
The superintendent opened the meeting by reading a prepared 
statement. He said: 
the district has the responsibility to make policy 
decisions that do the right thing. The right 
thing for Portland is desegregation and this is 
the direction the Board o~ Education has followed. 
We have made a significant number of attendance 
area shifts. Few or none of them have been with-
out opposition. Typically, they were for the 
reason of sustaining efforts to follow the deseg-
regation plan of the district. This plan is to 
carry out a constructive desegregation program. 
Obviously, the effort has been to accomplish this 
without disruption of a court order. (Portland 
Public School memo to Board of Education, 7/25/77, 
p. 2) 
The superintendent recommended that the board request that 
the NAACP, Urban League, and Metropolitan Human Relations 
Commission address the Jefferson imbalance issue. He also 
recommended the deferral of a decision to 12/15/77 because 
"I think it impractical to proceed at this time ••. 
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without some support from groups who are traditionally com-
mitted to the goals that are involved here" (Portland Pub-
lic School memo to Board of Education, 7/25/77, p. 5). 
He also commented that 
I am very troubled when influential groups and 
individuals take exception to proposals based on 
the amount of criticism voiced rather than on the 
merits of the issue. This comment was interpreted 
by many as a slap in the face at dissenting citi-
zens. (Oreg~nian, 7/26/77, p. AI) 
The audience response was immediate. The chair of the 
Committee for Quality Education said "we resent the impli-
cation that we are rabble rousers" (Board minutes, 7/25/77). 
A representative from the Boise neighborhood said the 
superintendent had "insulted the community who gav"e up 
their time voluntarily to be involved," and that the "black 
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community will not accept certain groups to make decisions. 
We want a voice in the decision." (Board minutes, 7/25/77) 
The NAACP representative objected to the naming of 
the three organizations. 
You should have asked 
be on the committee. 
from the community as 
three organizations. 
the neighborhood who should 
Try to get some feedback 
to whether it wants those 
(Journal, 7/26/77, p. 1) 
The other two organizations, MHRC and Urban League, both 
had representatives at the meeting. MHRC agreed to accept 
the challenge, but did not agree with the Board's decision 
to "restrict input to Jefferson when the program needs to 
be studied in depth" (Board minutes, 7/25/77). The Urban 
League speaker expressed his concerns about the process. 
You didn't wait to hear our recommendations. The 
NAACP, Urban League, the Metropolitan Human Rela-
tions Commission represent the black community. 
The process is merely dumping the issue back on 
blacks, saying you come up with something better. 
Why not create a commission of all individuals 
and let the chips fall where they may? (Board 
minutes, 7/25/77) 
The board voted unanimously to ask the three organizations 
to develop their own proposal for Jefferson by December 15, 
1977. Several board members and the superintendent also 
expressed the hope that other groups would be involved in 
addition to the three named organizations. However, there 
was no clear statement from the board as to whether these 
three groups should examine the entire desegregation pro-
gram. (Board minutes, 7/25/77) 
The board decided to create an independent group, 
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rather than appoint a blue-ribbon panel like the Schwab 
committee, for several reasons. As citizen distrust of 
government increased, blue-ribbon panels had become suspect 
for too close a relationship with the administration. 
(Interviews, 8/20/80, 9/8/80, 8/12/80) The board, faced 
with community opposition to its proposal, needed to get 
a genuine, independent look at desegregation policy. It 
was felt that would not happen with a board-created or 
board-controlled group. 
Individual board members had various reasons for their 
support of an independent study group. One believed that 
citizen input W~8 necessary even on controversial issues 
(Interview, 8/12/80). Another thought that if reasonable 
people, committed to integration, would examine the deseg-
regation program, they would support the current program 
(Interview, 9/8/80). A third view, also substantiated in 
the media, was that the board's decision was an indignant 
reaction to community outcry over the handling of the 
Boise-King plan (Interview, 8/26/80). 
Regardless of the intent of the board and the super-
intendent, the three groups were committed to involve the 
whole community in addressing the problems with the deseg-
regation programs (Interview, 6/17/80b). 
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Factors Contributing to Community Dissatisfaction 
Community Perspective 
According to one analysis of political change, people 
need to act at the right time 
on the right issue 
with the right leaders 
and the right people 
in the right place. (Barber, 1969, p. 166) 
community people who testified before the school boa~d in 
July, 1977, all agreed that the proposed policy change was 
the culmination of a series of decisions on desegregation 
that primarily affected the black community (6/18/80a, 
6/18/80b). It was the right issue, but the timing of the 
proposed policy change was awkward. It carne at the end of 
the school year, when many people were making summer plans. 
The timing may have presented initial difficulties, but the 
right peoplA and leaders were ready to address the issue 
(Interviews, 6/11/80, 6/19/80b). "The issue was volatile, 
tangible and visible" (Interview, 6/17/80b). 
Jefferson was the symbolic black high school which 
a number of black and white parents were committed to pre-
serving, as was the school district which had invested 
thousands of dollars in order to improve educational oppor-
tunities and to attract more white students. A policy 
change that affected only Jefferson High School by trans-
ferring only black students out of Jefferson had a strong 
impact in the black community. Some felt this was an 
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effort to get rid of Jefferson, the "bad, black school" 
(Interview, 6/20/80). Others feared that the policy change 
would result in the elimination of all grade schools in 
Albina, because the proposed change would mainly affect 
Boise School, the only K-8 school remaining in Albina 
(Interview, 7/24/80). 
Others saw the proposed policy change as an overt 
sign that the district was in serious trouble. The board, 
for the first time, proposed ,a desegregation policy change 
based solely on race (Interview, 9/15/80). The black com-
munity saw the board reacting to a crisis, and that their 
solution would once again affect black students (Interview, 
6/17/80a). More importantly, the nature of the policy 
change indicated that the board was not following their 
announced desegregation plan, but had reacted to the crisis 
with emergency measures (Interview, 4/18/80). 
The two board meetings in July, 1977 also provided 
an outlet for parents' complaints about desegregation 
(Interviews, 6/10/80, 9/15/80, 9/19/80). The community's 
presence at the board meetings made the issue visible to 
the greater Portland community because of extensive news-
paper and television coverage. These parents learned that 
other people were concerned about the same issues. 
The leaders of the groups opposing the "redistricting" 
plan felt that this was a cri~ical and timely issue. The 
black community's attitude on the busing issue had changed 
(Interview, 7/25/80) and the school district was unaware 
of these changes (Interviews, 6/2/80, 7/25/80b, 9/8/80, 
9/21/80). The changes were reflected by the questions 
being asked about the issue: is there data that shows that 
d~segregation provides quality education for black chil-
dren?" (Committee for Quality Education, Board minutes, 
7/25/77). 
The Oregonian described the change in the black 
community as 
After 14 years of school desegregation, the focus 
of black concern has turned from fighting for the 
right to attend white majority schools to examin-
ing what happens to black students after they get 
there. (Oregonian, 11/16/78, p. Bl) 
There was a new group of younger black leaders, several 
of whom had been involved in Model Cities and the War on 
Poverty community act}.on programs in the 1960s. 
Another factor was community awareness. Through the 
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efforts of groups like the Committee for Quality Education, 
Black Concerned Parents, and Jefferson High School parent 
groups, the black community was more aware of the issues. 
There was also growing white liberal dissatisfaction with 
the board's direction on desegregation. Some city-wide 
education groups had decided to examine those areas. 
(Interview, 6/19/80b) 
Citizen involvement has been present in other govern-
ment arenas in Portland. Citizens were very active in the 
campaign and election of a major in 1974 who encouraged 
1 
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citizen involvement in budget planning, economic develop-
ment, and crime prevention. Thrr ... i..Lgh Model Cities and then 
the neighborhood association movement, citizens were 
involved in making decisions about housing, freeways, and 
neighborhood revitalizat'ion (Interviews, 4/18/80, 8/6/80b). 
During the 1970s in Portland, a cadre of experienced com-
munity organizers developed who believed that citizens 
could make a difference in solving community [,tatters. 
Board Perspective 
Board members offered several explanations for the 
community's response to the proposed policy change on 
desegregation. Although citizens had testified against the 
district;s desegregation plan during the 1970s hearings, 
the current board was surprised by the degree of opposition 
of the black community to the proposed "redistricting" plan. 
One board member attributed some of the community reaction 
to the presence of someone on the board who was willing to 
raise questions, which in turn encouraged dissatisfied 
citizens to do the same (Interview, 8/26/80). 
Another board member thought the desegregation 
language ill-advised. Fifty-one percent black made a school 
"racially isolated," but not fifty percent white. Also, 
Jefferson, because of the district's financial investment 
in making it a magnet school, was a success and black 
children wanted to attend it (Interview, 8/20/80). 
I 
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A long-time board member identified several histori-
cal and political factors which contributed to the black 
community's dissatisfaction with the prevailing desegrega-
tion policy. (1) The City of Portland had a commitment to 
neighborhood revitalization. There was tension between the 
need to plan city-wide desegregation and the retention of 
the neighborhood primary school, which is vital to neighbor-
hoodness. (2) The experience of Model Cities, Office of 
Economic Opportunity - Community Action Programs (OEO-CAPS) 
and affirmative action had demonstrated the positive results 
that black group action could bring. (3) The nature of 
black leadership had been changing in Portland with an 
influx of younger blacks with successful experiences with 
direct action programs. The board was not in touch with 
this emerging black leadership. {4; The district had been 
making slow progress on desegregation, due to the defeat 
of the tax levies and time-consuming reorganizational 
efforts. Both blacks and whites reacted negatively to 
these delays. (Interview, 9/8/80) 
School District Perspective 
School district staff also recognized that leadership 
in the black co~unity had shifted and that the district 
failed to involve the newer leaders in desegregation 
planning. Also, a second generation of concerns was being 
expres~ed on the part of community members who had been 
participating in desegregation efforts. Questions as to 
I 
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what difference does it make if a black child attends a 
desegregated school had become a primary concern. (Inter-
view, 6/2/80 and Committee for Quality Education, Letter 
to Board, 7/25/77) 
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The national picture had been changing as well as the 
local scene. Politically, the country had moved through 
the conservative period of the Nixon presidency, in which 
there was increased support for anti-busing position. 
Nationally, civil rights leadership was divided, as more 
blacks were supportive of community control of schools. 
Locally, the traditional civil rights organizations were 
no longer "unequivocally" supportive of desegregation, as 
they had been in the 1960s. (Interview, 8/28/80) 
The board was accustomed to making decisions in a 
consensus framework. Previously, it shared its plans with 
representatives of the black community and had public 
hearings at its board meetings. It assumed that the com-
munity could reach consensus on the issues, but there was 
no consensus on this issue. The desegregation issue had 
changed in the minds of a number of black participants. The 
black community was dissatisfied and through organizing 
various segments of the community, spoke out strongly 
against the policy change. The Coalition facing the board 
was the product of conflict, not consensus, decision-making. 
The school system responded to this conflict by ask-
ing some traditional civil rights organizations to 
1 
recommend a solution to the problem. The board, acting 
from a consensus perspective, still believed reasonable 
people would see it their way, after some study of the 
situation. 
In suwmary, segments of the community had expressed 
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a strong interest in studying the desegregation plan in it$ 
entirety. The board's response was to ask three organiza-
tions to make recommendations on the Jefferson situation 
by December 15, 1977. The next chapter will discuss the 
formation of the Coalition and its decision to expand its 
mission to study the entire desegregation plan. The 
second section will analyze the policy intervention, using 
Rothman's (1968) models of community organization practice. 
i 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY INTERVENTION 
Before this chapter provides an overview of the 
critical events in the life of the Coalition (8/77 to 9/79) 
and an analysis of the policy intervention, the environ-
mental setting of the policy intervention, Portland School 
District #1, will be examined. 
In 1977, Portland was a city of approximately 380,000 
people with a total metropolitan population of over 
1,000,000. School District #1 served an area covering most 
of the city of Portland, as well as some unincorporated 
areas contiguous to the City. The district was organized 
into three Administrative Areas, which operated with rela-
tive autonomy (Figure 4) ("Portland Public Schools: 1950 
to 1977," Portland Bureau of Planning, April, 1978, p. 1). 
Demographic changes had affected Portland Public 
Schools during the previous decade. Since 1969, Portland 
school enrollment has declined to 57,000--a drop of 27 
percent. ("Portland Public Schools: 1950 to 1977," p. 1) 
Other characteristics of the school district are: over half 
of the schools in use were built before 1950; nine schools 
were closed since 1970; and only two out of ten of the 
special levies since 1970 have been approved. 
PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
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.Figure 4. Portland public schools boundaries map--
elementary and high schools. 
A recent study of Portland's schools indicated a 
growing financial problem. 
The general population remains relatively constant 
at approximately 380,000, but is now composed of a 
smaller number of school-aged children and a greater 
number of both elderly people and young adults with-
out children. (p. 3) 
With the general population remaining constant, the 
average tax burden since 1970 has increased little 
more than the rate of inflation. However, the cost 
of educating each student has soared, increasing at 
a rate of 14% each year, roughly twice the rate of 
inflation during the same period. 
This rate of increase is partly attributable to 
increased services required by State and Federal 
legislation, smaller class sizes, and improvements 
of t.eacher and other employee workinq conditions 
and benefits. (p. 9) ("Portland's Public Schools: 
1950-1977") 
The biggest factor influencing change in the school-
aged population was the continued preference among home-
owners for suburban locations. 
The City is losing families with children to its 
suburbs through net out-migration. Also, families 
with children who move to the SMSA [Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Are.::-] tend to settle in sub-
urban areas. ("Residential Mobility Study for 
Portland, Oregon," Office of Planning and Develop-
ment, April 17, 1978, p. 10) 
This decline is expected to continue as Portland Public 
Schools now graduates more students than it enrolls in 
kindergarten. 
The other important factor fer Portland schools 
desegregation plan was that the enrollment decline has 
been mainly white families. In 1970, black students were 
9.2% (or 7,008) of the district's total enrollment (1979 
Enrollment Report, Portland Public Schools, p. 24). In 
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1979, blacks represented 14.7% (or 7,910) of the total 
enrollment. The number of black students increased only 
slightly, but the percentage rose due to the loss of white 
students from the district. Total minority enrollment in 
1979-80 was 23.2%. ("Superintendent's Annual Report to 
Board of Education on Racial Balance," Portland Public 
Schools, 1980, p. 4) Prior to 1970, the school district 
only kept figures on black enrollment as the minority 
enrollment figure. 
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The black population was concentrated in Northeast 
Portland. In 1979-80, seven Northeast grade achoo1s--
Boise, Eliot, Humboldt, King, Sabin, Vernon, and Woodlawn--
exceeded 50 percent minority enrollment and according to 
the state guidelines, were considered racially isolated 
schools ("Superintendent's Annual Report to Board of Edu-
cation on Racial Balance, 1980, p. 21). 
Since 1970, the district and board had used the 
combined approaches of Early Childhood Education Centers, 
Middle Schools, a magnet high school program at Jefferson, 
and the Administrative Transfer program to promote deseg-
regation in the schools. Although it had not been success-
ful in resolving the problem of racially isolated schools, 
a result of housing discrimination patterns, the district 
had worked to reduce the number of black students in 
racially isolated schools. 
The district believed it had a successful 
desegregation program. It stressed the educational divi-
dends of the various desegregation programs to both the 
black and white community. In 1976-77, 700 white children 
voluntarily were bused to Early Childhood Centers (Ore-
gonian, 11/12/78, p. Bl). There were 1,700 volunteer 
children in the Administrative Transfer program (90% of 
whom were black). An additional 800 students were "invol-
untary transfers Ii as there was no upper grade center in 
their neighborhood. Some of them had been assigned to 
middle schools, but there was dispute over the actual num-
ber who had not been reassigned. The school district 
claimed that only 350 really were "involuntary transfer," 
whereas the Coalition maintained that the figure was 
closer to 700 students (Oregonian, 11/24/78, p. Bl). 
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Another factor in the desegregation accomplishments, 
was that desegregation had not involved any major litiga-
tion, nor had there been any serious opposition from any 
segments of the white co~unity. The real constraints hyd 
been financial. With the defeat of the tax levies in 1971 
and the resulting delays in middle school conversion, the 
district made the Early Childhood Centers and the Adminis-
trative Transfer programs the major components of its 
desegregation program. As federal and state requirements 
for school desegregation progress increased, the district 
and board acted to diminish the racial isolation of certain 
schools. The Boise-King redistricting plan was one such 
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response. (Interviews, 8/27/80, 9/8/80, 6/2/80 and "Super-
intendent's Annual Report to the Board of Education on 
Racial Balance," 1980, pp. 5-6) 
The emphasis of the district's desegregation plan 
had been that of racial balance. A district spokesman 
said, "the purpose of busing blacks to a large number of 
schools is to have better racial balance in all our schools" 
(Oregonian, 11/15/78, p. Bl). The district wanted to 
reduce the number of all-whit~ schools. Although the dis-
trict emphasized the educational benefits of Early Child-
hood Centers, Middle Schools, and the Administrative Trans-
fer Program, there was no evaluation of these programs or 
of the students who participated in them. 
To date, the school district has no conclusive test-
ing data on black achievement inside predominantly 
white classrooms .••• the district only recently 
set up a testing program able to measure the effect 
of school desegregation on black achievement. 
However, school officials have determined that 
the pre-, ~nce of black children in white classrooms 
has not lowered the average white achievement 
levels--a conclusion which is consistent with 
national findings. (Oregonian, 11/16/78, p. Bl) 
Several district staff explained that achievement data was 
not collected because the primary goal of school desegre-
gation was social, not educational. In fact, assessment 
might detract from the goals of the desegregation plan, 
\'fl'hose emphasis \'las on racial balance. (Interviews, 8/27/80, 
9/3/80, 7/23/80) 
Academic achievement was the very issue that the 
black co~~unity had begun to view differently. After 
J 
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fourteen years of school desegregation, many black parents 
were concerned with the quality of experience black chil-
dren were receiving. Other issues were: discipline prac-
tices, teacher attitudes, and transportation. Specific 
complaints of the black community during the summer, 1977 
board meetings reflected their concerns. For some, it was 
the treatment that black children met at the "receiver" 
schools where they were bused. Generally, it was felt that 
the administration, teachers, and children were not pre-
pared to teach or relate to black child~en. 
A growing concern was the number of minority Adminis-
trative Transfer students who were suspended or expelled 
at these receiving schools. Minority student suspensions 
were three times the percentage of white students in 1977-
78 (Equity for the 80s, 1978, p. 95). Problems with trans-
portation included stories of children who missed the bus 
and missed school for the day, and of children waiting in 
the rain until school opened. Because of the distances 
involved, parents couldn't participate in school support 
activities and children couldn'~ stay for after-school 
activities. (Oregonian, 11/16/78, p. B1; Interviews. 
6/11/80a, 6/12/80, 7/16/80a, 7/24/80) 
Criticism of the desegregation plan was growing 
because of the black community's own experiences. A black 
parent in a letter to the editor expressed one perspective 
I 
on the problem. 
I am not against a positive plan that is fair and 
just to all students. Black, white, and others. 
I am against forcing black "children to be bussed 
and making all schools in the model neighborhood 
[Albina] early childhood centers. I felt at the 
recent School Board meeting that the superintend-
ent insinuated that I, as well as others have 
disagreed with him, am against desegregation. 
(Portland Observer, 8/18/77, p. 2) 
Segments of the black community were dissatisfied with the 
effects of the desegregation plan on their children. 
Black leaders, buttressed by the city's white lib-
eral establishment, have charged that creation of 
the centers has unfairly fo:\:ced a predomillantly 
black group of students to be bused out of their 
n~ighborhood schools, while transfer into the 
centers have remained voluntary for white students. 
(Oregonian, 11/24/78, p. El) 
Many blacks began to question the equity of one-way busing 
to achieve desegregation. 
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The conflict over the redistricting plan in the sum-
mer of 1977 showed the growing gap between the school system 
and community over desegregation. The school system felt 
that without the pressure from major community groups, they 
had gone as far as they could in implementing school deseg-
regation. The board and district believed they had demon-
strated strong and progressive leadership in implementing 
a board-initiated plan. They were proud of the fact that 
they had avoided a court suit or strong opposition from 
white conservative community forces. Their attitude can 
be summed up "we've done as much as can be done in a com-
munitylike Portland." Thus, they were genuinely surprised 
when the black community reacted so strongly to the June, 
1977 redistricting proposal. 
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The problem surfaced because the black community was 
asking different questions and responding to different 
constituencies than the school system. In addition to the 
goal of equal educational opportunity, they wanted to see 
evidence of educational qualit~l and equity in desegregation 
planning. The challenge the board and superintendent gave 
the community was, in essence, to see if the community 
could construct c.: better plan wi thin the framework of state 
and federal limitations. 
The school district and these issues were the setting 
fer the policy intervention by the Community Coalition. 
Next, this chapter presents a description of the activities 
for school integration during the life of the Coalition. 
Chronology of Coalition Activities* 
Phase I: 8/77-1/78 
On August 23, 1977, an interim committee, composed 
of representatives from the Urban League, NAACP, and Metro-
politan Human Relations Commission voted "to form a broad-
based coalition that would make recommendations to the 
School Board for implementation in the desegregation pro-
gram" (Coalition minutes, 8/23/77). Open letters of 
*Appendix D, Chronology of Coalition, 9/77-9/79 
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invitation were sent to organizations and individuals 
inviting their participation in the study. At the first 
me~ting (9/1/77) the coalition" became the Community Coali-
tion for School Integration. It established an organiza-
tional structure of a Task Coordinating Committee with 
several subcommittees for Research, Resources, and Community 
Involvement. 
Between September, 1977 and January, 1978 the Coali-
tion initiated and pursued the following tasks: (1) defining 
its relation with the board and district, (2) obtaining 
funds for staff, (3) conducting research on the Jefferson 
situation, and (4) getting the community involved in the 
study and the Coalition. 
The Coalition clearly wanted to be independent of the 
school system. At the same time, it needed access to 
school data and financial assistance. The Coalition was 
able to obtain funds from the city and county for staff 
salaries. The school district agreed to provide space, 
secretarial and telephone services, and a set amount for 
reproduction costs of the study. It also agreed to make 
data available to the Coalition. A research coordinator 
was hired in late November and an office was opened in a 
local school annex. In addition, the Coalition asked for 
technical assistance from various other agencies: HEW, 
Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, and the General 
Assistance Center for Desegregation. The resources of these 
• 
agencies were limited to providing technical assistance to 
local school districts. As an independent organization, 
the Coalition could not receive direct assistance. 
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Instead, the Compensatory Education staff at the Oregon 
State Department of Education served as the major technical 
resource for the Coalition • 
Invitations for membership in the Coalition were 
repeated during this time, including a news-release in all 
papers on 9i23/77 and 11/23/77. Members selected their own 
committee assignments. The research committee began to 
research and prepare its response to the SChOOL board on 
the Boise-King plan. The Coalition as a whole agreed to 
meet twice a month. 
The Community Involvement Committee recommended that 
a series of community forums be held to begin a dialogue 
between blacks and whites and to provide a means for people 
to discuss integration issues. Three forums were held in 
November and December, 1977 at Jefferson, Wilson, and 
Lincoln High Schools. 
The Coalition presented its recommendations to the 
school board in writing on December 15, 1977. The board, 
in its January 9, 1978 meeting, voted to "accept the Coali-
tion report and to drop further consideration of the Boise-
King Redistricting Plan" (Board resolution X-4l89). The 
key factor was the Coalition's research finding, based on 
an analysis of school data, that Jefferson was no longer 
I 
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"racially isolated." The second finding was that if all 
of the white students who should be attending Jefferson were 
doing so now, the minority enrollment would be only about 
27 percent (Coalition statement to board, 12/15/77). 
Phase II: 1/78-1/79 
The Coalition stated to the Board that its Boise-King 
recommendations were a first step in its overall study of 
desegregation in the Portland Public Schools. The board 
in resolution X-4189 (1/9/78) responded by voting to 
"stro"ngly endorse the contin".ling efforts of the Coalition." 
The work of evaluating the entire desegregation pro-
gram began. The research committee, with the two :cesearc;h 
staff, examined national desegregation options a~, well as 
analyzing the effects of Portland's current programs. 
Twelve more community forums were held in the winter of 
1978. The community input from the forums became p.::a,rt of 
the evalua.tion of the desegregation program. 
In the spring of 1978 the Coalition extended its 
deadline until November, 1978, in order to include the 
results of a survey to be conducted of students, parents, 
and staff participating in the Administrative Transfer p:co-
gram. The summer of 1978 was spent finalizing research 
options and analyzing the survey results. 
The resources committ.ee continued to work on securing 
necessary funds. A prominent business leader agreed to 
I 
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solicit funds from the business community. Approximately 
$4,000 was raised from ten major businesses in the Portland 
area (Coalition memo, 6/13/78). Both the city and county 
extended their share of Coalition salaries, as did the 
school district on its in-kind contrib~tions. In addition, 
the school district and State Department of Education paid 
a pri.vate research firm to conduct the survey. Many of the 
Coalition members also made contributions to continue the 
study. 
III the fall of 1978, the Coalition took its desegre-
gation options out to the community, as well as to meetings 
with its member organizations, for a second series of 
forums. The Coalition in its three November meetings voted 
on individual recommendations for its final report. This 
report was presented to the board in two meetings on Novem-
ber 27 and December 4, 1978. The next three board meetings 
(12/11, 12/18, and 1/8/79) provided time for public testi-
money on the Coalition's report as well as the superintend-
ent's response. The board voted on January 22, 1979 to 
accept nine of the Coalition's recommendations, but it 
rejected the major recommendation on school pairing. 
(Board resolutions X-6118-6127, 1/8/79 and 1/22/79). 
Phase III: 1/79-9/79 
By January, 1979, the Coalition had lost its staff 
and office space due to the end of its outside funding. 
I 
When the Coalition met after the board's action, it was 
again a volunteer organization without staff, space or 
budget. The reaction of the Coalition's membership to the 
board's decisions on its report ranged from angry frustra-
tion to cautious optimism. The Coalition did attempt to 
reorganize and establish new objectives. 
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This phase was characterized by a variety of rapid 
changes in the local school district. The Coalition was 
not able to continue its active role in desegregation advo-
cacy. An analysis of the events and the changing role of 
the Coalition will be explored in the next chapter, Impact 
of the Policy Intervention. A list of some of the events 
that occurred during this time period follows: 
1. Legal complaint filed with Office of Civil Ri.ghts, 
HEW; 
2. Two new school board members elected; 
3. Coalition team visited Seattle desegregation 
program; 
4. Coalition began and ended meetings with district 
about resolutions; 
5. Board member died and Coalition co-chair appointed; 
6. Black United Front emerged; 
7. Long-time school board member and initiator of 
Jefferson reorganization plan resigned; 
8. Boycott of schools by Black United Front proposed; 
and 
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9. Board approved short- and long-term resolutions. 
Between January, 1979 and September, 1979 four new board 
members were ~dded to the school board, changing its orien-
tation on various school-community issues. All four were 
supportive of the Coalition. In July, 1979, a black advo-
cacy group, the Black United Front, emerged and called for 
a boycott of the schools unless the board acted to alter 
desegregation policy in Portland (Portland Observer, 
7/12/79). On September 4, 1979, the school board voted to 
change the direction and nature of Portland's desegregation 
policy. 
This summary of the activities of the Coalition pro-
vides the background for the analysis of the policy inter-
vention. Another important factor influencing the type of 
policy intervention was the membership of the Coalition. 
This next section describes the background of the members 
and their orientation towards desegre~ation in Portland. 
Description of Coalition Membership 
The Coalition had individual and organizational mem-
berships. Each organization was permitted one representa-
tive. In addition, other organizational members could join 
the Coalition as individual members. This analysis is a 
composite of several interviews with Coalition members and 
staff (6/10/80, 6/20/80, 6/16/80, 6/17/80, 6/1B/80a, 7/14/80, 
7/25/BOd) plus material from the Coalition files, such as 
I 
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membership lists, as of 10/11/77, and Coalition minutes. 
The Coalition was a diverse organization representing 
different racial groups, residential locations, occupations, 
and previous organizatiorial experiences. Coalition member-
ship was approximately sixty percent white and forty percent 
black. Of the twenty-six organizations that joined the 
Coalition, one-half of the organizational representatives 
lived in Northeast Portland, eight lived in Southwest Port-
land, and three lived in Southeast Portland. Of the indi-
vidual members (seventy-two), twenty-eight lived in North-
east Portland, twenty-six lived in North Portland, three 
lived in Southeast, and eleven lived in Southwest. Four 
members gave no address. The T~sk Coordinating Committee 
was composed of nine blacks and five whites. Geographi-
cally, there were seven from Northeast, four from North, 
and three from Southwest. 
Most of the Coalition members were adults. Some high 
school students did participate in the community forams, 
the survey, and gave testimony on the final report at the 
board meetings, but for the most part, the Coalition was 
composed of adult advocates for the interests of children. 
Interviews were conducted with twenty-nine Coalition 
members and two staff members. Sixteen whites and thirteen 
blacks were interviewed. An occupational breakdown of those 
interviewed shows the highest number, eleven, held govern-
ment positions. The remaining categories of employment 
were: five, community activities; three, parents; two, 
teachers; two, private sector; two, social services; and 
one each in law, higher education, ministry, and research. 
Geographically, they were representative of the entire 
Coalition membership: seventeen lived in Northeast, four 
in North, seven in Southwest, and one in Southeast. All 
but one of the Task Coordinating Committee members were 
interviewed. 
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Fourteen of the twenty-nine were involved in the 
community's opposition to the Boise-King redistricting plan 
and initiated the formation of the Coalition. Nine members 
were appointed by their organizations to work with the 
Coalition. Five of the twenty-nine interviewed were not 
consistently involved throughout the eighteen months of 
research. 
The Coalition was an interracial coalition composed 
of individuals and organizational representatives (see 
Appendix E). Within the Coalition there were subgroups who 
tended to vote the same way or share the same point of view 
regarding integration. Membership in these subgroups over-
lapped, but the purpose of identifying these subgroups is 
to illustrate the range of perspectives within the Coali-
tion. (Interviews, 6/10/80, 6/20/80, 6/16/80, 6/17/80b, 
6/18/80a, 7/14/80, 7/25/80d) 
Among whites there were three major subgroups: "west-
side liberals," inner Northeast "new integrationists," and 
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North/Northeast "old-timers." The "West-side liberals" 
were people involved in organizations like the City Club, 
Schools for the City, and a variety of liberal causes in 
the city. Other Coalition members believed the whites had 
access to the city power structure. They were resented for 
this power connection, but at the same time Coalition mem-
bers expected them to use it on behalf of the Coalition. 
(Interviews, 7/24/80, 7i16/80a, 6/18/S0a, 6/12/80) These 
"liberals rt were very active in all the t!ornmitt,6es. 
Their counterpart on the east side of Portland were 
the "new integrationists." These were mainly professionals 
who had moved into the successfully integrated neighborhood, 
Irvington, and who were strongly committed to integration, 
as were the west-side liberals. They were perceived by 
other Coalition members to have worked hard for their 
neighborhood grade school, but not for the rest of the 
Northeast schools. Several of the families were bi-racial 
or had adopted a minority child. They were more affluent 
and though';: to have more power access than the other 
Northeast participants. 
The North-Northeast "old-timers" lived in neighbor-
hoods that were part of the old Model Cities area, but had 
not yet been touched by the ';revitalization" boom of Irving-
ton. They had integrated in a dif f eren t \1ay, i. e., mainly 
they were whites who had not left as blacks moved into 
their neighborhoods. Many of these whites became committed 
• J 
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to achieve the best education for blacks and whites in 
their local schools. Increasingly, they saw the issue as 
that of "class, not race." The parents' groups from Jeffer-
son High School were an example of this group. They, like 
the blacks, felt the school system did not listen to them. 
This group tended to identify with the black perspective • 
Generally, they felt and were perceived to have less access 
to pow~r than the other white subgroups involved in the 
Coalition. 
A bi-racial group, the "human relations professionals," 
was composed of blacks and whites who had a long-term com-
mitment to the improvement of race relations in the c:i.ty. 
These blacks and whites through their jobs had access to 
resources and the power structure which they used to further 
the Coalition's work. Their work experiences made them 
more willing to push the issue further politically than 
the "west-side liberals." They played a strong facilitating 
role in the Coalition. 
There were three major subgroups of blacks, the 
second generation "ne\'~ leaders," the first gel!era tion "his-
torical leaders," and black "activists." Among the "new 
leaders" there was a range of backgrounds. The young 
"comers" were members of traditional civil rights organiza-
tions, but they were willing to use different methods to 
achieve desegregation than the historical leaders. They 
were skilled professionals with organizational experience 
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in social change situations and provided much of the lead-' 
ership in the Coalition. Some were black professionals who 
participated because of their jobs. A third group, the 
"activist" blacks, were outspoken and willing to push the 
Coalition as far as they could. They served as lead-point 
persons and were frequently on the cutting edge of an issue. 
Their insights generated a lot of conflict within the Coali-
tion, but also served to communicate the anger and frustra-
tion of years of struggle over this issue with the school 
system. 
'The "historical blacks" were long-term fighters in 
the cause of integration. Their style was different as was 
their experience, than that of the "new leaders." They had 
a long history of struggling for better educational oppor-
tunities. Their backgrounds were in the churches and 
traditional civil rights orgaI"izatio!"!s. They were a moder-
ate force in the Coalition and bridged the gap between the 
"new leaders" among the blacks and the west-side and inner 
Northeast white liberal groups. 
Based on information from the interviews, a pattern 
of decision-making emerged in the Coalition. The "west-
side liberals" and "new leaders" were the leaders in forming 
the agenda, pushing issues, and strategizing the organiza-
tion's direction. The "new leaders" and North/Northeast 
"old-timers" voted together on the issues while the "west-
side and inner Northeast liberals" were the oth~Z' voting 
.. JL. 
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bloc. The mediators were the bi-racial "human relations 
professionals" and "historical leaders" who moved between 
the two voting blocs to resolve' the conflicts. (Interviews, 
7/14/80, 10/13/80; see Appendix C, question on roles) 
The Task Coordinating Committee, which reviewed all 
sub-committee work and then referred it to the whole Coal i-
tion for final action, had representation from each of the 
subgroups, but the "new leader" blacks were the majcritYf 
holding seven of the fourteen committee positions plus the 
support of two representatives from the North/Northeast 
"old-timers." The experiences and perspectives of individ-
ual members and their influence on the direction of the 
Coalition needs to be included in the analysis of the 
policy intervention by this community organization. 
Factors Shaping Community Organization 
Intervention (Rothman, 1968) 
Goal Categories of Community Action 
The two official goals of the Coalition were adopted 
at its first meeting. 
1. To identify common concerns of the community in 
connection with desegregation in the Portland 
School District. • • • the goal being to insure 
equal educational opportunities to maximize each 
child's potential. 
2. To request of the Portland Public School Board 
a complete statement and analysis of desegrega-
tion policy and practices from 1965 through 1977 
in order to enable the coalition to realisti-
cally make recommendations to the Portland Public 
~chool Board. (CC3I minutes, 9/1/77) 
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Rothman identifies two kinds of goals in community organi-
zation models: task and process. A task goal, as defined 
by Rothman, is "the completion of a concrete task or the 
solution of a delimited problem pertaining to the function-
ing of a con-.rt1unity social system" (1968, p. 477). The 
second goal of the Coalition was a task goal. The Coali-
tion planned to develop recommendations for the Jefferson 
situation and then, study the entire desegregation program's 
practices. Process goals are "concerned with a generalized 
or gross capacity of the community system to function over 
time"" (1968, p. 478). The Coalition's first goal, to ensure 
equal educational opportunity, is more of a process goal. 
The Coalition's goals reflect the social reform model 
of community organization. (See Figure 5.) The Coalition 
wanted to modify the existing desegregation policy through 
its study and recommendations. The reason the Coalition 
pursu~d this task was to ensure equality of educational 
opportunity, a "process," a social action goal which in the 
long run involves a "shifting of power relationships and 
resources." However, the Coalition did not see itself as 
making "basic institutional changes r " but "problem-solving 
a sUbstantive community issue" which was affecting the 
minority community. (Rothman, 1968, Definitions, p. 477) 
Seventeen out of the twenty-nine Coalition members inter-
viewed listed the task goal as the major goal of the 
Coalition. Other members were divided among three 
1. Goal categories 
of community action 
2. Assumption 
concerning co~~unity 
structure & problem 
conditions 
3. Basic change 
strategy 
4. Characteristic 
change tactics & 
techniques 
5. Salient 
practitioner 
roles 
6. Medium of 
change 
7. Orientation 
toward power 
structure 
8. Conception of 
constituent popula-
tion & role 
9. Assumptions 
regarding interests 
of communi~y subparts 
10. Conception of 
the public interest 
Shifting of power rela-
tionships & resources: 
basic institutional 
change. (task or 
process goal) 
Disadvantaged ----------
populgtions, social 
injustice, depriva-
tion, inequity. 
Crystallization of 
issues & organization 
of people to take 
action against enemy 
targets. 
Conflict or contest 
confrontation, dire~t 
action, negotiation. 
Activist-advocate 
agitator, broker, 
negotiator, partisan. 
Manipulation of mass 
organizations & 
political processes. 
Power structure as 
external target of 
action: oppressors 
to be coerced or 
overturned. 
Population as ----------
victims; role as 
employers or members. 
Conflicting interests 
which are not easily 
l'econc ilable: scarce 
resources 
Task goal: 
study , make 
recommendations 
for change of 
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* 
-Social prov1s10n 
for disadvantaged 
group (task goal). 
policy. 1 
Inequity ------ ----- Substantive 
social problems 
, disadvantaged 
I populations. 
Coalition 
politics 
Research: -----
fact-finding 
& recommenda-
tions for 
change 
Coalition 
builder, 
researcher 
Work with 
community 
groups 
Power center 
influenced thru 
persuasion 
Coalition 
members both 
acted for oth-
ers, but also 
had constituent 
members. 
Reconcilable 
interests 
----- Organization 
of. coalition of 
concerned inter-
ests. 
--- Employment of 
facts , persuasion 
to apply pressure 
on appropriatE! 
decision-making 
bodies. 
Coalition-builder, 
fact-gatherer. 
--- Manipulation of 
voluntary associ-
ations & legisla-
tive bodies. 
--- Neutral view 
of decision-making 
centers in "gate-
keeper" terms. 
Influence thru 
persuasion 'lor 
pressure. 
Population at 
risk; Act on 
behalf of that 
population. 
-- Interests 
reconcilable or 
in conflict. 
Reality-Individualist.-- ---------------- -- Realist-
I Individualist. 
Figure 5. Comparison of the community 
coalition with two models of community 
organization practice. (Rothman, 1968)* 
additional goals: quality education, integration without 
undue stress on blacks, and equity in desegregation. 
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Equal educational opportunity, the Coalition's process 
goal, had three components: equity, quality education, and 
desegregation/integration. For some, equal educational 
opportunity was providing quality education for all chil-
dren. However, there was growing concern that desegregation 
schooling did not mean quality education for black children. 
(Interview, 6/17/BOb; Oregonian, 11/16/BO, p. B1, 11/20/BO, 
p. B1) There was no evidence of increased achievement in 
test scores and there was evidence of disciplinary problems, 
e.g., the "out of compliance decision" by the federal gov-
ernment in July, 1977 over discriminatory disciplinary 
practices (Oregonian, 11/16/80, p. B1). 
Some Coalition members had a commitment to integration, 
but only if it was accomplished without undue stress on black 
children (Interviews; 7/25/BOb, 7/24/BO, 7/21/BO, 9/15/BO). 
Finally, there was support of desegregation programs, but 
the overriding issue became how they were desegregated. Is 
the desegregation plan equitable to all students? The Coa-
lition members and the black community did not think one-way 
busing was equitable (School Desegregation in Portland, Ore-
gon, 1977; Interview, 7/21/BO; Oregonian, 11/12/BO, p. 1). 
Four hundred citizens who participated in the Coalition's 
forum series listed inequity as the major issue in school 
desegregation in Portland (Coalition Report, 3/1B/7B, p. 1). 
Assumptions Concerning Community Structure 
and Problem Conditions 
Coalition members felt very strongly that inequity 
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in school desegregation was the substantive social problem. 
The policy was inequitable because black children bore the 
greatest burden. The social reform model assumptions about 
the community structure "include both substantive social 
problems and disadvantaged populations." The Coalition was 
closer to the social reform model as few members described 
the community as "comprised of a hierarchy of privilege and 
power, the social action model orientation" (Rothman, 1968, 
pp • 4 77 I 48 8) • 
The Coalition assumed that if it documented the 
inequity, the board and superintendent would change the 
inequitable policies. As the research committee began to 
document the degree of "scattering" among minority children, 
Coalition members felt the practices were so clearly 
inequitable that once documented, it would be incumbent upon 
the school district to changes these practices. (Interviews, 
7/10/80, 6/19/80b, 6/18/80a) 
Basic Change strategy 
The basic change strategy of the social reform model 
"involves the coalition of concerned interests" (Rothman, 
1968, p. 488). The Coalition exemplified this basic change 
strategy. The process of building an interracial coalition 
I 
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began as a result of the three invited community organiza-
tions extending an invitation to all community groups to 
participate in the study. These three organizations saw 
the need for broad-based community involvement in this 
study. (Interviews, 6/10/80, 6/ll/BOa, 6/ll/80b, 6/l7/BOb) 
One hundred and ten people carne to the first meeting 
of the Coalition. They selected the name, Community Coali-
tion for School Integration, because they wanted a name 
that was "progressive and positive" (Interview, 6/l7/80b). 
The Task Coordinating Committee which functioned as the 
executive committee~ was broad-based, reflecting racial, 
residential, and occupational diversity. 
The Coalition's first task was to develop a group 
that could work together. It was one thing to say that 
this was an interracial organization; it was another to 
work as one. Several Coalition members commented that 
initially there was distrust, which had to be overcome, 
between blacks and whites, but also between the east and 
west-side whites. One approach to this issue was to select 
two co-chairs, one black, one white, for each committee. 
Two-way communication on the issues took time because 
many whites were unaware of the changes in Albina schools. 
Blacks were insistent that the whole community be involved 
in this study because it was a city-wide problem, not just 
a problem of the black community. (Interview, G/ll/aOa, 
6/ll/BOb) 
· I· 
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One perspective on the group process was described in 
the following: 
The group was varied in age, ethnic background, 
economic background and geographic location. 
Therein lay its strength. Therein, also lay the 
difficulty of coming together as separate individ-
uals with many different perspectives and experi-
ences. The dynamics that operated within that 
organization was really thrilling to observe. 
[In the beginning, a simple planning of a panel 
seminar at a high school would take four hours for 
the Community Involvement Committee. And then we 
got so that we could do our work in an hour's time 
which felt like a reasonable leugth of time.] But 
for volunteers to go week after week~ sometimes 
twice a week, and spend four hours an evening. 
You understand there was something very significant 
occurring or they wouldn't have done it for eighteen 
months. 
C~edibility had to be established. The process 
of examining an issue and arguing the issue rather 
than getting angry at the person who was taking 
an opposing position to yours--that was a very 
important learning process. Learning the differ-
ence between feeling and facts--that feelings are 
facts, as well as data. And the people who were 
accustomed to thinking and speaking in terms of 
feeling came to value those folks who could trans-
late their feelings into communicable information 
that could become part of the report. If you are 
going to permit someone to corn~unicate your feel-
ings, you have to trust the ~~rson who is doing 
the translation. (Interview, 7/10/80) 
The Coalition also established a democratic decision-
making process. The members wanted the entire body to make 
the final decisions. The working committees would submit 
recommendations to the Task Coordinating Committee which 
in turn would ask the entire Coalition to take final action. 
The Coalition saw the need to "educate ourselves first, 
then others in the community" (Interview, 6/17/80b). The 
decision-making process allowed much of the work to be done 
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in the committees, but the entire membership would partici-
pate through the final vote. This process allowed the 
Coalition to act as one voice when making outside presen-
ta.tions. 
A coalition representing diverse interests involved 
trade-offs as well as listening to other people's points 
of view. There was complete agreement among interviewed 
Coalition members that the process was one of the most 
democratic of any group. The meetings were long because 
everyone was heard. When it came time to vote, especially 
on controversial issues, people were either ready to com-
promise or to accept the results because their voice had 
been heard. Also, individual groups were free to pursue 
their own goals outside of the Coalition. If the Coalition 
could not agree on an issue, an individual or group might 
decide to work on it. 
Characteristic Change Tactics and Techniques 
Social Action (p. 477) 
Change tactics are: 
confrontation, direct 
action or negotiation. 
(Rothman, 1968) 
Social Reform (p. 488) 
Change techniques use in large 
measure campaign tactics, the 
employment of acts and persua-
sion to apply pressure on 
appropriate decison-making 
bodies. 
The Coalition's strategies generated much of the 
debate and controversy over style and substance in the 
greater commun~ty. Was the Coalition composed of social 
f 
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activists or a more traditional group of reformers? One 
board member characterized them as proponents of the "poli-
tics of confrontation" (9/8/80). For Coalition members, 
they were operating very much within the reformist mode of 
change. The Coalition believed it was practicing consensus 
politics. 
The test for strategy selection, according to one 
member, was "Is this strategy relevant to our goals?" 
(Interview,6/19/80c). The strategies the Coalition 
employed were: research (data gathering and analysis), 
community involvement, media suppport, and lobbying. 
Research 
The Coalition was committed to a comprehensive and 
high quality research effort. It hired two research staff, 
both with previous experience with desegregation. One had 
worked as a research assistant on a year-long participant-
observer study of the first year of desegregation in a 
Portland elementary school. The second person had been 
involved in a desegregation struggle in an eastern city 
school system, as well as having worked for integrated 
housing as part of a national movement. The Research Com-
mittee divided into subcommittees to analyze all parts of 
the desegregation program. The fou~ major subcommittees, 
Legal, Demographic, Policy and Plans, and National fol-
lowed a research outline that targeted the following areas 
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for study: 
1. Desegregation efforts of other cities--specifi-
cally, role of the community; 
2. Legal constraints--federal and state regulations; 
3. Administrative Transfer programs; 
4. District magnet programs; 
5. Multi-cultural preparation; 
6. Staffing; 
7. Early Childhood Education Centers; 
s. Curriculum--e1ementary, middle school, and high 
school; and 
9. Housing. 
In order to evaluate the desegregation program, the Coali-
tion had to know what the district knew plus be knowledg-
able about the national desegregation efforts. As one 
member explained, "You can't advocate for change, if you 
don't know what you want to change" (Interview, 6/l0/S0). 
In addition to the work of the staff and the Research 
Committee, community forums were a source of information 
regarding people's experiences with desegregation. Forum 
participants' comments were part of the data base. 
The Coalition was dependent on the school system for 
all local school data. There were some problems obtaining 
adequate data. As one school district employee explained: 
Until recently, the school district had set up no 
program to evaluate the effects of desegregation on 
student achievement.. The reasons • • • were myriad. 
The objectives of the desegregation program were 
primarily social objectives, he said. It was 
probably assumed in the first years of the program 
that its effectiveness (in. improving black achieve-
ment) would not be so great. 
I also think there was an honest fear that if you 
began emphasizing achievement, then that might be 
used as a reason for terminating the program. 
For the past two or three years, the school 
superintendent really wanted to have a testing 
program, but we found ourselves in such a data dis-
array that we couldn't do it. (Oregonian, 11/20/78, 
p. B1) 
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The "disarray" grew out of several problems. (1) The dis-
trict had no city-wide testing program, other than the 
METRO Tests, a locally developed achievement test. These 
tests· were given only at grades 3, 8, and 11 ~nd could not 
be used for desegregation evaluation because they did not 
follow students from one grade level to another. (2) Also, 
each of the three administrative areas has used different 
tests at different times of the year, which makes compari-
son impossible.* 
(3) Another problem was in the area of keeping ade-
quate records. The district which was decentralized into 
three administrative areas, had no student numbering system 
so that individual students could be identified and fol-
lowed as they moved from one school to another. (Inter-
view, 7/23/80) 
*Use of a new measurement system began district-wide 
in 1980. A three-year data base has been established which 
will be available for analysis in the fall of 1980, so that 
achievement data can be used in the future. (Oregonian, 
ll/10/7t) 
I 
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The Coalition, with the assistance of the district, . 
developed a survey which an independent research firm used 
to interview all participants in the Administrative Trans-
fer program. In sum, the Coalition's research was based 
on analysis of local school district data, co~~unity input, 
review of desegregation research nationally, legal preced-
ents, the Administrative Transfer survey, and a review of 
all aspects of the district!s desegregation programs. 
The Coalition's recommendations were resubmitted for 
review to a series of community forums in the fall of 1978, 
as well as to the participating organizations. The entire 
Coalition voted on the final recommendations for the 
board in November, 1978. Additional discussion of this 
process is found in the section, Assumptions Regarding 
Interests of Community Subparts. 
Community Involvement 
The second major strategy of the Coalition was to 
involve the entire community in an examination of past 
desegregation programs and a decision on the direction of 
future desegregation programs. Community education a~d 
community involvement were the two approaches pursued in 
order to generate public awareness of and support for the 
need to change the situation. The Coalition held two 
series of community forums. The first series involved 
fifteen meetings and approximately 400 persons partici-
pated. (Coalition report, 3/78) The purpose of these 
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forums was to gather information from the community as to 
the nature of the problems with desegregation programs, 
and about peoples' views of what the priorities in desegre-
gation should be. The four priorities they named were 
inequity, interracial understanding, quality education, 
and neighborhood integrity. (Equity for the 80s, 11/27/78, 
pp. 128-29) The second series of forums was held in Fall, 
1978 at twelve schools. The Coalition presented various 
desegregation plans for community response. Of the various 
cptio~s; a one-year transfer program received support from 
59% of the , ... hite participants and 70% of the blacks. For 
pairing of grades 1-4, white support fell to 42% "accept-
able" and 55% "unacceptable," as compared to black support, 
72% acceptable. On p~iring grades 5-8, white support rose 
slightly to 45% "acceptable," but 50% still found it unac-
ceptab1e. The black figures were 76% acceptable and 18% 
unacceptable. (Equity for the 80s, CCSI, 11/27/78, p. 142) 
The Coalition recommended a combined pairing approach, but 
it acknowledged that the one-year required t.ransfer idea 
received significant support from participants who attended 
the public forums. 
Under either program, a concept which received broad 
public support--the concept of keeping students from 
a particular neighborhood together as they go 
through school--wou1d pertain. Considering the two 
from a purely economic view, the pairing plan, in-
volving far fewer schools than the one-year plan, 
is preferable because transportation costs would 
lower. (Equity for the 80s, 11/27/78, p. 85) 
Transcripts of .both series of for~ms are contained in the 
I 
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appendices of the Coalition's final report, Equity for the 
80s (1978). 
Another way the Community· Involvement CommitteE: 
involved the communi t:{ was through social gatherings. The 
Coalition sponsored two parties on May 19, 1978 and Novem-
ber 4, 1978. Four hundred and fifty people attended the 
first party. The parties were an opportunity for Coalition 
members to work together on an informal basis. Several 
people commented that washing dishes was a great way to 
work out geographic and ethnic differences (Interview, 
6/19/8.0b). The parties attracted city and county politi-
cians. The party was an opportunity for community-building 
among Coalition members, as well as with the broader com-
munity. 
The Community Involvement Committee also established 
a speaker's bureau which provided speakers to organizations 
to explain the study the Coalition was doing and to solicit 
support from various groups as the Coalition prepared its 
final recommendation. 
Media 
A third strategy involved work with the media for 
extensive coverage of the Coalition's activities. Part 
of the community education proce~s was to make all citizens 
aware of the issues in desegregation. Coalition members 
believed one of the problems was that desegregation choi~es 
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~~Tere not openly discussed in the past. One role the Coali-
tion played was to expand the discussion both in terms of 
the number of participants as well as the scope of the 
issue. The media was an important part of this strategy. 
Four newspapers, the Oregonian, Oregon Journal, 
Portland Observer, and Willamette Week, covered the Coali-
tion. The television stations also regularly covered 
Coalition meetings and forums, and did a special series 
on the issues. The Portland Observer offered the most 
continuous coverage of the Coalition in articles and edi-
torials. The Oregonian education reporter was released 
from regular assignments for four months to research in-
depth the desegregation program. (Interview, 9/21/80) 
The O~egonian carried a twelve-part series analyzing deseg-
regation in November, 1978, right before the Coalition 
presented its report to the board. One television channel 
showed a four-part series on its evening news in February, 
1978, focused on desegregation, and on educating the public 
about the community forums. During the time from November, 
1978 to January, 1979, there was extensive coverage by the 
newspa.pers, television, and radio on the Coalition's recom-
mendations. Willamette Week ran lead stories for three 
weeks in December, 1978. The Oregonian and Oregon Journal 
gave front-page coverage as well as editorial support to 
the work of the Coalition. In January, 1979, a local tele-
vision news analyst did a three-day series on the evening 
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news which was supportive of the Coalition. The news media 
very consciously tried to show the school system the amount 
of community support behind the Coalition. (Interview, 
9/19/80). 
Lobbying 
Coalition members question how effective their lobby-
ing efforts were. In fact, some Coalition members prefer 
to describe their efforts as more persuasion than lobbying. 
One Coalition person said, we were informing people to get 
support (7/25/80a). The Community Involvement Committee 
met with city council and county commission members several 
times to keep them advised of their progress, as well as 
to solicit support for their proposals (Community Involve-
ment minutes, April, 1978). Small groups also met with 
school board members between Spring and Fall, 1978 to 
apprise them of their work. Several school district staff 
were asked to read draft reports for discussion and com-
ment. The lobbying/persuasion effort was fairly low-key 
in the attempt to keep all the people aware of the Coali-
tion's study and recommendations. (Interview, 9/15/80) 
The Coalition did want the city and county politicians' 
support and endorsement of the final report. They also 
inform:-;d and asked for support from member organizations. 
It was a "soft" approach of communicating and sharing ideas 
with the board--in essence, "cultivating the board." 
(Interview, 7/14/80, 8/6/80) 
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Other Strategies 
The pr~mary strategies of the Coalition characterize 
it as a "social.l reform" organization. However, some of 
the tactics the Coalition· considered but did not adopt 
reflect more of a social action approach. The direct action 
tactics of a boycott and legal action were considered after 
the board's rejection of the scho~l pairing plan. On a 
March, 1979 visit to Seattle; the Coalition team learned 
that a successful boycott by blacks had contributed to 
that school systemls adoption of a mandatory plan (Inter-
view, 7/16/80). Legal research was done to explore the 
possibilities of a lawsuit, but the conclusion was that 
it would be difficult because of the district's record of 
voluntary desegregation (Interview, 7/16/BOb). The Coali-
tion as a whole decided net to take legal action, but 
several individuals did file a complaint with the Office 
of Civil Rights in January, 1979 regarding the "dispropor-
tionate burden" issue. (See Impact chapter.) 
Because of the policy that individuals and organiza-
tions could pursue thei.r own objectives in desegregation, 
the Coalition decided not to play an "ombudsman" role of 
trying to respond to all the concerns 0f the black community 
regarding education. The fear was that the Coalition would 
become too diffused from its major goal. Also, that it 
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would lose credibility if it were constantly getting side-· 
traced on other issues. 
There were two vacancies on the board between January, 
1978 and November, 1978. The Coalition did not back candi-
dates, but a small group of Coalition members supported 
a black candidate with a compatible educational philosophy. 
They were not successful in ·.getting their candidate 
\. 
appointed because the board selected another black candi-. 
date. The selection process indicated, however, the divi-
sions within the black community and that no black would 
represent the entire black comrnunity.* 
The reaJ. struggle over tactics was more a matter of 
tone and style. One faction within the Coalition wanted 
to use confrontational tactics--"to embarrass the Board 
publicly" (Interview, 6/16/80). They thought the record 
of abuse was perfectly clear. The struggle was between 
confrontive and conciliatory styles. Some wanted to be 
clear and indicting--to call the administration "racist." 
Others sought a more conciliatory model of communication 
and advised against "burning our bridges" (Interview, 
6/18/80). These differences were not solely based on race, 
since many of the North/Northeast "old-time whites" agreed 
with the "new leader" blacks in assigning blame to the 
* For further discussion of this appointment struggle, 
see Wi11amette Week, 10/2/78 and Portland Observer, 8/10/78, 
8/17/78, 8/24/78. 
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school system. Some "historical blacks" agreed with "west-
side white liberals" that they could still work with the 
school system (Interviews f 7/10/80, 8/11/80, 6/19/80b). 
Some Coalition members liked the confrontive mode, while 
others liked a more conciliatory role. Regardless of 
individual preferences, the Coalition agreed that it had 
to confront the district and board with the findings of 
the study and advocate strongly for its recommendations. 
Salient Practitioner Roles 
Rothman (1968) identifies various roles a community 
organizer employs while working in an organization. This 
study asked Coalition members to describe the ro1e(s) they 
played. There is overlap as several people described them-
selves as playing more than one role. Under the social 
action category, five described themselves as activist-
advocates, two as brokers, and one as a negotiator. Under 
the social reform category, eight described themselves as 
coalition-builders (mediators) and five as fact-gatherers. 
In addition to these categories,· four people saw 
their ro3.e as that of "facilitator," two people as "inter-
preter," and about six people played an "organizer-p1anner-
stra'tegist" role. The mediators-faci1itators-negotiators 
played a critical role since they spent much of their time 
listening to the different opinions of the members. Their 
task was to "calm people down, to bring people back 
together, and to help people with opposing styles to hear 
each other" (Interviews, 7/10/80, 7/14/80, 7/25/80b). 
Many Coalition members felt the leadership played 
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a significant role as "the glue that held the Coalition 
together." At meetings everyone had a chance to speak. 
(Interview, 6/11/80b; Willamette Week, 12/25/78) The diver-
sity of individuals and organizations made it imperative 
that everyone work together on the key issues. One way 
the Coalition encouraged its members to become involved 
was through committee assignments. That way, each person 
could learn about the issues firsthand at the committee 
level and then reconsider issues at the full Coalition 
meetings. 
An overriding characteristic of the Coalition was 
its commitment to the democratic process. It served as 
an alternative model to the school district in that it 
allowed the coromunity and it~ membership to determine the 
agenda. Some people voiced their opinions strongly, but 
"people eventually put away their private agendas, became 
part of the Coalition process and struggled to reach an 
acceptable compromise on our Board recommendations" (Inter-
view, 7/10/80). 
Medium of Change 
Activists in the social action model "create and 
manipulate mass organizations and movements and influence 
I 
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political processes" (Rothman, 1968, p. 482). The 
coalition-builder "manipulates voluntary associations and 
legislative bodies" (Rothman, 1'968, p. 488). The coa:i..ition 
addressed two arenas: formal organizations in the political 
process, and voluntary associations. 
"Manipulation of formal organizations and of data, 
the social planning model" was primary in the Coalition's 
operation (Rothman, 1968, p. 477). 
Coalition members were optimistic about this approach 
because the school board had accepted and implemented the 
Schwab committee repoLt. Its line of reasoning was: 
If the Coalition does responsible research, the 
board will accept our recommendations. The Coali-
tion is a responsible, commited group of citizens 
similar to those who researched and wrote the 
Schwab report. ( In ter'\T iew, 7/10/80)· 
Coalition members met with board members and district staff 
periodically in an attempt to keep everyone informed of 
its progress. (Interview 6/18/80c; Coalition minutes) 
They were committed to play by the rules, i.e., submit 
reports on time (Interview, 9/15/80). 
In retrospect, some Coalition members noted the polit-
ical naivete concerning its research approach (Interview, 
6/19/80b). The Coalition was not prepared for the "po1it-
icalness" of the process (Interview, 7/21/80). It didn't 
understand the need for more people with clout to be 
involved (Interview, 6/18/80c). Although Coalition members 
met with school district staff, board members, and city and 
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county politicians, it decided not to lobby or negotiate 
with the board prior to the final recommendations (Inter-
views, 6/17/80, 7/21/80). 
Some Coalition member~ may have been politically 
naive. Others, however, decided to support the research 
and recommendation approach as the most viable at that 
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stage of events and recognized that community support would 
be critical for the acceptance of the report. The Coali-
tion did not consider the social action model of "influence 
the political process" until after the board's rejection 
of the school pairing plan. (See Chapter VI for further 
discussion.) 
Not all Coalition members supported the research 
format as a way of changing the board's policy. However, 
the major focus of the Coalition from January, 1978 to 
January, 1979 was on collecting and analyzing data. The 
Community Involvement Committee and the Task Coordinating 
Committee recognized the need for support from influential 
groups for their final recommendations. Although the 
Coalition received support from a variety of community 
groups, there were some important community segments 
missing. 
Every successful desegregation plan has happened 
because city and business leadership gave it their full 
support (Kirby et al., 1973). Although the Coalition 
sought support from these groups, it received only limited 
I 
endorsement from the business, political, and religious 
community segments. There were individual exceptions. 
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Two city commissioners did support the Coalition's report 
with written testimony before the board; the Chamber of 
Commerce joined the Coalition; and the regional ecumenical 
religious body endorsed the Coalition's findings. Other 
people with power and influence were noticeably absent. 
One Coalition member suggested that business, politi-
cal, and religious leaders speak out only in crisis situa-
tions where harm may occur in the community (Interview, 
7/21/80). The Coalition documented the problem but evi-
dently it \tlas not perceived as being at the crisis stage. 
Another possible explanation was that the business and 
political community was generally supportive of the board 
and superintendent. "The superintendent didn't let anyone 
know he had a problem," explained one Coalition member 
(Interview, 6/19/80c). In addition, the board's and super-
intendent's attitudes about the Coalition made it difficult 
to approach some business people (Interview, 6/19/80b). 
Some members of the business community did contribute 
financially to the work of the Coalition, but did not pub-
licly support the Coalition report. 
The Coalition was most successful with its "manipula-
tion of voluntary associations l' (social reform model)--in 
essence, its own member organizations. The Coalition 
was able to get support for its findings and recommendations 
I 
123 
from most of its member organizations. Not every organiza~ 
tion supported the school pairing concept. Several groups 
supported the overall value concepts of the report, but 
not the specific recommendations. 
Orientation Toward Power Structure 
The historic development of the desegr~gation issue 
in Portland was an important factor in how members viewed 
the power structure. The Coalition began with the research 
change strategy because that was what the board asked them 
to do~~study and make recommendations about the Jefferson 
situation. Second, they adopted the research strategy 
because the Schwab committee report had been accepted. But 
unlike the Schwab report which began with a blank slate 
of desegregation accomplishments and was able to make 
recomendations about what to do about segregated schools, 
there was a thirteen-year history of desegregation programs 
for the Coalition to evaluate. The school system, the 
families, and the neighborhoods involved in the desegrega-
tion program had been affected by the experience. The 
board and school district generally were pleased with their 
progress. Some black parents had begun to question its 
success, while others continued to support the programs. 
(Interviews, Oregonian, 11/10/78-11/20/78, Portland 
Observer) 
How people perceive the power structure has a great 
deal to do with their previous experiences in trying to 
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make changes in the system. Many Coalition members a~cribed 
to the social reform orientation. They saw the power struc-
ture as that of "gate-keeper" and that its power center 
could be influenced through persuasion or pressure. In 
contrast, the social action model sees the power structure 
aa an external target of action. The "oppre~;sors need to 
be coerced or overturned." Some Coalition members and, 
later, the Black United Front shared this view of the Port-
land power structure. (Rothman 1 1968, p. 483) 
Portland has had considerable citizen involvement 
in city politics during the 19705. Neighborhood associa-
tions have been involved in communit~l development plans; 
the citizens advisory committee of the Downtown plan and 
numerous City Club reports all have influenced politics 
and policy. The success of the Schwab committee and experi-
ences with city-wide citizen action led Coalition members 
to see the power structure, the school board and super-
intendent as open. to influence. Some Coalition members 
were skeptical and thought there was a need for stronger 
action. 
Although the Coalition began with this social reform 
orientation, it changed during the process cf persuading 
the board. Coalition people began to lose confidence in 
this approach. One member commented on the "frustration 
l2.~ 
because no one took the concerns seriously." Neither the 
board nor superintendent wanted to discuss "how do we make 
it work better?" (Interview, 6/l9/80b). People with City 
Club and Schools for the City background had successfully 
used persuasion in past approaches to power structures. 
They were ~~rprised when the board expressed resentment 
over their criticism when their attitude seemed to be--
we don't want to answer questions about desegregation pol-
icy. (Interviews, 6/l9/80b, 7/10/80) 
Although the persuasion approach was not successful 
with the board, Coalition members offered these explana-
tions for that failure. The power structures does not res-
pond the same way to the black assessment of the problem, 
as it does to a white assessmen·c. (Interview, 7/21/80) 
The interaction with the ~oard was not a static process. 
Perceptions were constantly in flux. One board member felt 
that the Coalition was not interested in discussions 
because the board was not able to dialogue with Coalition 
members (Interview, 9/8/80). Board members were not accus-
tomed to the independent, adversarial style of the Coali-
tion. Coalition members felt that the board and superin-
tendent were threatened by the differences in style. The 
interactions quickly became an issue of personalities and 
positions. One board member believed this happened because 
two or three school system people were interacting with a 
core Coalition group on the issues, and that the discussions 
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and decisions became more a matter of personality than the 
issues involved. Increasingly, the Coalition described 
the board and administration as "arrogant, paternalistic, 
entrenched, unresponsive and close-minded" (Summary of 
interviews, CCSI). 
Coalition members began the study assuming that the 
school system knew what it was doing in desegregation. As 
information became difficult to obtain ~nd errors in school 
data were revealed, respect for the district staff eroded 
(Interview, 6/17/80b). For some Coalition members it 
increased their feelings of paranoia--the district had 
deliberately set out to destroy the black community. Other 
Coalition me~bers, who assumed the board was composed of 
liberal; progressive people, saw a power structure which 
wore blinders and did not look at the consequences of its 
actions. (Interview, 8/6/80) 
As the recognition of the political nature of the 
educational process evolved, people grew dissatisfied with 
Coalition actions. Some were upset at the compromises made 
over the research report in order to have acceptable recom-
mendations for the board (Interview, 7/25/80a). Others 
hoped that the more powerful whites (those with past experi-
ence of influence with the district) would accomplish the 
needed changes. Their hope was replaced by anger when that 
did not happen. Coalition members, although recognizing 
that the power structure was closed to their questions, 
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still hoped the board would accept all its recommendations. 
The Coalition hoped its unity, strong community support, 
and research findings would be enough to convince the board. 
One newspaper report commented: 
Clearly, the Coalition has a couple of things in its 
favor. While Portland long has possessed its fair 
share of racists, such people are not currently in 
power on the school board. A close observer suggests 
that the 'principal motivation in board members' deci-
sions on such an issue is "what's basically acceptable." 
And it's clearly not socially acceptable to be per-
ceived as racist at this point in Portland's history ••• 
Additionally, some moralists will say the Coalition 
has a clear moral issue on its side: 't.he unfairness 
of requiring one community to travel to get an edu-
cation without making a similar requirement of others. 
Social acceptability and moral issues, however, 
may not be enough to get the coalition the result it 
wants. (Ronald A. Bue1, "The Pclitics of Pairing," 
Willamette Week" 12/11/78, p. 6) 
Some Coalition members felt "The district may have under-
estimated us because we were nice people. Sometimes we 
worry too much about being nice" (Interview, 6/12/80). 
The Coalition pursued the nice, liberal, progressive game 
of change with the board as its target and then did not 
win all that it wanted. 
Conception of Constituent 
Population and Role 
The CoaU.tion moved in and out of the Social Action/ 
Social Reform definition of its constituent population, 
the "community at risk." One view was that the community 
constituents were a population "suffering at the hands of 
the broader community and thus in need of support" (Rothman, 
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1968, p. 484). The black at-risk population was the pri-
mary target of the Coalition's advocacy efforts. However, 
for some Coalition members, the entire community, black 
and white, was affected by the inequitable desegregation 
policy. Coalition members advocated for their own children 
as well as the community's children. 
Over two-thirds of the Coalition members interviewed 
identified the black community as the population at risk. 
The Coalition began in order to redress the grievances 
against the black community. As the research findings were 
shared about one-half of those interviewed identified the 
entire community as the secondary target. They argued that 
the entire community benefits from desegregation and that 
whites need integration. So, a secondary target was advo-
cating for an integrated society. (Interview, 6/l9/80b) 
The Coalition was not viewed as paternalistic in their 
relationship to minority constituencies. In constrast, 
the Committee of 100, Schwab committee, and Schools for 
the City were groups "doing it for or acting on behalf of 
blacks." Acting on behalf of the population at risk is 
more in the tradition of the social reform L..ldel. "A com-
mon mode of social action involves activity by a group or 
coalition of interests which acts vigorously on behalf of 
some outside client group which is at risk" (Rothman, 1969, 
p. 488). 
The Coalition worked hard to advocate for its own 
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constituencies. One perspective was that the black commu-
nity, through its involvement in the Task Coordinating 
council and Research Committee never gave up control or 
surrendered its advocacy for black children. (Interviews. 
7/21/80, 7/25/80c, 9/15/80). This reflects the social 
action model, "the client group, whether employers or con-
stituents, is in the position of determining broad goals 
and policies" (Rothman, 1969, p. 487). At th~ same time, 
the blacks needed white support i:'nd advocacy (Interview, 
7/21/80). Another perspective was that whites did advo-
cate with blacks and for black children, but they also saw 
desegregatioll as a community problem. Many of them were 
advocates for integration, as well. (Interviews, 6/19/80b, 
7/10/80, 7/25/80a, 8/6/80) 
Assumptions Regarding Interests 
of Community Subparts 
The social action model assumes that interests among 
community subparts are "at variance and not reconciliable," 
while the social reform model assumes that the "interests 
may be reconci1iable or in conflict" (Rothman, 1968, pp. 485, 
488). The majority of the Coalition people interviewed said 
that conflicting interests were reconciliable which fits 
with their orientation to the power structure as being 
permeable to persuasion. 
Internally, the members of the Coalition found they 
were able to reconcile their differences as a group. There 
I 
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were several reasons for their ability to reconcile differ-
ent interests within the Coalition. The organization of 
the Coalition provided an escape route. Organizational 
members could present their own perspective, but if their 
organization disagreed, they could withdraw from the vote. 
Despite their own preferences, members worked as a group 
on desegregation issues. (Interview, 7/30/80) 
All the Coalition members joine:d because "som3thing 
had to be changed." The st:aff and committee members used 
the community forums to identify underlying values that 
people shared and then built a value consensus on the issue 
o:E equity. Equity was a value both blacks and whites sup-
ported. (Interview, 7/25/80d) Differences were negotiated 
within the Coalition. Whites werEl interested in integra-
tion and multi-racial experiences; blacks were interested 
in quality education. The whites discovered that blacks 
were not opposed to integration, but not at the expense 
of destroying black neighborhood schools. (Interviews, 
7/25/80b, 7/25/80c) Given these different priorities, the 
hottest debate focused on the recommendation about school 
pairings at a November, 1978 Coalition meeting. The recom-
mendation read: 
"The district should pair each of the seven predom-
inantly minority schools in the district with one 
or two predominantly white schools in a manner that 
will comply with state guidelines on racial balance." 
The League of Women Voters representative said that 
pairing with only one or two schools was 'too limit-
ing' and that she thought more students should have 
the opportunity to attend integrated schools than 
such a system would allow. 
It was a black teacher who responded most force-
fully to that motion. 'I'm more interested in the 
welfare of the children who are being scattered all 
over the city. When black" children are divided up, 
the achievement level is lower. When people are 
together, more people support each other. I'm not 
interested in trying to give all the white people 
the experience of having one or two in their school.' 
(Wi11amette Week, "Politics of Pairing," 12/11/78, 
p. 6) 
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Although Coalition members were committed to a resolu-
tion of conflicting interests between the board and them-
selves, they increasingly realiz~d it was a one-way street. 
The board was not able to hear the citizens on this issue. 
(Interview, 6/19/80a) Another member described Portland 
as a city of "civilized politics." The modus operandi is 
not to admit to problems, but to resolve situations in a 
gentlemanly way. (Interview, 6/17/80b) The Coalition did 
play by the rules of the game, but not always in the style 
to which the school power structure was accustomed. 
The board and superintendent were not used to being 
challenged by parents and other non-educators who were 
knowledgeable on the issue to be decided. The board was 
used to negotiating with teacher unions and other educa-
tional professionals. It also was accustomed to citizen 
advisory committees who were normally consulted after the 
fact and, in some instances, did not clearly understand 
th8 problems. For example, the Title VII, ESAA Citizen 
Advisory Committee responsible for desegregation planning, 
was unaware of the scattering and other issues the 
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Coalition raised. If it had been informed or more involved, 
it might have asked for the kind of data the Coalition 
obtained. (Interview, 6/17/80) 
Portland's political style was not one of confronta-
tion. As the Willamette Week described the evening of 
the Coalition's board presentation: 
It was a scene to remember. It was big-time racial 
politics come to Portland, a city that somehow had 
escaped the intense backlash and explosive fireworks 
that have come out of school integration in many 
other American cities. (12/11/78, p. 1) 
A Coalition member describing Portland politics, said, 
"Most· of the: outs when they want to deal with educational 
issues, it's by way of appeal and appeasement syndrome. 
They appeal to the good will and knowledgeability of the 
insiders and the insiders accede to that if it makes them 
look good or if it's in their interests" (Interview, 
6/17/80b). 
The kind of negotiation that characterized ~he Coal i-
tions' reconciliation of conflicting interests did not occur 
between the Coalition and the school system. The Coalition 
decided not to negotiate prior to the board presentation. 
It had chosen to persuade the board to adopt its recommenda-
tions by the strategy of an united front with considerable 
community support. The board and superintendent confronted 
with a pairing proposal that they considered politifcally 
infeasible, chose not to negotiate, but rather to accept 
all the Coalition's other recommendations except the one on 
school pairing. (Int~rviews, 7/31/80, 8/12/80, 8/27/80, 
9/8/80) 
During that critical time in December, 1978, there 
was community re~ognition of the need for negotiation. 
The mayor offered his services as a mediator between 
the board and citizen's coalition, sensing trouble 
between ~~e two groups would develop. The board 
melLIDers turned him down. 'It's a legitimate issue 
for the city t.o get involved in,' argued the mayor. 
The board chairman--who up to a point welcomed 
the mayor's advice--said the mayor's services as a 
mediator simply were not needed. 'The board di~n't 
think that that was the best way to get at the 
problems,' said the chairman. (Oregonian, Forum, 
2/1/79, p. B7) 
By this time, neither the board nor the Coalition wanted 
the mayor's involvement (Oregonian, Letter to the Editor, 
2/79). The newspapers and television media maintained a 
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level of support for the Coalition's recommendations. The 
media hoped by focusing attention on the need for the 
business and political community to back the desegregation 
proposals that such support might develop (Interview, 
9/19/80). 
The Coalition testified in response to the superin-
tendent and asserted its willingness to negotiate (Coalition 
response, 12/18/78). The board, while emphasizing the 
common ground between the Coalition and themselves, would 
not accept the pairing proposal (Interview, 9/8/80i Oregon-
ian, 1/23/79). The board accepted the superintendent's 
judgment that the pairing plan would not work (Interview, 
8/12/80). There was one vote for the Coalition's plan. 
The Willamette Week pointed out the board's dilemma: 
This political hot potato being dropped in their 
laps wash't ex&ctly welcom~. This had been a rugged 
year for the board, with members under fire on a 
number of fronts. At one point, a petition was dis-
tributed to recall the board. And four of the seven 
members are up for election in April. (12/11/78, 
p. 1) 
One board perspective was that the Coalition had failed 
to consider the "political sensitiveness" of the issue. 
The Coalition, by focusing on equity, represented blacks 
and whites already committed to desegregation, but it did 
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not address the silent majority or white reactionaries who 
were llot always supportive of desegregation plans. For 
example, the PTA was not able to support the pairing plan, 
although the PTA representative to the Coalition personally 
supported it. (IntervieTtl; 6/19/80c: Willamette Week, 
12/11/78). The board, on the other hand, focused on the 
voting public, the business community, and middle to upper 
income areas in Portland. The Coalition did not have 
enough of these kind of people participating to convince 
the board that a mandatory, school pairing program would 
not result in white flight. (Interviews, 8/12/80, 9/8/80) 
Conception of the Public Interest 
Both the social action and social reform models' con-
ception of the public interest is "realist-individualist." 
I: .: i 
This view stems from the fact: 
Of having no control of, and little access to, 
a central decision-making ~pparatus in the 
community, and usually comprising a small minor-
ity of the population, special interest groups 
can only be effective confronting others, some-
times attempting to make ad hoc coalitions and 
alliances in the community market place. 
(Rothman, 1968, p. 486) 
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Two-thirds of the Coalition members interviewed, des-
cribed the Coalition as representative of the public inter-
est. For some members the Coalition offered a "vision for 
public education," whil~ others saw it as a public interest 
group with a special focus on education. (Interview, 
7/10/80). Some felt it began as a special interest group, 
but moved to a public interest group as it recruited people 
from diverse backgrounds. Another perspective was that 
the Coalition represented special interests, people com-
mitted to desegregation, but made an effort to include all 
elements in the community (Interview, 6/2/80). The Coa1i-
tion did not include conservatives, pro-neighborhood school 
groups, the business establistlment, and some segments of 
the black community. The Coalition was composed of a 
number of special interest groups, but because of the 
nature of the issue, they joined together to work for their 
perception of the public interest. (Interviews, 6/11/80, 
7/10/80, 7/25/80d) 
The issue was how to achieve equity in desegregation? 
The solutions needed support from the entire community. 
1 
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The reality in Portland was that whites were not concerned 
about desegregation since it was a voluntary effort for 
them, unlike the blacks' experiences. (Interview, 6/11/80; 
City Club report, 1980) The challenge the Coalition 
accepted was to open up the decision-making arena to the 
entire community on the implementation of desegregation. 
Working primarily with social reform tools, the 
Coalition tried to educate the community to the desegrega-
tion reality in Portland, Oregon before any changes could 
be made. 
In the ne~t chapter, the impact of the Coalition as 
an advocacy organization and its recommendations on the 
school system and the greater community will be examined. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPACT OF THE POLICY INTERVENTION 
Did the intervention by the Coalition have any impact 
on the desegregation policy of the Portland Public Schools? 
In trying to answer that question, this study will look 
at short-term and long-t.erm impacts on the board, school 
district, the Coalition, and the community. The focus of 
the impact analysis will be on changes in the formal rules 
of the educational syst.em that affect children at risk 
(laws, regulations, court decisions, school district plans) 
and the educational practices affecting th6se children 
(service denials or implementation of mandated services). 
(Moore, 1980) The third area of analysis of the impact 
of this policy intervention is whether the advocacy organi-
zation altered the complex network of activities at the 
federal, state, school district, and school levels that 
critically shape services to children. The rationale for 
this third criterion is that past research on educational 
intervention shows that for new laws and court decisions 
to be implemented, appropriate changes must take place in 
dozens of interrelated activities carried out by public 
officials and educators at the federal, state, school dis-
trict, and school levels. 
A Carnegie Corporation report on Child Advocacy an~ 
the Schools (1980) points out that child advocacy has 
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developed as one response to breakdowns in the implementa-
tion of educational programs for children at risk. 
Advocates argue that implementation failure occur 
because laws are not vigorously enforced, because 
rigid organizations continue old habits in the face 
of new program ideas, because political pressuras 
at various points in the implementation process 
dash the promise of new programs. They argue that 
reforms will improve services to children on a wide 
scale only when vigorous independent organizations 
press the educational system to carry them out at 
each point in the implementation process, in each 
important activity in the network of activities 
that shapes services to children. 
The Community Coalition for School Integration was 
an advocacy organization working to change the local school 
district's desegregation plan. It established two goals: 
tl) "to ensure equal educational opportunities to maximize 
each child's potential through the process of identifying 
common concerns of the community in connection with deseg-
regation" and (2) "to make recommendations to the School 
Board on needed changes in the desegregation policy, after 
an extensive analysis of the present desegregation plan" 
(eCSI minutes, 9/1/77). 
The Coalition, as documented in the last chapter, 
did involve the community through (1) its own membership, 
(2) the two series of community forums, and (3) extensive 
media coverage in identifying the concerns and problems 
the community had with the desegregation plan. The 
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Coalition also made recommendations regarding Administra-
tion, Student Transfer plan, Curriculum, Teacher Training, 
Student Discipline, Minority Hiring, Minority Teacher 
Placement, Integrated Housing, Advisory Boards, and Future 
School Board Relationship with the Coalition. The school 
board accepted all of the recommendations except the Stu-
dent Transfer plan. 
The school pairing section of the Student Transfer 
plan recommended: 
The school district should use school pa1r1ng as the 
major means to accomplish desegregation/integration. 
The District should pair each of the seven predom-
inantly Minority schools in the District with one 
or two predominantly White schools in a manner that 
will comply with state guidelines on racial balance. 
(Equity, 1978, p. 87) 
Initial Impact of Coalition Report 
Before exploring further the impact of the Coalition's 
recommendations, it is important to examine the board and 
district's response to the school pairing plan. Why was 
it rejected? Their rejection was a critical factor in the 
nature of the impact that the Coalition's work had on the 
desegregation poli=y. The student pairing plan was impor-
tant to the Coa1ition ' s demand for equity in desegregation. 
From the start, the Coalition had made it clear that 
the student transfer, or pairing recommendation, 
was the one it cared about, the crucial part of its 
report. (Willamette Week, 12/25/78, p. 1) 
The superintendent provided the first indication of how the 
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district viewed that particular recommendation. In his 
preliminary response to the Coalition's report (12/11/78) 
he said "that the:: pairing idea "appears to be a considerable 
overreaction in view of the extent of the problem it is 
intended to solve ll (p. 25). He did not make a recommenda-
tion on the student transfer section, but added that "there 
are serious logistical problems with the pairing proposal 
that have to do with numbers of students, size of facili-
ties, and racial percentages" (p. 24). His third area of 
concern was "the Coalition's proposal on pairing would 
reverse a series of decisions that were approved by the 
Board after extensive community involvement and support" 
(p. 28). 
The Coalition wanted to substitute its student pairing 
plan for all the desegregation plans in operation because 
it believed it was a more equitable plan. The Coalition 
was concerned that upper grade level students from some 
Early Childhood Centers in Albina had no middle school of 
assignment. The irony, as the superintendent pointed out, 
that it was board policy regarding community acceptance 
of middle schools that converted two of the Albina schools 
into Early Childhood Centers rather than middle schools • 
.",~' He said, "Both of these buildings were sui table for middle 
school use. The communities rejected the idea after much 
discussion. Both favored the establishment of Early 
Childhood Centers instead" (Memorandum: Superintendent 
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Response, 12/11/78, p. 28). 
In addition to his administrative concerns over imp1e-
mentation of the plan, the superintendent did not think 
it was a plan, but more of an "ideological conviction." 
The fact that the Coalition did not name a single school 
demonstrated the political naivete of Coalition members, 
as they could not bring themselves to discuss which schools 
might be involved. (Interview, 8/27/80) 
The Coalition responded to the superintendent's con-
cerns on December 18, 1978. They challenged the superin-
tenden't's nUI'nbers, based on keeping the racial balance 
70/30 and on the total number of children involved in the 
schools, not just those who would be bused. The assistant 
coordinator of the Coalit:ion ::refuted the Superintendent's 
statement that 15,000 students would have to be bussed to 
pair schools at a 70/30 ratio" (Portland Observer, 12/21/78, 
p. 1). The Coalition's estimate was approximately 5,000, 
a number based on a 50/50 ratio which is the district's 
current policy for the Albina schools. The Coalition 
reasserted that the plan is workable, but the "bottom line 
is the willingness of the Board to assign white students 
to the Albina schools" (Coalition response, 12/18/68, p. 12). 
The Oregonian underlined the challenge: 
The board must face an issue that the school adminis-
tration has largely avoided--mandatory busing of white 
students to Albina schools to complement the present 
system of mandatory busing of many black students out 
of Albina. (12/19/78, p. B1) 
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Part of the battle was over numbers. The Coalition claimed 
it would involve 5,000 students and the superintendent said 
12-15,000 students would be bused. There were differences 
on how many minority stt..!de!!ts were "involuntary transfers." 
It finally carne down to whose numbers did you trust. The 
coalition (12/18/78) cautioned the board to look carefully 
at the district's statistics because they contained errors 
and were based on different racial ratios. 
The Willarnette Week (12/25/78) analyzed the numbers 
argument. 
The Superintendent's technique crumbles with a closer 
look. If you turn to the analysis provided by his 
own staff, and change the ratio away from 70-30 but 
keep all the schools under 50 per cent minority 
enrollment, the pairing works out fine within the 
guidelines suggested by the Coalition. 
There are 3,557 resident minority students in the 
predominantly black schools. In an analytical paper, 
the school district chose 14 westside shools with 
a total of 5,119 nonblack students and spaces for 
6,375. If you pair each of the predominantly black 
schools with two predominantly white schools, the 
numbers work out as follows: Bus half the black 
students, or 1,778 students. Bus less than half, or 
2,147 of the white students, making the percentage 
of black students in the seven Albina schools 45.3 
and the percentage of black students in the 14 white 
receiving schools 37.4. In short, the arithmetic 
works if you make it work, and the Superintendent's 
plan is nothing more than a straw man. (p. 1) 
Meanwhile, the school board had not discussed in pub-
lie its reaction to the Coalition's proposals. On Decem-
ber 29, 1978, the chairperson of the school board addressed 
the City Club on "The State of the Schools." The first 
public statement by a board member on the Coalition's plan 
indicated that the pairing plan was in trouble. 
It appears that the pairing proposal of the Coali-
tion has at least three principal elements which 
depart significantly from the School Board's 
integration program. 
1. First, the Coalition calls for middle schools 
to be established without regard to the Board's 
community acceptance policy. The School, on the 
other hand, has not sought to impose middle 
schools over the opposition of the parents of 
the cluster, but to encourage parents to reor-
ganize into middle school clusters to improve 
the educational programs. 
2. Second, the Coalition calls for three middle 
schools to be established in Albina. We hav,e 
placed middle schools on the periphery of Albina. 
Furthermore, under the Coalition proposal at laast 
two early childhood centers would have to be con-
.verted to middle schools even though the buildings 
are being remodeled for early childhood center 
use with full support of the local school advisory 
committee. 
3. Third, the Coalition proposes that the attend-
ance area of non-resident children (principally, 
majority children) at the Albina schools, includ-
ing the early childhood centers, be mandatory. 
I do not favor the pairing proposals made by the 
Coalition. I do not think the pairing proposals are 
wise or likely to lead to greater equity or integra-
tion. (City Club, 12/29/78, pp. 18··19) 
The philosophy underlying the district's emphasis on the 
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voluntary approach to desegregation was underscored in this 
speech. 
For example, in the absence of a court-ordered plan, 
it is not improper, and indeed it is wise, to place 
middle schools in locations, as we have done, where 
community acceptance has made the transition possible, 
on the periphery of Albina, and then to ask that 
children, white and black, gather at these locations, 
by bus if necessary, for improved educational pro-
grams. (City Club, 12/29/78, p. 20) 
On January 8, 1979, the school board voted to adopt all 
the resolutions regarding the Coalition's recommendations, 
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with the exception of student transfer. On January 12, 
1979, the board chairperson sent a letter to the Coalition 
chairperson asking for the Coalition's participation in 
discussing how to "flesh out the general directions these 
resolutions indicate" (Letter from board chairman). 
The boa:.:-d had deferred action on the "pairing" pro-
posal until the January 22, 1979 meeting so that they could 
emphasize the common ground they shared with the Coalition 
(Interview, 9/8/80). There were two meetings with the 
Coalition between January 8 and January 22 so that the 
board could outline the resolution on pairing that they 
would present at their next meeting (Interview, 9/8/80). 
The headline on the front page of the Oregonian (1/23/79) 
describes the act.ion of the board: "School Board Rejects 
'Pairing' Propo~al." 
The Portland School Board Monday night adopted a 
desegregation motion that rejects school pairing, 
proposes eventual establishment of middle schools 
in Albina, and relies heavily on present desegre-
gation methods to bring about more equity in the 
district's school integration efforts. (p. 1) 
Board resolution X-6184, in rejecting the Coalition's pair-
"ing plan, stated: 
The Board • • • does not believe that the pa1r1ng 
proposal of the Coalition will either assure greater 
equity, increase interracial understanding, and 
improve educational quality, or further the Dis-
trict's integration programs. (Board minutes, 
1/22/79) 
The board's resolution did address the "scattering" issue 
as it committed itself to "reduce substantially the 
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scattering of minority students"; second, to "consider ways 
within the board's existing policy to establish middle 
schools for students in the Boise, King, ELiot and Humboldt 
schools attendance areas w ; and to "increase attendance of 
white students in the later primary grades at Early Child-
hood Centers" (Oregonian, 1/23/79, p. 1). These were all 
issues raised by the Coalition. 
The Coalition had failed to convince the board that 
the pairing plan or mandatory assignment of white students 
to Albina schools was necessary to achieve greater equity. 
The board reaffirmed its commitment to work for greater 
equity within the framework of its own desegregation policy. 
A variety of reasons contributed to the majority vote of 
the board against school pairing. (One board member was 
absent that night, so the final vote was 5-1 in favor of 
board resolution X-6l84.) The board member who supported 
the Coalition's pairing plan said it failed because Chap-
man and Ainsworth, two predominantly white west-side 
schools, would have been bused to Boise, a predominantly 
black, east-side school. (Interview, 8/26/80) Past board 
decisions on middle schools had involved the same kind of 
problem: people were always interested in schools of 
higher status than lower status. The decision to pair 
schols involved having to make class and race assignments 
(Interview 8/26/80). A COclition member echoed this 
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thought. 
The board believes that the white community won't 
accept programs to end injustice if those programs 
involved busing white students into the black com-
munity ••• But the more I know Portland, the 
more I think you sell white citizens short. 
(Oregonian, 1/23/79, p. 1) 
Several board members who voted for the board resolution 
had accepted the school district's nlmIDerS and the super-
intendent's assessment of the unworkability of the plan 
(Interviews, 8/12/80, giS/SO). One board member believed 
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that the Coalition's efforts had created the right climate 
for the development of a cross-busing plan, but the support 
for such a plan never materialized from the community, 
newspapers or the board (Interview, 8/12/80). Another 
board member felt the survey data from Administrative 
Transfer program participants confirmed that the present 
plan was doing a good job, so why vote to support the 
Coalition's proposal which would involve major changes 
(Interview, 8/7/80). The COf"J.ition had not convinced 
another board member that they had done their political 
homework regarding the impact of pairing on the white com-
munity. This board mewher found the Coalition to be 
politically naive because aU. its emphasis was on equity 
and it ignored the previous desegregation efforts of the 
district (Interview, 7/31/80). 
Once the board had made the decision, there was little 
room for negotiation. Each side continued to issue public 
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statements which made "behind the scenes" or "off the 
record II conversations extremely difficult. (Interview, 
6/2/80) The board made the decision they thought was most 
viable and the Coalition objected. A Coalition spokes-
person said in response to the board's decision, "If you 
try to give us a solution that doesn't involve white people 
actively, you aren't giving us an equitable solution. It 
is still one-way busing" (Oregonian, 1/23/79, p. 1). 
The impact of the board's rejection devastated the 
Coalition. Even though their other recommendations had 
been accepted, the membership felt it had failed to obtain 
a more equitable solution. 
The first few months after the board's rejection of 
the pairing plan, the Coalition was directionless, angry, 
and divided. One member said, "we were exhausted and 
disappointed. The white liberals were angry and the blacks 
felt they'd been kicked in the face. Instead of turning on 
the board and the school district, we turned on each other" 
(Interview, 7/25/80). The Coalition had lost its staff 
and had no strategy ready for operation after the board's 
decision. All the attention and work of the Coalition had 
gone into the presentation of the report. (Interview, 
7/14/80) Coalition members were burned-out and wanted to 
rest after the energy they expended during the two months 
of board presentations. (Interview, 6/10/80) Some members 
felt that they had accomplished what they set out to do--
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research and recommend. Others, from the past months' 
experiences, conclude.d that it was essentially a political 
process. It was going to take more than study and facts 
to change the desegregation policy. There was a growing 
feeling that the changes would not occur with the present 
board. (Interviews, 6/10/80, 7/25/80b) 
A television news analyst, in a January 23, 1979 
commentary, assessed the school board decision. 
In its resolution, the school board deals directly 
and firmly only with middle schools. It seems to 
promise a middle school in Albina and possibly a 
second nearby. Otherwise, the present program is 
not disturbed. In the lower grades, the burden of 
desegregation continues to fallon Black families. 
When the Board's hard commitments are sifted 
from its soft language, the resolution remains a 
middle school policy, which has been the center-
piece of district pulicy for ten years. The plan 
is likely to produce some marginal gains in deseg-
~egation. It is by and large a middle school pro-
gram, not a desegregation program. (Transcript 
from NBC local affiliate, Evening News, 1/23/79, 
pp. 2-3) 
The Oregonian had not supported the pairing proposal, but 
had favored the other Coalition recommendations. After 
the board decision, the Oregonian urged the board and Coali-
tion to continue the negotiation on the basic issues. It 
criticized the lack of public discussion by the board on 
the substance of the proposals and suggested that in the 
future discussions on improvements in the integration pro-
gram should be held in the open (1/23/79). 
Three weeks after the board meeting, another Oregonian 
article noted that the Coalition still planned to push for 
'equity' in busing. 
The coalition, which took shape in the summer of 
1977 out of the anqer of the black community over 
a plan to step up forced busing of black students, 
has to view the :rejection of it:; pairing plan as 
a setback. (2/11/79, p. D3) 
Although the Coa.lition members were discouraged with the 
board's response, they announced that the Coalition "will 
continue to prod the district to re-examine its policies, 
perhaps enlisting support from the city and state. Right 
now, it's regrouping" (Oregonian, 2/11/79, p. D3). 
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The Coalition took several actions in February, 1979. 
They decided to reopen their membership which had been 
frozen since the previolls fall. They redefined their 
mission to include monitoring of the district's performance 
on the resolutions. They reviewed complaints filed a.ga.inst 
the district with the Office of Civil Rights by a group 
of minority educators and parents. They decided not to 
join the complaint. They also decided not to endorse candi-
dates for the April, 1979 school board elections, but 
encouraged individual members to get involved. A Coalition 
spokesperson explained the reason behind these various 
decisions. 
We have a very delicate coalition, which is commited 
to improving people's attitudes toward integration, 
and we can agree on that. • • • If we start support-
ing candidates solely on their positions on desegre-
gation, we'll lose some people and reinforce the 
board's belief that we are a radical group ••• The 
Coalition's role now will be less activist and more 
consciousness-raising. (Oregonian, 2/11/79, p. D3) 
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The Coalition divided over which strategy to pursue. 
A small group of merobers, mostly white with occasional 
black participation, decided to pursue a monitoring role 
with the district over the implementation of the resolu-
tions. Subcommittees were formed on student discipline, 
curriculum, teacher training, and housing. (CCSI Minutes, 
3/22/79) • 
The Coalition began to fragment. People who wanted 
to work at the monitoring role became involved in that. 
People who wanted more act.ion, legal or political, chose 
that route. (Interview, 6/l1/80c) General attendance at 
meetings began to falloff and black participation lessened. 
Black Coalition members thought that mo~e direct, 
political action was needed. Several filed a complaint 
with the Office of Civil Rights; others worked in the 
school board campaigns to defeat the incumbents. Still 
others became involved in organizing the Black United 
Front, a black advocacy group. One Black United Front/ 
Coalition participant described the difference in strategy 
between the Coalition and Black United Front. Coalition 
members were concerned about "doing tbings that would make 
the board feel good. The problem was that the board wasn't 
going to do what we wanted them to until we got the leverage 
that would make a politician move" (Interview, 7/21/80). 
During this time, the Coalition wrestled with defin-
ing its role, strategies, and purpose as an organization. 
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One Coalition member observed we were not at "the end of 
a process, the fight was just beginning" (Interview, 
6/17/80a). This time, however, the Coalition was not agreed 
on the course of action. 
In sum, the initial impact of the Coalition's recom-
mendations was: 
1. Acceptance of nine recommendations and rejection 
of one, the pairing plan; 
2. Board and district "working sessions" with Coali-
tion representatives on resolutions; 
"3. Coalition pursues monitoring and educational role; 
4. Black Coalition members and other members of the 
black community seek a more activist strategy to implement 
changes; and 
5. Defeat of two incumbenets who had supported the 
board's resolutions by two candidates who were supportive 
of th~ Coalition's plan. 
Long-Term Impact 
What was the impact on the formal rules and the 
educational practices of the school system that affect 
children at risk? Were there any changes in the network 
of activities at the federal, state, school district, and 
school levels that critically shape services to children? 
These criteria were used in an "applied research study 
concerning the effectiveness of independent child advocacy 
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groups focused on the public schools" (Moore, 1980, p. 1). 
The Coalition's impact will be analyzed in light of. its 
effectiveness in improving services to children and al ter-
ing the complex network 6f activities (Figure 6). 
Educational Practices Formal Rules 
"Improve Services to Children" 
COALITION: 
oreduction in scattering 
oinitiation of evaluation 
and data gathering in 
areas of: 
suspensions 
achievement for A.T. 
students 
oteacher evaluations 
'reorganization of deseg-
regation program 
BLACK UNITED FRONT: 
ofreedom of choice for 
black children in 
schools 
oboard appointment 
°N.E. middle school 
oshort- and long-term 
resolutions on 
desegregation plan 
Individuals: 
ofile OCR complaint 
Network of activities 
oelectoral and appointive changes on school board 
'Coalition and Black United Front set the stage for 
further changes, still in process 
Figure 6. Policy impact of Coalitiono 
Educational Practices 
The Coalition identified several major problems in 
Portland's desegregation practices which directly impacted 
children: the issue of "scattering," the fact of dispropor-
tionate suspension rates for minority students, and lack 
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of achievement and other educational data on Administrative 
Transfer students for evaluation purposes of the program. 
In its reco~~endations, the Coalition asked the district 
to respond to these problems. It made the board aware of 
the policy impact of its incremental decisions on desegre-
gation. The Coalition dramatized the issues to the board 
and corrununity with its visual presentation of the fact of 
liscattering"--thirty-nine buses drawing up every morning 
to King School which would scatter 451 children to thirty-
nine schools (Equity for the GOS,I 1978, p. 44a, Figure 1). 
The school district took action on these issues. 
First, the school district now collects achievement data 
on black and white students, including the Administrative 
Transfer students. The district also provides suspension 
data by age, sex, and race so that evaluations can be made 
of the district's progress on discipline practices. (Inter-
view, 1/8J.) The Metropolitan Human Relations Corrunission 
has conducted ian outside evaluation of district statistics 
on suspension for the past two years (Analysis of Suspen-
sion and Enrollment Patterns Among Portland Public Schools, 
1977-78 and 1978-79 ) • In addition, the American Friends 
Service Committee initiated an education research and 
action project to provide case advocacy to families on 
school discipline practices as well as to monitor the 
district's record as regards minority children. Both of 
these community groups became involved in this issue as a 
.l 
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result of the Coalition's research and recommendations on 
this issue. (Interviews, 6/20/80, 7/21/80) 
The Coalition's school pairing recommendation was 
designed to solve the problem of "scattering" which its 
research had documented. The board rejected the Coalition's 
proposal because "the board does not believe that the pair-
i.ng proposal of the Coalition will either assure greater 
equity, increase inter-racial understanding, and improve 
educational quality, or further the District's integration 
program" (Board resolution X-6184, 1/22/79). However, the 
board did agree to "reduce substantially the number of 
receiving schools to which children from a particular 
neighborhood are transferred, while preserving appropriate 
latitude for parent choices of schools" (Board resolution 
X-6184, 1/22/79) 0 
The Coalition appointed a subco~nittee to work with 
the district and board to develop a plan to reduce scatter-
ing. By April, 1979, the district had worked out standard-
ized school assignments for King I and Humboldt upper grade 
students. (Interviews, 8/27/80, 9/8/80) The superintend-
ent reported on the progress to the board. The superin-
tendent agreed with the Coalition that scattering reduction 
is only viewed as an essential step, not the total sol~1.tion 
of desegregation problems. However, "the standard and 
optional school assignments on the attached list will be 
implemented immediately by personnel of the district 
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charged with re~!?onsibi1ities for school assignments and/or 
transfers" (Memo to Board of Education, 4/24/79, p. 1). In 
August, 1979, the superintendent again reported that "the 
number of receiving schools for new students has been 
reduced by 65% for 1979-80. That is 45 schools instead of 
the 168 schools identified by the Coalition for the 1977-78 
school year" (Memo to Board, 8/29/79, p. 35). The number 
of children affected by these decisions were the 1,413 
"voluntary transfer students," as well as the 351 black 
students for whom no grade level was available (the invol-
untary transfer students) (Superintendent's response to 
Community Coalition for School Integration, 12/11/78, p. 3, 
Chart H). One school district staff person commented that 
in order to reduce the scattering "we ended up matching 
schools. We did more pairing than we thought we'd do" 
(Interview, 8/12/80). 
One of the most significant changes was in the teacher 
evaluation procedures. Board resolution X-6121 on Standard 
of Performance in Multi-Ethnic Education expanded the 
criteria on which a teacher's performance was based. 
The competent teacher in subject with multi-ethnic 
dimensions includes appropriate multi-ethnic themes 
in lesson plans and instruction, including histori-
calor other information as to cultures having 
significant impact on the world, nation, or com-
munity. (Board resolution X-6121, 1/8/89) 
This criterion was added in th~ Spring of 1979 as part of 
teacher evaluations and continues to be used as of April, 
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1981. This action was one of the more significant changes· 
with long-reaching implications for district personnel, 
according to a district staff member (Interview, 12/10/80). 
There were also administrative changes as a result 
of the Coalition recommendations. Desegregation planning 
was centralized. The Office of the Assistant Superintend-
ent for Community and Staff Development had a 50 percent 
increase in staff and acquired more authority to monitor 
and implement tile desegregation program. The creation of 
the positions of Director of Desegregation Programs and a 
Coordinator of Student Transfer programs has resulted in 
better record-keeping and the machinery to evaluate the 
results of current desegregation efforts. (Interviews, 
8/12/80, 12/10/80) 
Network of Activities 
Network of Activities refers to the forces that shape 
services to children. 
For new laws and court decisions to be implemented 
whose purpose is to benefit children at risk, 
appropriate changes must take place in dozens of 
interrelated activities carried out by public offi-
cials and educators at the federal, state, school 
district and school levels. (Moore, 1980, p. 6) 
The Coalition and, later, the Black United Front, had 
a major impact in changing the political structure of the 
school district. In a related effort, two Coalition mem-
bers, through the filing of a complaint with the Office of 
'~ , 
Civil Rights, tried to obtain its assistance changing the 
desegregation program. This section will discuss both 
these changes. 
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Much of the changes wrought in the educational prac-
tices began in the Winter of 1979, but the defeat of two 
incumbent school board members in April, 1979 signaled 
the possibilities of more changes. The board chairman's 
reaction to the defeats highlighted the problems that lay 
ahead. "I'm sorry to lose the only minority member of the 
Board and the two women on the Board, • • • the loss may 
hurt the Board's ability to deal with desegregation issues 
in a way that is credible to the minority community" 
(Oregonian, 4/4/79, p. 1,. The women had both supported 
the board's rejection of the pairing plan. The remaining 
woman board menilier was recovering from a heart attack. The 
two new board members had supported the Coalition's work, 
but were not in agreement with the pairing plan. They did 
support the citizen process and the research findings on 
the problems in desegregation policy. 
Most Coalition ~embers and many of the board and 
school district staff believe the Coalition's report con-
tributed to the election of two new board members. Coali-
tion members attribute the defeat of the incumbents to the 
awareness that changes were needed on the board. Movement 
on the desegregation plan would not occur without changes 
on the board. As one Coalition member explained, "We did 
1 
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not change the board policy on desegregation, but we did 
change the Board" (Interview, 6/ll/80b). Newspapers keyed 
the incumbents' defeat to the issue of credibility. 
The school board has never before seriously chal-
lenged district desegregation policy, part of the 
Schools for the Seventies plan. Indeed its whole-
sale agreement (with one exception) with the Super-
intendent's rejection of the Coalition pairi~g 
proposal last winter caused it to lose more than a 
little face in Portland's black and white liberal 
community. Critics asked, Does a school board that 
relies so much on the super.intendent's advice have 
credibility? This issue of school board credibility 
became the touchstone of .the recent board election, 
and eventually catapulted the two new members of 
the board into office. (Willamette Week, 7/16/79, 
p. 9) 
The Coalition laid the groundwork for the changes 
that r'lere to come. The Coalition expanded the range of 
policy options and paved the way for major policy shifts, 
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observed one Coalition member. "We wlere the snowplow whose 
job it was to expand the level of discussion on the issue. 
We proposed radical soluticms in order to get the Board to 
make moderate changes" (Interview, 7/14/80). 
Office of Civil R~.qhts 
Complaint 
With the death of the woman board member, another 
vacancy was created on the board in July, 1979. The appoint-
ment of a new board member became intertwined with two 
other events, the Office of Civil Rights ruling and the 
emergence of the Black United Front. 
In 1977, the Office of Civil Rights received a letter 
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of complaint from the Oregon Minority Educators Association, 
charging the district with seven violations of Title VI 
because of race discrimination. Of the seven, three areas 
were scrutinized in the 1979 spring investigation: bias in 
the disciplining of black students, lower achievement scores 
for black students in Early Childhood Centers, and the 
excessive burden of desegregation borne by black students 
in Portland's student transfer-assignment program. In 
December, 1978, a companion complaint was filed by another 
educational staff member,. Both persons were active in the 
Coalition. The Coalition had decided not to join the 
complaint process, but did meet with Office of Civil Rights 
investigators and did supply its research findings to the 
investigation. Although the Coalition was not an official 
complainant, many members hoped that the federal government 
would intervene to force the board to change the district's 
desegregation plan (Interviews, 7/10/80, 7/24/80). 
In June, 1979, the Office of Civil Rights cleared 
the Portland schools of a bias charge in school desegrega-
tiona 
Because busing in Portland is voluntary, the inequity 
we found is not violative under the law. Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act limits our authority to 
review cases of discrimination only to places where 
there is a legal obligation to desegregate--in other 
words, where there is a court-ordered remedy to 
prior findings of discrimination. • • • although we 
identified discrimination in Portland, it comes from 
a voluntary remedy to correct deficiencies in a sys-
tem whose problems we hadn't even previously 
J 
identified. And technically we just don't have the 
authority to act on it. (Interview with Virginia 
Balderrama, acting director of Region X, Office of 
Civil Rights, Willamette Week, 7/16/79, p. 9) 
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At its all-day planning session on June 30, 1979, the 
Coalition explored strategies for responding to the federal 
ruling. They asked an attorney to check the legality of 
the ruling and to see if it could be appealed. The Coali-
tion also held a press conference and issued a public 
statement in response to the Office of Civil Rights ruling. 
The district was exonerated on a technicality; its 
plan was considered voluntary because it is not the 
product of a court order. HEW's letter of findings 
similarly vindicates the District based on the 
Department's interpretation of what constitutes 
'gross' inequity--the measure for which is not clear 
in the letter. 
This does not alter the fact that Black children 
continue to be discriminated against under Portland 
Public Schools desegregation program. (Press 
release, Community Coalition for School Integration, 
7/12/79, p. 1) 
At the July 12, 1979 Coalition meeting, members discussed 
the feasibility of filing a complaint based on the Acts of 
Segregation which they had documented in their press 
release. They debated the question: "Can we be both coop-
erative and confrontational? The group view was that it 
is not smart politics to alienate ourselves from the dis-
trict. Members were urged to report back to their own 
parent organizations to keep an active support of the 
Coalition alive" (Coalition minutes, 7/12/79, p. 1). 
This decision not to file a complaint was a critical 
turning point in the life of the Coalition because the 
..... -
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blacks already had organized the Black United Front and had 
called for a boycott. The Coalition, while recognizing the 
frustration that gave rise to the formation of the Front, 
could not decide whether to take a more ac:ivist stance. 
From this point, it was the Front which pushed for and 
achieved changes in the formal rules and educational prac-
tices of the district regarding its desegregation policy. 
Black United Front 
The Black United Front, on July 12, 1979, called for 
a boycott of the Portland Public Schools. Theco-
chairperson explained the reasons behind this decision. 
The ultimate indignity is that the Federal Govern-
ment has done nothing, and apparently will do nothing, 
although it acknowledges that the District's pro-
gram is discriminatory. 
It is now up to Black parents to find solutions 
for themselves ••.• become more involved and take 
a more active role in the education of our children. 
(Portland Observer, 7/19/79, p. 1) 
The Black United Front (BUF) boycott demands reflected 
Coalition research and recommendations. The central issue 
was the scattershot busing of black students to white 
schools. School administrators claimed they had made sig-
nificant progress in reducing the scattering since it was 
first exposed by the Coalition, but boycott leaders called 
the approach "piecemeal" and claimed that a co~prehensive 
plan was needed. (Oregonian, 7/29/79) 
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Board Appoint~ent 
In the midst of the board's negotiations with the 
Black united Front, the board was also reviewing applicants 
for the vacant position •. A board review panel recommended 
three white women for the post, which angered the black 
community even further (Portland Observer, 7/12/79). There 
were five black applicants who were turned down. At the 
August 6, 1979 meeting, two blacks were added to the final-
ist list. The appointment was a critical one to the future 
direction of the district. 
A majority formed by the added vote of this appoint-
ment, for instance, could give the district's deseg-
regation pI.ogram a radically new direction • • • But 
the fight for the majority-making vote--nothing less 
than a struggle for the control of school district 
policy--is on. Next week will tell which voting 
bloc--the traditionally pro-superintendent trium-
virate or the newer, more critical members of the 
board=~will claim the balance of power in the future. 
(Willamette Week, 8/13/79, p. 1) 
The candidacy of the black co-chairperson of the Coalition 
and now a leader in the Black United Front boycott received 
endorsements from the Oregonian, Willamette Week, -and the 
Portland Observer. (Portland Observer, 8/9/79) On 
August 13, 1979, before an audience of 200 citizens, the 
board appointed the Coalition co-chairperson and then 
heard its most veteran member immediately announce his 
resignation, creating anc)ther vacancy on the board. 
"It's a whole new ball game now," said one member of 
the audience as the reconstituted board began dealing with 
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a response to the demands of the BUF (Oregonian, 8/15/79, 
p. F1). The new members (two elected, one appointed) plus 
the one member already supportive of the Coalition, gave 
the new majority to ~~e board. (Note: The additional 
vacancy on the board was not filled until after September, 
1979, when a young woman, active in city-wide youth affairs, 
was appointed.) 
On August 28, 1979, after lengthy negotj.:'I.tions between 
the Black United Front and the boar~, the school board 
voted to change the district's long-standing desegregation 
policy. An Oregonian editorial described the board's 
actions. 
:rhe School Board's plan responds positively to almost 
all published objectives of the coalition seeking 
to end isolation of blacks in public schools and 
fragmentation of black communities as a result of 
school policies. 
Many of the remedies can begin without delay. For 
example, additional grades would be added at Eliot 
and Humboldt schools, which are early childhood 
centers; 351 black students who have no assigned 
middle schools will be able to choose among three in 
North and Northeast Portland; and parents whose chil-
dren are in the district's Administration Tra.nsfer 
Program will be notified immediately that their 
children can return to the neighborhood primary, mid-
dle or high school. 
Other changes that will tar~ longer: developing 
a comprehensive plan on all aspects of the integra-
tion program; planning and implementing one, and 
perhaps two, middle schools in Albina; and creating 
a broadly based monitoring group to serve as the 
voice of parents and children who may experience 
difficulty in receiving equitable treatment. 
The central points, though, are that the School 
Board, by its actions, has acknowledged that the 
system has been unfair in the burdens blacks have 
had to shoulder in desegregation and has moved 
strongly--not in a token fashion--to remedy the 
injustices. (8/30/79, p. B6) 
The black community responded by deferring the boycott to 
allow the district time to implement its decisions. As 
school opened, 300 black students left the Administrative 
Transfer program and returned to inner-city schools. 
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(Oregonian; 9/5/79) The new policy, freedom of choice for 
black children, was greeted by black BUF members as the 
"beginning of a new day." 
The formal rules had been changed, not by the persua-
sive tactics of the Coalition, but by the direct action 
tactics--a proposed boycott--by the BUF. The Coalition 
never resumed an active role with the district and in 
June, 1980 formally dissolved as an organization. It 
divided its remaining funds in a way that reflected the 
pluralistic diversity of the Coalition--half went to 
establish an dward for the new middle school students who 
wrote the best essay on integration, and the other half 
to the BUF to continue its work for educational change. 
(Coalition minutes, 6/3/80) 
CHAPTER VII 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss t.he appli-
cability of the dissatisfaction theory of governance to 
a theory of educational policy intervention and the contri-
butions of the findings from this case study to a theory 
of pclicy intervention by citizen advocacy groups. 
The problem statement which generated this study 
of policy intervention by a citizen's advocacy organization 
was "How do citizens intervene in the policy process to 
address perceived inequities?" It is recognized that there 
are others who can and do intervene in the policy process, 
but the focus of this study was on citizen action as an 
intervention strategy. The dissatisfaction theory of 
governance was the framework to analyze the developmental 
process of citizen dissatisfaction. What does this 
theoretical framework contribute towards an understanding 
of citizen intervention in the policy process? 
Dissatisfaction Theory of Governance 
The findings of the study support Iannaccone and 
Lutz's dissatisfaction theory of governance as a way of 
explaining the .developmental process of citizen 
.1 
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dissatisfaction with school desegregation policy in Portland 
from 1963 to 1977. (See Chapter I, Theory Framework, 
p. 26.) The school board, the legal authority, made its 
initial commitment to desegregation with its acceptance 
of the Schwab committee report and the initiation of Model 
Schools and Administrative Transfer programs. In 1970, 
the board and superintendent did alter elements of the 
desegregation plan with the Schools for the 70s plan. That 
plan reorganized the district, converted schools in Early 
Childhood Centers, middle schools, and later, magnet high 
school programs. A critical part of reorganization was 
the establishment of Area Citizen Advisory Committees. 
There is some evidence that from 1965 to 1977 the 
board and district became closed to outside criticism and 
suggested changes in the desegregation programs. In 1969, 
two groups, the Model Cities Education Committee and the 
Citizens Committee for Better Schools, both urged the 
board to adopt a cross-busing plan and to give citizens 
a stronger role in the school decision-making process. 
The Area Citizen Advisory Committees can be seen as the 
board's response to their recommendations, but the ACACs 
did not have the degree of autonomy and independence that 
the community groups had recommended (Oregonian, 1/13/69, 
p. 16; 3/15/70, p. 34). 
The failure of the tax levies and community opposition 
to middle schools made the district more dependent on policy 
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changes that lay within its sphere of operations. T~e 
exception was the Early Childhood Centers, which did require 
citizen consent. The district conducted no evaluations 
of any of its desegregation programs. It relied on the 
area citizen advisory committees for community input. There 
is research by Gittell (1979) and others (Boyd and 
Shea, 1975) suggesting that the presence of advisory 
committees serves to buffer sc~ool policy makers from 
parents' interest groups. 
Gittell, for example, found that in those school 
systems in which mandated advisory committees were 
present, administrators restricted their contacts 
with the public to such groups. They defended this 
practice with the claim that such committees were, 
after all, representative of parents. 
The buffering effect is not limited to the beha-
vior of school administrators. Frieburger's (1976) 
study of school governance in a m~dium-size Massa-
chusetts city revealed that school boards were three 
times more likely to consider presentations made 
by school advisory councils than voluntary parents' 
organizations. (Davies and Zerchykov, 1981, 
pp. 287-88) 
The strongest indicator of the board and district's 
attitude toward external questioning of its desegregation 
policy was their reaction to community opposition over 
the Boise-King redistricting plan in June-July 1977. 
Newspaper coverage of the board meetings and interviews 
with board, district, and Coalition members for the purposes 
of this case study all attested to the feelings of anger 
and resentment on the part of the board, district, and 
community members alike. The corr~unity, in particular 
members of the black community, were upset that they had 
not been consulted before the policy was proposed. 
Part of the ill feeling comes from the way the 
school board has handled the proposal. The plan 
was announced without consulting beforehand the 
community immediately affected or the community 
at large, both of which have much at stake in the 
vitality of city schools. (Oregon Journal, 
7/20/77, Editorial) 
The board and district's response was described in an 
Oregonian article: 
In a comment interpreted by many as a slap in the 
face at dissenting citizens, the superintendent 
said he was 'very troubled when influential groups 
and individuals take exception to proposals based 
on the amount of criticism voiced rather than on 
the merits of the issue.' (Oregonian, 7/26/77, 
p. AI) 
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Some community members, later Coalition participants r said 
their motivation to join the Coalition and to work for 
changes in the school desegregation poli~y stemmed from 
the board and district's disrespectful attitude, as evi-
denced at the July 25, 1977, board meeting. (Interviews, 
6/12/80, 7/21/80, 7/24/80, 7/25/80b) 
In addition to the gradual closing of the system 
to external questic~s and criticism, two other factors 
need to be examined. These factors are the changes in 
the community's view of desegregation and demographic 
changes in the school-aged population. 
The black community from 1965 to 1970 objected to 
the Model Schools program because it did not desegregate 
the schools. ~he implementation of the Schools for the 
I -. 
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70s plan began to reduce the percentage of students in 
racially isolated schools. The percentage of black students 
in Albina grade schools after their conversion to Early 
Childhood Centers did decline, e.g., Humboldt grade school 
before conversion was 87% and after conversion was 51% 
(Oregonian, 11/12/78, p. Bl). 
With the conversion of Albina grade schools to Early 
Childhood Centers, the practices of school desegregation 
began to impact the black community's view of desegregation. 
Early Childhood Centers may have improved the educational 
program at local schools and attracted some white students, 
but it cost the neighborhood their grade schools. There 
were incidents where black children could not attend the 
cent~rs because all the spaces for all local children were 
filled (Interview, 7/16/80a). Administrative transfer 
children told their parents of racial incidents on the 
bus, in school, and after school at their receiving schools. 
Some parents became disillusioned with the Administrative 
Transfer program, as their children did not have successful 
experiences at these new schools. These were concerns 
of black parents as they comprised the majority of Adminis-
trative Transfer students. People began to question if 
busing was enough or if the quality of education at the 
receiving schools should not be examined. 
This questioning of busing and the doubts about 
desegregation did not develop in isolation. Nationally, 
President Nixon had expressed opposition to busing and 
major media sources had covered the community of Boston's 
opposition to school busing. Throughout the country, 
blacks realized it was mainly they who got on the bus, 
not whites. Ironically, the Early Childhood Education 
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Centers were attracting whites, but they were also a symbol 
to the black community in Portland of a school system that 
changed. black neighborhood schools, but not other areas 
of the city. As the Office -of Civil Rights noted in its 
1977 report on School Desegregation in Portland, Oregon, 
Another problem area rests with the continuing 
feeling among some members of the minority popu-
lation that the burden of the desegregation 
process has been borne by minorities. (p. 14) 
Between 1970 and 1977, the percentage of black stu-
dents in the school system doubled due to a decline in 
white student enrollment. The major factor in that decline 
was that families were choosing homes in the suburbs rather 
than the city. The city population was increasingly elderly 
and young adults (Portland Mobility Survey, 1978). Budget 
constraints were another factor in the slow development 
of desegregation programs, especially middle schools and 
magnet high schools. 
Another factor during the time period of 19iO-77 
was changes in the politics of the City of Portland. 1974 
saw the election of a young mayor who was committed to 
citizen involvement in community development projects. 
1 
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Many people worked on his grass-roots election campaign 
and then continued their involvement in neighborhood asso-
ciations, community block grant projects, crime prevention, 
and economic development projects. There was a cadre of 
experienced organizers available to become involved in 
local issues (Interview, 4/18/80). 
All these factors contributed to the development 
of community dissatisfaction with the school desegregation 
policy. The next stage in Iannaccone and Lutz's theory 
on the formation of public opposition then leads to school 
board· incumbent defeat. Next, how does public opposition 
form? It is at the point of intervention that the find-
ings of this case study provide some insight into the 
conditions necessary for policy intervention by citizen 
advocacy groups. 
The critical factors for the formation of the Coal i-
tion and its subsequent intervention were the timeliness 
of the issue, available leadership, financial resources, 
and the potential of the group to generate support. David 
Truman (1950), an advocate of a system equilibrium model 
of government, "believes interest groups arise in an effort 
to establish a new homeostasis whenever the stability of 
a system has been disturbed. It is the disturbance that 
creates the interest group" (Education and Urban Policy, 
p. 156). 
172 
Critical Issue and Timing 
The disturbance was the community's reaction to the 
Boise-King redistricting plan. Up until June, 1977, the 
community believed that the board was following a desegre-
gation plan, adopted in 1970, even if it affected black 
schools more than white schools. The Boise-King plan 
impacted the black community and some segments of the white 
co~~unity in several ways: 
1. It was the first decision based solely on race. 
Jefferson was over 50% black, therefore, graduates of two 
primarily black grade schools would no longer be able to 
attend it. 
2. The board did ~ot act according to its cesegre-
gation plan, which invC'lved ECECs i middle schools, and 
magnet high school prosrams. 
3. The community reacted negatively to the manner 
in which the board handled the proposed policy change 
because the community was not asked for their opinion 
beforehand (Interviews, 6/12/80, 7/21/80, 7/25/80d, 
8/20/80, 9/15/80). 
Another factor in motivating citizens to act is a 
crisis situation. One characteristic about schools is 
that information about school issues is not widely avail-
able. 
! .' 
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The kind of information which can mobilize a poten-
tial interest into an actual group only occurs in 
cases of institutional crisis in schooling - such 
as desegregation or school' closures due to declining 
enrollment. Parental reactions tend to be after 
the fact, reactive and negative and episodic. 
(Davies and Zerchykov, 1981, p. 187) 
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The community perceived there was a crisis in policy-making. 
The board and district denied that it was a crisis and 
seemed surprised by the community opposition (Portland 
Observer, 7/21/77; Interviews, 6/2/80, 8/12/80, 8/27/80, 
9/8/80). The board became defensive and finally, out of 
frustration, they asked several community groups to develop 
a better plan for Jefferson. 
Leadership, Resources, and 
Organizational Support 
After the community dissatisfaction emerged, there 
were three factors which helped the Coalition develop as 
an ad hoc, temporary group. First, the issue was important 
to several human relations, civil rights, and education 
advocacy groups in Portland. These organizations and their 
leaders were committed to act on the Boise-King proposal. 
Second, these organizations provided some financial resour-
ces and helped the Coalition obtain its own funding. Third, 
these established groups gave credibility to the fledgling 
Coalition. They sent out the first mailing to approximately 
500 people in August, 1977. Slightly over 100 people came 
to the first organizational meeting of the Coalition, 
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september 1, 1977. The initial group of organizations 
attracted other organizations with power and influence 
plus some high status individual members (Coalition member-
ship lists; Intervie\tTs ,6/17 /80b, 6/19/80b). The Coalition 
was able to generate support from various groups, ranging 
from the Chamber of Commerce to the PTA. Finally, it 
obtained its own staff and, titrough funding from the city, 
county, school district, and private sources, sustained 
an eighteen-month research project. 
In summary, the conditions that produced the policy 
intervention by a citizen's advocacy group were the timeli-
ness of a critical issue, available leadership, financial 
resources, staff, and support from organizations and people 
who had established credibility. This finding is consistent 
with other research which identifies the "backing of soli-
darity interest groups as a major source of power with 
which to induce social change" !Dubey, 1972, p. 231). A 
similar finding is that "money, time, criticalness of issue 
and coalitions were the conditions under which citizen 
participation could improve the responsiveness of an agency 
to the aims of particular groups" (May, 1971, p. 40). 
DIS/ID/STO/OS, the dissatisfaction theory, seeks 
to explain the political change and adaptation of the school 
organization due to citizen dissatisfaction. DIS is evi-
dence of community changed dissatisfaction reflected in 
voting behavior leading next to incumbent scheol board 
, 11' 
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member defeat (ID), followed within two years by involuntary 
superintendent turnover (STO) and outside succession (OS). 
The study of the Coalition finds that policy-makers 
who do not address citizen dissatisfaction with certain 
educational practices can lead to the community's readiness 
to intervene. The outcome of community intervention in 
Iannaccone and Lutz's model is change in the political 
process--incumbent defeat. Two researchers who applied 
the dissatisfaction theory to an analysis of 104 Southern 
California school board elections, concluded: 
Based upon our findings, it appears that it is appro-
priate to equate democratic control over school policy 
with these episodes of electoral instability arising 
from voter dissatisfaction with incumbent school 
board members. Further evidence is needed to see 
if citizens change their orientation toward the 
schools during the period immediately prior to the 
onset of an incumbent defeat period. 
They hypothesize that "it may take a period of 
10-16 years after demographic and ideological changes 
in a district, for school board member defeat and 
superintendent turnover to emerge. (Criswell and 
Mitchell, 1980, p. 209) 
The community's expression of dissatisfaction during June-
July, 1977 did not lead directly to incumbent defeat, but 
to the formation of the Coali-tion and their subsequent 
intervention in the policy process. 
To test the Criswell and Mitchell hypothesis on the 
Portland situation, it was fifteen years from 1962, when 
the NAACP first challenged the district to end "de facto" 
school segregation, until 1977 and the community dissatis-
faction evidenced itself in its resistance to the Boise-King 
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plan. Two years later, in April, 1979, two incumbent school 
board members were defeated. The Coalition challenged 
the board's desegregation policy and made the public aware 
that desegregation was a critical issue in the community. 
The board and district's credibility was qu~stioned in 
the process. The actions of the Coalition focused public 
attention on the critical nature of the desegregation issue. 
It made the school board accountable for the policy impact 
of its desegregation decisions. The proximity of this 
public attention to the scheo1 board elections influenced 
the voting public to make some changes on the board. 
The research of Criswell and Mitchell (1980) called 
for further evidence to identify when citizens change their 
orientation toward the schools. The actions of the Coali-
tion between 1977 and 1979 suggest that intervention by 
a community organization in the policy process may be an 
intervening variable in the stages of dissatisfaction. 
The Coalition was a critical factor in focusing public 
attention on the board which resulted in incumbent defeat. 
In the case of Portland,community dissatisfaction led to 
intervention which then resulted in voting behavior leading 
to incumbent board member defeat. 
The Coalition was successful as a citizen advocacy 
organization in several important ways, as discussed in 
previous sections. It mobilized people, financial resour-
ces, its own staff, other organizations, and the media. 
· , ! 
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The lack of these elements is a serious constraint to most 
citizen organizations. As one reseQ~cher observed, 
"resource-poor groups are unlikely to secure the control 
they need over resources sufficient to alter the pattern 
of benefits that they receive from the political system" 
(May, 1971, p. 46). 
Not only was the Coalition able to build an organi-
zational structure, but it had some success in raising the 
issue of school desegregation before the entire community. 
The Oregonian, the major newspaper in Portland, Oregon, 
had a two-week series on the issues the Coalition addressed 
in its final report (November, 1978). All the local tele-
vision stations as well as other newspapers gave the Coal i-
tion's final presentations front-page coverage for over a 
month and television news editorials. 
The Coalition was unable to change the desegregation 
policy in the manner it had planned. There were two major 
factors which served as constraints: reform model of change 
and the political environment. 
Theoretical Implications for Polipy'_.Intervention 
By Citizen A~.vocacy Groups 
One year after the Coalition's intervention, a Coal i-
tion spokesman, during an interview, commented: 
We made one chief error. Once we delivered the 
report to the board, we did not plan for the strug-
gle we needed to get it through the political 
I 
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process. But for all its lack of political savvy. 
• • • the Coalition was no failure. It proved for 
the first time that blacks and whites could work 
together in Portland without the blacks' selling 
out. I think the Coalition's success is told in 
the rise of the Black United Front. (Willamette 
W~~k, 11/11/79, p. A4) 
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The primary lesson to be drawn from the Coalition's inter-
vention is that social reform strategies should not be 
used when the political and social realities call for 
radical political change. The Coalition is an example of 
the liberal reform model of social change. Coalition 
members looked to the past and saw the success of the Schwab 
committee, a board-appointed, blue-ribbon committee of the 
1960s. Many :)f the Coalition members were from the Port-
land liberal establishment, like the Schwab committee, and 
had easy access to the school board and superintendent. 
For example, Schools for the City, a major participant in 
the Coalition, had monthly meetings with the superintendent 
to discuss school-community issues. Many Coalition members 
also were active in the election of the liberal mayor in 
1974. Both black and white members of the Coalition had 
used social reform techniques to accomplish political and 
social changes in Portland. They believed the same tech-
niques would work in the desegregation issue. 
The Coalition did not analyze the nature of the 
issue, its organizational constituencies, and the. political 
environment in its policy intervention. The issue of 
school desegregation was and is a controversial policy. 
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Nationwide, the media has provided the public with images 
of Boston riots, Los Angeles school board law suits oppos-
ing court-ordered desegregation, and buses burning in 
Pontiac, Michigan. Locally, the Portland school board 
and superintendent were proud of the dGsegregation plan 
which had not provoked white flight or public discussion. 
They were committed to its maintenance. 
The Coalition did attract a diverse group of individ-
uals and organizations, but failed to obtain support from 
the business and political constituences. Kirby (1973) 
fO'Jnd'that the business community and mayor's support were 
critical factors in successful school desegregation plans 
in northern cities. seattle school district, in changing 
its desegregation plan from voluntary to mandatory, received 
strong support from the downtown business community and 
the mayor's office. The Coalition did try to gain support 
from these two constituencies. However, the liberal mayor 
was conspicuously silent and the business community pro-
vided some financial assistance, but no strong, visible 
support. 
Third, the Coalition misread the political environ-
ment for school desegregation. The Coalition knew who the 
critical actors were but did not apply sufficient political 
pressure to gain their support. The Coalition b~~ieved 
the political environment was liberal reformist and, thus, 
it relied on reformist tactics. Because it used only 
reform tactics, it was unable to convince the board to 
change the desegregation plan. Part of its failure lies 
in its unwillingness to use direct action tactics. 
The Coalition was just that--a coalition of people 
who had different reasons for wanting to change the 
desegregation policy. Some of the people were unwilling 
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to consider direct action tactics; lawsuits or other more 
political forms of change. These were the people who had 
successfully accomplished change through reform tactics. 
Others less successful with reform tactics urged confronta-
tion and direct action. During the final days in November, 
1978, as the Coalition struggled to make its final recom-
mendations, an uneasy compromise was reached. The Coali-
tion called for an extensive school pairing plan which 
satisfied members' insistence on equity in the plan, but 
the plan was to be presented in the final report. There 
were no strategies developed if the research and recommen-
dation approach, a reformist tactic, did not work. The 
plan called for radical changes but was delivered in a 
reformist style. 
Local school district politics demonstrates the 
nature of political decision-making in Portland. The 
Coalition documented the inequity of Portland's school 
desegregation plan in practice, but was unable to change 
it. It took political and direct action intervention 
tactics to chan.ge the plan. The Black United Front, a 
. ,' 
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black advocacy group, assessing the political environment 
in the city of Portland as racist and resistant to change, 
selected direct action intervention tactics. What the 
Coalition was unable to accomplish with its reform tactics, 
the Black United Front accomplished with a threatened boy-
cott and use of the Coalition's research. The election 
and appointment of four new board members between April 
and September, 1979 was the other major factor contributing 
to the new board's willingness to change the desegregation 
plan. 
'A brief review of the events in school district poli-
tics sinc~ September, 1979 indicates how changes are made 
in educational policy. The Coalition's recommendation on 
school pairing was unacceptabl~ because the white estab-
1ishment did not want its children to be bused to black 
schools and they feared white flight with a two-way busing 
plan. Racism is not overt, but more subtle in Portland • 
In the Spring of 1980, when the "new board" fired the 
superintendent, the business-professional establishment 
began a recall movement to remove the four members who 
made the termination decision. Although unsuccessful with 
the recall, the establishment forces formed a citizen 
committee to raise funds and to select appropriate candi-
dates for the school board election in March, 1981. Two 
of their candidates were successful. The only black school 
board member, f.ormerly of the Coalition, was reelected, 
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but with less than fifty percent of the vote. Of the three 
other votes to terminate the superintendent, one member did 
not run for reelection, one board member was defeated, and 
the third member was not up for reelection and remains on 
the board. This election leaves only two of the new board 
and it seems as if the power of the board has returned to 
representation of the interests of the white business-
professional establishment. 
In summary, citizen aevocacy groups, to be effective, 
must be flexible about strategies and tactics, but more 
importantly must analyze the political environment of the 
issue as to how eecisions are made. If the citizen advo-
cacy group is a coalition, it should decide early in its 
life whether to seek consensus on its intervention tactics 
or to pursue separate but mutually supportive tactics, 
which recognize the differen·~ viewpoints and strengths of 
its members. Lastly, as tha Coalition spokesperson indi~ 
cated, the Coalition did not plan for the struggle to get 
its plan through the political process. Citizen groups 
must be prepared for the process of change to take a long 
time and to have the endurance to accomplish its goals. 
Areas for Future Research 
One limitation to this study of a policy intervention 
by a citizen advocacy group was the time limit. This study 
covered a two-~ear period concluding with the board's 
decision to change the district's desegregation plan in 
September, 1979. There is a need for a longitudinal 
analysis of citizen advocacy intervention in the community 
change process. Such a study should evaluate the imple-
mentation of a decision, as well as the impact of the 
decision itself. For example, this study is unable to 
evaluate the long-term effects of the policy intervention 
which still is affecting the district. There have been a 
series of unintended and intended consequences from the 
policy intervention: the new desegregation plan adopted in 
March~ 1980, the firing of the superintendent in June, 
1980, a boycott by the Black United Front in Spring, 1980, 
and a recall mov~ment in the Summer of 1980. One indica-
tion of the reverberation of policy decisions is confirmed 
in the work of Crisswell and Mitchell (1980) who indicate 
that periods of electoral instability may last for eight 
years after community dissatisfaction emerges in the form 
of incumbent defeat. 
In addition to a longitudinal study of specific 
policy intervention by citizen groups, a comparative study 
of citizen advocacy groups and intervention strategies 
would test the findings of this case study. A study of a 
variety of communities might reveal similar patterns or 
identify new attributes of successful intervention. 
Seattle, for exam~le, which changed its desegregation pro-
gram during the Fall of 1978, had substantial citizen 
! 1 
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intervention that included a successful boycott and a 
threatened court suit. 
Citizen groups continue to be involved in the educa-
tional decision-making process, whether it is as monitors 
in the implementation of programs or as advocates for 
policy in its formation stage (Davies, 1978). 
Cohen (1978) foresees the continuance of citizen 
advocacy organizations. Whether they are official or pri-
vate, they will operate through existing channels of admin-
istration and control, using hearings, studies, litigation, 
and various decision-review processes to achieve their 
objectives. 
Moore (1980) explains why advocacy groups will con-
tinue to be a factor in the educational decision-making 
process. 
Child advocacy has developed as one response to 
breakdowns in the implementation of educational 
programs for children at risk. Advocates argue 
that implementation failures occur because laws are 
not vigorously enforced, because rigid organiza-
tions continue old habits in the face of new pro-
gram ideas, because political pressures at various 
points in the implementation process dash the 
promise of new programs. They argue that reforms 
will improve services to children on a wide scale 
only when vigorous independent organizations press 
the educational system to carry them out at each 
point in the implementation process, in each 
important ~ctivity in the network of activities 
that shapes s2rvices to children. (pw 7) 
Further research is needed to test the relation of 
these various factors such as focus in advocacy, perma-
nency, multiple intervention strategies to different kinds 
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of organizations in varying political settings. A compari-
son of ad hoc, temporary self-initiated groups with mandated 
citizen groups is needed. Gittell (1978) observes that 
unfortunately there have been no sophisticated evaluations 
comparing the role of mandatory organizations under federal 
programs with self-initiated groups (1/78, p. 5). 
Davies (1978), Gittell (1978), and Moore (1980) all 
call for a strengthening of citizen-initiated, private, 
voluntary groups concerned about the schools. 
It is clear • • • that citizen-initiated community 
organizations are more likely to reflect the 
diversity of community interests than organiza-
tions mandated by government agencies. There is 
evidence that they are more aggressive and often 
more successful than government-sponsored community 
groups. They are more able than government-
initiated groups to articulate community interests 
and place issues on the local political agenda. 
(Davies, 1/78, pp. 13-14) 
This case study of the Coalition demonstrates some 
of the limits to effective policy intervention by a citizen 
advocacy group. However, citizen advocacy groups do inter-
vene in the policy process. They can affect the policy 
outcomes. The Coalition is evidence of a specific kind of 
policy intervention. Other citizen groups intervening in 
other fields of interest need to be studied to see if they 
demonstrate the same pattern of intervention strategies. 
. ~ 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
What were the events that led to the formation of 
the coalition? 
Why did a coalition form in the summer of 1977? 
How did it become a coalition? 
What was the goal of the coalition? 
What were the specific complaints of the black commu-
nity about Portland's desegregation effort? 
What strategies did CCSI adopt to change the 
situation? 
How were these strategies selected? 
What other strategies were considered? 
How would you characterize your role in CCSI? 
Activist 
Advocate 
Agitator 
Broker 
Negotiator 
Coalition Builder 
Researcher 
Fact-Gathering Analyst 
Facilitator 
*Other: Please talk about what you did. 
I 
198 
In your opinion, di& CCSI have support of community 
groups? If so, which ones? How did they demonstrate their 
support? 
Were there others who were not supportive? If so, 
how did they not show support? 
What was your view of school board members on the 
issue of school desegregation in 1977 when CCSI began? 
Did your view change during life of CCSI? If yes, when 
and why? What was new view? 
What was your view of school administration (central) 
on issue of school desegregation in 1977? Did your view 
change? If yes, why and when? What was new view? 
Which constituency or community grpup (S) was CCSI 
trying to help? 
How do conflicting groups work out their different 
interests in Portland? 
Was the CCSI a special interest group or representa-
tive of more general community concern - i.e. public 
interest? 
When the coalition made its final report to the school 
board 12/78 and major recommendation on school pairing 
was not accepted, what direction did CCSI take? 
What were the critical events in the life of the 
coalition? 
Is there anything that I have not asked you that 
you think is very important to know about the coalition? 
(success, failure, contribution, lasting impact) 
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APPENDIX B 
INFORMED CONSENT RELEASE 
I, , hereby agree to be 
interviewed in ~he dissertation research on the role of 
ci tizen advocar.;;y groups in educational policy-making -
specific~!l~, the Community Coalition for School Integra-
tion. This research project is being conducted by Patricia 
J. Rumer, doctoral candidate in the School of Urban Affairs, 
Portland State University. 
I understand that the study involves a discussion 
of t.he events during the life of the CoalH:ion and my view 
of them. It has been explained to me that the purpose 
of the study is to learn how citizen advocacy groups can 
intervene to change or affect the implementation of specific 
educational policies in local school districts, and second, 
to assess the effectiveness of such an intervention. 
I may not receive any direct benefit from partici-
pation in this study, but my participation may help to 
increase knowledge which may benefit others in the future. 
Patricia J. Rumer has offered to answer any questions I 
may have about the study. I have been assured that all 
information I give will be kept confidential and that the 
identity of all subjects will remain anonymous. 
I have read and understand the foregoing information. 
DATE: SIGNATURE 
If you experience problems that are the result of partici-
pation in this study, please contact Richard Streeter, 
Office of Graduate Studies and Research, 105 Neuberger 
Hall, Portland State University, 229-3423. 
APPENDIX C: KEY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND THREE MODELS 
OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION PRACTICE (Rothman, 196B) 
PRACTICE VARIABLES INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Goal categories of 
community action 
2. Assum~tions concerning 
conununity struc'ture and 
problem conditions 
3. Basic change strategy 
4. Characteristic change 
tactics and techniques 
5. Salient practitioner 
roles 
6. Mediu.'n of cha.'1ge 
7. Orientation toward 
power structure 
8. Boundary definition 
of the conununity client 
system or constituency 
9. Assumption regarding 
interests of community 
subparts 
10. Conception of the 
public interest 
11. Conception of the 
client population or 
conatituency 
12. Conception of client 
role 
"What was the goal of the Coalition? 
·Why did a Coalit:,~on form in the Summer 
of 1977? 
"What were the events that led to the 
formation of the Coalition? 
"What were the specific complaints of 
the black community about Portland's 
desegregation efforts? 
"What strategies did the Coalition adopt? 
"How were these strategies selected? 
"What other strategies were considered? 
·Provide examples of how change tac'tics 
were used. 
"After January, 1979, what direction did 
the Coalition take? 
"How would you characterize your role in 
the Coali tion? 
"Did Coalition have support of conununity 
groups? If yes, which ones? How did they 
demonstrate their support? Were there 
others who were not supportive? If so, 
how did they not show support? 
"What was your view of the school board 
members in 1977 and then in 1979? View 
of school adminstration? 
"Which constituency or community group 
was the Coalition advocating for? 
"How do conflicting groups work out 
their different interests in Portland? 
"Was the Coalition a special interest 
group or representative of more general 
community concern, i.e., the public 
interest 
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APPENDIX D 
CHRONOLOGY OF COALITION ACTIVITIES: September 1977 to September 1979 
Aug. '77 
Decision to form 
broad-based 
Coalition 
Feb. '78 
Research begins 
on deseg. issues 
Media focus on 
forums 
Aug. '78 
Write-up of 
deseg. options 
Feb. '79 
Reorganization 
of CCSI 
OCR complaint 
filed 
CCSI response 
to Board 
Sept. '77 
Organization of 
of Coalition 
March '76 
CCSI report: 
findings of 
forums 
Private fund-
raising 
Sept. '78 
Oct. '77 
Locate funds. 
School give 
access to data 
April '78 
Extend deadline 
of final report 
to 11/78 
Outside firm to 
do survey 
Oct. '78 
Second series of community 
forums 
12 part ~eries 
on CCSI & deseg. 
in Oregonian 
Nov. '77 
Staff hired 
Community 
forums 
May '78 
1st CCSI party 
Board-CCSI 
meetings 
Nov. '78 
CCSI final vote 
on recommen-
dations 
Dec. '77 
Office opens 
Recs. to board 
on Jefferson 
June '78 
Mtgs. with city 
council & county 
commissioners 
Dec. '78 
CCSI presenta-
tion to Board 
Superintendent 
response 
March '79 A,eril '79 May '79 June '79 
CCSI subcommit- HEW visit with School board CCSI planning 
tees appointed CCSI incumbent defeat workshop 
to work with 
Decline in black 
board district 
participation in 
End of CCSI/ OCR Decision 
board meetings 
CCSI visit to CCSI 
Seattle 
August and Se,etember, 1979 
CCSI statement to school board re: 
need for action on desegregation 
Board action: sho~~ & long-term 
resolutions 
Jan. '78 
Board acceptance 
of CCSI recs. 
July '78 
Discussion of 
legal issues 
Survey results 
Jan. '79 
Board rejection 
of school pairing 
CCSI office closes 
loss of staff 
!!!!.!L'79 
Appointment of 
Coalition co-chair 
to school board 
Board member resigns 
BUF call for boycott 
CCSI response to OCR 
I 
APPENDIX E 
"WHAT IS THE COALITION?" JUNE 1978 
PURPOSE OF THE COMMUNITY COALITION FO~ SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 
1. Identifying common concerns in the Portland commu-
nity regarding school desegregation. 
2. Developing the kind of policy recommendations that 
would enhance equal educational opportunity and 
thereby maximize the potential of every student 
to achieve. 
MEMBERSHIP: 104 indivisua1s and 38 organizations repre-
senting parents, teachers, students, administrators, 
businessmen, neighborhood associations, churches and other 
civic groups. 
HISTORY: The Coalition was formed out of community opposi-
tion to proposed Portland School Board policy dealing with 
"racial imbalance" at Jefferson High School. 
On July 25, 1977, the Board asked the NAACP, the 
Urban League of Portland and the Metropolitan Human Relations 
Commission to develop alternative recommendations for addres-
sing the problem of "racial imbalance" at Jefferson. 
These three organizations extended an open invitation 
to any group or individual to participate with them in 
responding to the School Board's proposed policy. 
It soon became apparent that a district wide examin-
ation of desegregation policy was necessary in order to 
adequately consider the problem of "racial isolation" at 
Jefferson. It had been 13 years since the blue ribbon 
study of the Schwab Comrrlitt~~ (1964). 
The Coalition presented its findings on the Jefferson 
attendance area to the School Board on Dec. 15, 1977. (A 
summary is available.) In January, the Board adopted the 
Coalition's recommendation to drop the high school redis-
tricting plan for. the Boise/King araa. 
DISTRICT WIDE EXAMINATION OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: The 
Coalition held 15 COMMUNITY FORUMS to give information 
and hear the concerns of the citizens. A press conference 
detailing the results of the Forums was held on March 31, 
19;8. . (A summary is available.) 
and The RESEARCH COMMITTEE is gathering information 
studying these areas relevant to school desegregation in 
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Portland: 
1. 
2. 
Hil5tory of School Desegregation Efforts in Portland 
Analysis of Current Desegregation Efforts in 
Portland. 
A. Programs 
B. Legal Issues 
C. Resource Allocation 
D. Population and Housing Trends 
E. Economic Trends 
3. Analysis of School Desegregation in Other Cities 
The Coalition is conducting a SURVEY of parents, 
students, teachers, and principals connected with the Admin-
istrative Transfer Program,. Early Childhood Education 
Centers and High School Magnet Programs. A prof'3ssional 
research firm will conduct interviews of parents and princi-
pals and analyze the results of all the surveys. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: Plans and recommendations for 
school integration will be formulated within the Coalition 
and presented to the School Board in November 1978. 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT: The Coalition has received financial 
support from the Portland School District, City of Portland, 
Multnomah County, the business community and the individuals 
and organizations that make up its membership. 
Coalition meetings are open. Call the office for 
information. 
The following groups and organizations are members 
of the Community Coalition for School Integration: 
ALBINA ACTION CENTER, INC. CITIZENS FOR CHILDREN 
ALBINA MINISTERIAL ALLIANCE CITIZENS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 
BOISE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY EDUCA-
TION FOR ALL CHILDREN 
BRIDLEMlLE SCHOOL P.T.A. 
CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION 
CHURCH WOMEN UNITED 
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF ALBINA 
COMMUNITY 
CONCORDIA COMMUNITY ASSO-
CIATION 
ECUMENICAL MINISTRIES OF 
OREGON 
FIGHTBACK 
HEALTH HELP CENTER, INC. 
OREGON MINORITY EDUCATORS 
ORGANIZATION 
OREGON SOCIALIST WORKERS 
PARTY 
PORTLAND ACTION COMMITTEE 
JEFFERSON DAD'S CLUB TOGETHER 
KING IMPROVEMENT ASSOCI- PORTLAND ASSOCIATION OF 
ATION TEACHERS 
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LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS PORTLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
MARSHALL HIGH SCHOOL PORTLAND COUNCIL P.T.A. 
COMMUNITY COUNCIL 
PORTLAND FEDERATION OF 
METROPOLITAN HUMAN RELA'l'IONS TEACHERS 
COMMISSION 
SABIN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE SCHOOLS FOR THE CITY 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF S.E. YOUTH SERVICE CENTER 
CHRISTIANS AND JEWS 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH 
WOMEN 
N.E. COALITION OF NEIGHBOR-
STUDENT COALITION AGAINST 
RACISM 
THE URBAN LEAGUE OF PORTLAND 
HOODS VANCOUVER AVENUE FIRST 
BAPTIST CHURCH 
OREGON ASSOCIATION OF COLORED 
WOMEN'S CLUBS WILSON HIGH SCHOOL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE 
